From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 00:57:31 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA38D9ABAC4; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 00:57:31 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (gate2.funkthat.com [208.87.223.18]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "gold.funkthat.com", Issuer "gold.funkthat.com" (not verified)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BD86DDAF; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 00:57:31 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6S0vUQD075299 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 17:57:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: (from jmg@localhost) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5/Submit) id t6S0vUdG075298; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 17:57:30 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg) Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 17:57:30 -0700 From: John-Mark Gurney To: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org, freebsd-net@FreeBSD.org Subject: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... Message-ID: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 9.1-PRERELEASE amd64 X-PGP-Fingerprint: 54BA 873B 6515 3F10 9E88 9322 9CB1 8F74 6D3F A396 X-Files: The truth is out there X-URL: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/ X-Resume: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/resume.html X-TipJar: bitcoin:13Qmb6AeTgQecazTWph4XasEsP7nGRbAPE X-to-the-FBI-CIA-and-NSA: HI! HOW YA DOIN? can i haz chizburger? User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (gold.funkthat.com [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 17:57:30 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 00:57:32 -0000 Upon doing some investigation, I have found that the SKIPJACK IPsec encryption mode was never standardized. It was a draft[1] back in 1999, but never made into an offical RFC, and IANA nor IETF never assigned an offical number for the mode. Skipjack is also a very weak cipher[2]. The largest key it supports is 80bits, which is really too weak for modern usage. FreeBSD's setkey doesn't support manually keying skipjack, so this means it depends upon a daemon to configure it. It looks like NetBSD has it at the same value (250) as FreeBSD, but OpenBSD has it at 249. So there may be interoperability issues with it. I would like to remove it from HEAD immediately as I don't see a use for it. Some time ago I proposed removing Skipjack from the OCF in 12, but personally, now that I think about how long 12 is, we deprecate these sooner rather than later. P.S. If you want to keep this mode, you have to say you are currently using the mode and include a working sample config. Thanks. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsec-skipjack-cbc-00 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skipjack_(cipher) -- John-Mark Gurney Voice: +1 415 225 5579 "All that I will do, has been done, All that I have, has not." From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 01:24:18 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38F759AC052 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 01:24:18 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jim@netgate.com) Received: from mail-oi0-x22d.google.com (mail-oi0-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c06::22d]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 03EB61A36 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 01:24:17 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jim@netgate.com) Received: by oihq81 with SMTP id q81so61518028oih.2 for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:24:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=netgate.com; s=google; h=content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=8lF11mm1ZiiiXhWEQYkqiLMZJ7eqOt5LqqvpU+GZioY=; b=CG+YqTu2vmQTA4HBEP77Z01iz8BSvd+TMp2L8bD8MgK6/r72FmeHRArvTsse0ePxS2 mbOrk8+jgU/z/gAKwcJRrP9gbbmYoc+DWfalTE7NbhSIulTZ2/Z2MQinKTQeDJv6Dx8x 6aNFk1GREx45NDD5EDz/C7vTZPR1sOGln54IM= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:content-type:mime-version:subject:from :in-reply-to:date:cc:content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references :to; bh=8lF11mm1ZiiiXhWEQYkqiLMZJ7eqOt5LqqvpU+GZioY=; b=cUciydifC8XjOo9v5vlqWmT9vb8J3Q57ipCoZIh9/fJqVO5QK2lKXTspKguGsdUSsR 1WWTutGFwmj2hxnm+DXIozRsFfzv0eqvQhkSvAIpRWf5WE91teb53v3dx5XHU4xxV5xw tjIb4RkdhJfSCW29KBF1Jl/rRhzReIxpI0si89CrDgh6OLyf0jXluAAJWwYxUtwaWxEZ kVi7fIRzJ8zj0hqFSy2osF9XwbOCJ7UB0U2w9vb/TNBrG+BO63J13FwtbcVEPw6lF/J+ CdJYYxhfkCswGtOP7AZtcstoYAdoU2EpXT6VRfK8SHgn7HDLaK51fNBL/JtIh897zAb/ QZrw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmHF8VbA0+s1v5X1EYBlaCN29mPvUFXTktr3nJWzznzYxDARKTzBQktOyJ3VUP4bBQABuLE X-Received: by 10.202.48.22 with SMTP id w22mr29762282oiw.95.1438046657043; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:24:17 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [172.21.0.83] (65-36-83-120.static.grandenetworks.net. [65.36.83.120]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id w7sm11552902obv.6.2015.07.27.18.24.15 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:24:16 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... From: Jim Thompson X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (12H143) In-Reply-To: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 20:24:15 -0500 Cc: "freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org" , "freebsd-net@FreeBSD.org" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> To: John-Mark Gurney X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 03:35:53 +0000 X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 01:24:18 -0000 > On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:57 PM, John-Mark Gurney wrote: >=20 > I would like to remove it from HEAD immediately as I don't see a use > for it. Some time ago I proposed removing Skipjack from the OCF in 12, bu= t personally, now that I think about how long 12 is, we deprecate these soon= er rather than later. Are we also going to comply with RFC 7321? https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7321 From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 03:41:58 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 872479AB19A; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 03:41:58 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (gate2.funkthat.com [208.87.223.18]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "gold.funkthat.com", Issuer "gold.funkthat.com" (not verified)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 682E51E5A; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 03:41:58 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6S3fvQi077558 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 20:41:57 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: (from jmg@localhost) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5/Submit) id t6S3fvrj077557; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 20:41:57 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg) Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 20:41:57 -0700 From: John-Mark Gurney To: Jim Thompson Cc: "freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org" , "freebsd-net@FreeBSD.org" Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... Message-ID: <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 9.1-PRERELEASE amd64 X-PGP-Fingerprint: 54BA 873B 6515 3F10 9E88 9322 9CB1 8F74 6D3F A396 X-Files: The truth is out there X-URL: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/ X-Resume: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/resume.html X-TipJar: bitcoin:13Qmb6AeTgQecazTWph4XasEsP7nGRbAPE X-to-the-FBI-CIA-and-NSA: HI! HOW YA DOIN? can i haz chizburger? User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (gold.funkthat.com [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 20:41:57 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 03:41:58 -0000 Jim Thompson wrote this message on Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 20:24 -0500: > > On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:57 PM, John-Mark Gurney wrote: > > > > I would like to remove it from HEAD immediately as I don't see a use > > for it. Some time ago I proposed removing Skipjack from the OCF in 12, but personally, now that I think about how long 12 is, we deprecate these sooner rather than later. > > Are we also going to comply with RFC 7321? > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7321 Looks like the only thing we need to change to comply w/ RFC7321 is to remove DES support (note to those that don't read closely, DES, not 3DES aka triple-DES), and I am fine removing DES support sooner rather than later... -- John-Mark Gurney Voice: +1 415 225 5579 "All that I will do, has been done, All that I have, has not." From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 06:07:42 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE1BF9AC356; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:07:42 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (gate2.funkthat.com [208.87.223.18]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "gold.funkthat.com", Issuer "gold.funkthat.com" (not verified)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 82C321BEF; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:07:42 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6S67e8H079001 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 23:07:41 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: (from jmg@localhost) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5/Submit) id t6S67exf079000; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 23:07:40 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg) Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 23:07:40 -0700 From: John-Mark Gurney To: Jim Thompson Cc: "freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org" , "freebsd-net@FreeBSD.org" Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... Message-ID: <20150728060740.GP78154@funkthat.com> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 9.1-PRERELEASE amd64 X-PGP-Fingerprint: 54BA 873B 6515 3F10 9E88 9322 9CB1 8F74 6D3F A396 X-Files: The truth is out there X-URL: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/ X-Resume: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/resume.html X-TipJar: bitcoin:13Qmb6AeTgQecazTWph4XasEsP7nGRbAPE X-to-the-FBI-CIA-and-NSA: HI! HOW YA DOIN? can i haz chizburger? User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (gold.funkthat.com [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 23:07:41 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 06:07:42 -0000 Jim Thompson wrote this message on Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 23:18 -0500: > > On Jul 27, 2015, at 10:41 PM, John-Mark Gurney wrote: > > > > Jim Thompson wrote this message on Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 20:24 -0500: > >>> On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:57 PM, John-Mark Gurney wrote: > >>> > >>> I would like to remove it from HEAD immediately as I don't see a use > >>> for it. Some time ago I proposed removing Skipjack from the OCF in 12, but personally, now that I think about how long 12 is, we deprecate these sooner rather than later. > >> > >> Are we also going to comply with RFC 7321? > >> > >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7321 > > > > Looks like the only thing we need to change to comply w/ RFC7321 is > > to remove DES support (note to those that don't read closely, DES, > > not 3DES aka triple-DES), and I am fine removing DES support sooner > > rather than later... > > The RFC 7321 requires it. I???m willing to do the work, but I don???t want it to bikeshed. Requires what? removing DES? That's basicly three lines of code.. Look at: https://github.com/jmgurney/freebsd/commit/a357a3398d8142d698b65f42367f480ec588171c For how I removed Skipjack... Of course there is more work to do in the various utils, like setkey, but shouldn't be hard.. -- John-Mark Gurney Voice: +1 415 225 5579 "All that I will do, has been done, All that I have, has not." From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 04:18:43 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6A429ABC73 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 04:18:43 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jim@netgate.com) Received: from mail-oi0-x22d.google.com (mail-oi0-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c06::22d]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 795061017 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 04:18:43 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jim@netgate.com) Received: by oibn4 with SMTP id n4so62733677oib.3 for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 21:18:42 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=netgate.com; s=google; h=content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=dZq5Pno1bAlZrpY0M5RM4njVE0IMeMYDWTrsmgrlbdg=; b=kAwF6x7VyqQXqjlt+FHJ7ICGMfMMied9PXpX6RFPzAdyEKhdiQBAvDuhLrHiijvlmz Q7Fv2HZRMIPEIgtTPnZwTHwXNaJsnEdftwNnyPgMFUhlUzoNFCWf1Uis/fgms3Eim6cN rmqj4b0LnOUETyyDwhWML9Ul9Rag+hS0xNNeI= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:content-type:mime-version:subject:from :in-reply-to:date:cc:content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references :to; bh=dZq5Pno1bAlZrpY0M5RM4njVE0IMeMYDWTrsmgrlbdg=; b=JDFRvr78uK+Lqh1vNBiY3Mz8HAUifObqsIG0RprAlnAlFgWGFsCC405NqflOnou/RQ u0PV4RwvdcwtRD+ZFIVxazFMenEgiAQuMOIWRDUC+oZFtS7HoimjHvBK1hMG2AjtpTxJ gz3NkozTsRI2ifco/4C4Lo+sFANl5zhez+oMNTaYVfysIGyHK+wFAW4DWyJXiGcbJ25E 673KV8TLuS9I8k29N/Bx1xxJtC7W01R5v546KvsOnTq+yR5hAFzjcB/AGLVXCvc6zokS N8qh70JLp8sUy5CWXqctZY4/N4UYA/UqwUWVQ7chxGosSG1iW4InWq0urZIZwhtYS8W+ bX7A== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQky1MeIRvB03r1tMVYtbuAGMYvBq8DNOKnL3imziqfLQcyaAxQmKu86U1G9kw/g/ygzOLlS X-Received: by 10.202.212.205 with SMTP id l196mr29710400oig.54.1438057122851; Mon, 27 Jul 2015 21:18:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [172.21.0.26] (65-36-83-120.static.grandenetworks.net. [65.36.83.120]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id oy11sm11625499oeb.3.2015.07.27.21.18.41 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Mon, 27 Jul 2015 21:18:41 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2102\)) Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... From: Jim Thompson In-Reply-To: <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 23:18:40 -0500 Cc: "freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org" , "freebsd-net@FreeBSD.org" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> To: John-Mark Gurney X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2102) X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 11:12:35 +0000 X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 04:18:43 -0000 > On Jul 27, 2015, at 10:41 PM, John-Mark Gurney = wrote: >=20 > Jim Thompson wrote this message on Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 20:24 -0500: >>> On Jul 27, 2015, at 7:57 PM, John-Mark Gurney = wrote: >>>=20 >>> I would like to remove it from HEAD immediately as I don't see a use >>> for it. Some time ago I proposed removing Skipjack from the OCF in = 12, but personally, now that I think about how long 12 is, we deprecate = these sooner rather than later. >>=20 >> Are we also going to comply with RFC 7321? >>=20 >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7321 >=20 > Looks like the only thing we need to change to comply w/ RFC7321 is > to remove DES support (note to those that don't read closely, DES, > not 3DES aka triple-DES), and I am fine removing DES support sooner > rather than later... The RFC 7321 requires it. I=E2=80=99m willing to do the work, but I = don=E2=80=99t want it to bikeshed. Jim From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 11:35:44 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B00A9AD898; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 11:35:44 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from Daniel@Plominski.eu) Received: from root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu (root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu [IPv6:2a01:4f8:a0:4283::10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu", Issuer "StartCom Class 2 Primary Intermediate Server CA" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EA810999; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 11:35:43 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from Daniel@Plominski.eu) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58D35AE007A; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:35:39 +0200 (CEST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu Received: from root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id MeuKhM7cMnrS; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:35:38 +0200 (CEST) Received: from [172.31.253.4] (unknown [46.246.49.180]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: daniel@plominski.eu) by root1-rz1-hetzner.plitc.eu (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B23E7AE0074; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:35:37 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55B768DC.6020009@Plominski.eu> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 13:34:52 +0200 From: Daniel Plominski MIME-Version: 1.0 To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, freebsd-net@freebsd.org Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> <20150728060740.GP78154@funkthat.com> In-Reply-To: <20150728060740.GP78154@funkthat.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="jGUuK6UbOa00VscmegvsdeIvUkhoLjqv2" X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 11:35:44 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --jGUuK6UbOa00VscmegvsdeIvUkhoLjqv2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable instead of code to remove it is a better idea manuals to revise, people depend on old recommendations like https://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/ipsec.html would be better: https://blog.plitc.eu/2014/freebsd-10-ipv4-vpn-relay-ipsec-entryopenvpn-m= iddleopenvpn-exit-node-mit-jails/ or the racoon example from: https://blog.plitc.eu/2014/freebsd-10-ipv4-ipsec-net-to-net-vpn-in-der-ja= il/ best regards Daniel --jGUuK6UbOa00VscmegvsdeIvUkhoLjqv2 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJVt2jhAAoJEHqkZNWiQao77nAP/0difbhZBxTb6h6emlCIbuQ7 5YayC7tIyneiFIfYQMd3DjM4kc4B3NLegX2uG/nSUu3VcGGvHK1xpNMhjYsiK9wX viZFrhLwu8YSQuTfp1na+w9znFru+elEImzCdZw++3BLm5eYRAbAUnx3Z0jmicq5 QdrzeCev2dmrV9hTBxJSlOfoZ56DIztgeE2UuwGOXi+ZmFDBqp4ci9LH180OOfNw vd5Lxd/i02ICd7XnPIdCp7Whk0XYPSXrTKNERT5x5GCnkoeOpire0KeYJjsFSx4h mfg8HhE6X3Gz6R6cZ0kHZRu1UFwDIR8MHoJYJ+idTUk/wwRlmdhKRYvHC7Wz66vc TW29ZCdAYLkOUMNN2ndU9speUIzCRP5hFp/HtboE3CViXK5c14caFXSedupd3q0+ 8BRgv6wRfAlrWtpXYyRycJYTIgbZ1Mebshi5NZhiqzJtJ511PWnAJzjd8Ox0a+V6 FuL6rs+k//roKH6sO8kWGgldaM3pc10hwB461KOVgewX0n8bcHxa5rO7oeNqbMr9 27/P+G6059G10XmNUDe2vktBIGQT+yus/OJBg1Ykk4HXy3vyGpWY2PGWW5sV2DHw crld3e4Ud7bzpWGlZxQEk0vcfa9fGwv2Gj9/7U91jFjI6qk8ZEoTzCgWnzXhVIYU YAPR/xTa8UT6k1FSz1kU =hggU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --jGUuK6UbOa00VscmegvsdeIvUkhoLjqv2-- From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 17:23:59 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9577D9ADFF3; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:23:59 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (gate2.funkthat.com [208.87.223.18]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "gold.funkthat.com", Issuer "gold.funkthat.com" (not verified)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 78E232EA; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:23:59 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6SHNwho087955 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:23:58 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: (from jmg@localhost) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5/Submit) id t6SHNv0u087954; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:23:57 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg) Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:23:57 -0700 From: John-Mark Gurney To: Daniel Plominski Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, freebsd-net@freebsd.org Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... Message-ID: <20150728172357.GT78154@funkthat.com> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> <20150728060740.GP78154@funkthat.com> <55B768DC.6020009@Plominski.eu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <55B768DC.6020009@Plominski.eu> X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 9.1-PRERELEASE amd64 X-PGP-Fingerprint: 54BA 873B 6515 3F10 9E88 9322 9CB1 8F74 6D3F A396 X-Files: The truth is out there X-URL: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/ X-Resume: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/resume.html X-TipJar: bitcoin:13Qmb6AeTgQecazTWph4XasEsP7nGRbAPE X-to-the-FBI-CIA-and-NSA: HI! HOW YA DOIN? can i haz chizburger? User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (gold.funkthat.com [127.0.0.1]); Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:23:58 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:23:59 -0000 Daniel Plominski wrote this message on Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 13:34 +0200: > instead of code to remove it is a better idea manuals to revise, people > depend on old recommendations like > https://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/ipsec.html Thanks, I have at least removed the inclusion of des from the cipher suite... If you'd like to generate a patch to update the section w/ references to the below, that would be welcome, and I'll make sure that the changes git committed.. > would be better: > https://blog.plitc.eu/2014/freebsd-10-ipv4-vpn-relay-ipsec-entryopenvpn-middleopenvpn-exit-node-mit-jails/ > > or the racoon example from: > https://blog.plitc.eu/2014/freebsd-10-ipv4-ipsec-net-to-net-vpn-in-der-jail/ > > best regards -- John-Mark Gurney Voice: +1 415 225 5579 "All that I will do, has been done, All that I have, has not." From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 17:26:00 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A83109AC14D; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:26:00 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from adrian.chadd@gmail.com) Received: from mail-ig0-x235.google.com (mail-ig0-x235.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4001:c05::235]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 750E17E9; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:26:00 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from adrian.chadd@gmail.com) Received: by igbij6 with SMTP id ij6so125739389igb.1; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:26:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=JM5x/IFesFIhB23B3FG4lbQXh22p7435zFFbTO3IJA4=; b=O5bqKeSJfzqUnSURlkCKXXntQn75gFGxiatSSGI5YrSUwGJ+waqdlJjbnRz3bBUEjx ePnS9i1KsxIRUQmlvBqbveBm0QUc5qExFsd9vmIOoSc1NAGqAEadTJP79hbBVGf6X7Z3 GMv8jE2V0n6Idi/1lrWfXGqzSz8OsMO1krIFqJY83l1x0bQRwTBsLs/Dgl1oq67IxdnL RZGx+dEoPUgPt7PGkTbmaZhVS+PVfWyUIUZP1Yz24q4Bi860U+GtNwzxKygSk81qA7sn Wtg/tfgX2sac/3k9KMKTsL5SwUhPvpF3whn6A9cewfCYtpmFjksyp2th+9/q2nwKFd/a IFqw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.122.40 with SMTP id lp8mr8905850igb.49.1438104359996; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:25:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.38.133 with HTTP; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:25:59 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <55B768DC.6020009@Plominski.eu> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> <20150728060740.GP78154@funkthat.com> <55B768DC.6020009@Plominski.eu> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 10:25:59 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... From: Adrian Chadd To: Daniel Plominski Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, FreeBSD Net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:38:31 +0000 X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 17:26:00 -0000 Hi, I'd put together a deprecation plan, which starts with the kernel warning that this stuff is being removed, MFC that to stable/10 and stable/9 so people aren't surprised when they upgrade, and then have it removed in 11. -adrian On 28 July 2015 at 04:34, Daniel Plominski wrote: > instead of code to remove it is a better idea manuals to revise, people > depend on old recommendations like > https://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/ipsec.html > > would be better: > https://blog.plitc.eu/2014/freebsd-10-ipv4-vpn-relay-ipsec-entryopenvpn-middleopenvpn-exit-node-mit-jails/ > > or the racoon example from: > https://blog.plitc.eu/2014/freebsd-10-ipv4-ipsec-net-to-net-vpn-in-der-jail/ > > best regards > > Daniel > From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 20:30:26 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47DC79ADD2D for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206c::16:87]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3DADAB95; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1035) id 3C8D41746; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:14.bsdpatch Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20150728203026.3C8D41746@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:14.bsdpatch Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: shell injection vulnerability in patch(1) Category: contrib Module: patch Announced: 2015-07-28 Credits: Martin Natano Affects: FreeBSD 10.x. Corrected: 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-PRERELEASE) 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-BETA2-p2) 2015-07-28 19:59:04 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RC1-p1) 2015-07-28 19:59:11 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p16) CVE Name: CVE-2015-1416 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The patch(1) utility takes a patch file produced by the diff(1) program and apply the differences to an original file, producing a patched version. The patch(1) utility supports certain version control systems, namely SCCS and RCS, and attempts to get or check out the file before applying a patch, if the original file do not already exist. II. Problem Description Due to insufficient sanitization of the input patch stream, it is possible for a patch file to cause patch(1) to run commands in addition to the desired SCCS or RCS commands. III. Impact This issue could be exploited to execute arbitrary commands as the user invoking patch(1) against a specically crafted patch file, which could be leveraged to obtain elevated privileges. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems where a privileged user does not make use of patches without proper validation are not affected. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. A reboot is not required after updating. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install A reboot is not required after updating. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:14/bsdpatch.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:14/bsdpatch.patch.asc # gpg --verify bsdpatch.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/10/ r285976 releng/10.1/ r285978 releng/10.2/ r285979 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.6 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVt+JfAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnmAAP/37DmuKX127SHD4Au3a1xy2F 90RP1doqTzpq2w3wzn8JPPK/IUxG6yjDWUk097/aadSMSiUWi/RyTERe68ZNHDia IkcTnvF1308OM91yAJDogTKyCpomZwWqkhDhT8qRIkRijr7gr0q3SYF2Uqrj+QKy fvhJrEEjhv9Lgw8I1qmnxWCpcmkKaW2Fm1eqplYlPOIwJky+2+Ddzv5PcjtQTjye tNIkF9D+ILmGFbotKbNPDKSxapreLOsyDnf0W9QMURi7UolF9AClZnerfVZUWy78 4lJdbC9q5bf/FNUDv2o928hMgG+cc+blaH8AGXGOgxOx3ok0XWp3xEWRJnggyrZX P6NN39u6yFSIrYaNHEwYLFGCIeA0nGWVLupq5h6WwJ+mhCpHz90kMw/5unlXc/wS mfFVMeoFiqL227qBgB4azQkiBjN/fVsqPcMv/xk0PNYHaRPS/DASRYPSJF2gXY7h fjemohKs9wmyc78nyrnayffPQ6hkXvVzw9zMfLJ1XWg/Fa/5X4u/POggivzGI4ia yrvp3zd4avNbEVwlirTxxYgQJ1X44JwTP3Tkq11fea9WJcJtjLTWpIwrHSd8PHEg n3r4bo52iPyaGORGUw3Zhx93gOse+I3ayXmBEVJLGDONlEdUf/uju0kSIyCXn4ab LvnW7evT5KHA0rh5B07E =JTtx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 20:30:26 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 561839ADD30 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206c::16:87]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B676B99; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1035) id 4A35F1751; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:15.tcp Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20150728203026.4A35F1751@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:15.tcp Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Resource exhaustion in TCP reassembly Category: core Module: inet Announced: 2015-07-28 Credits: Patrick Kelsey (Norse Corporation) Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-PRERELEASE) 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-BETA2-p2) 2015-07-28 19:59:04 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RC1-p1) 2015-07-28 19:59:11 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p16) 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p21) 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p35) CVE Name: CVE-2015-1417 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) of the TCP/IP protocol suite provides a connection-oriented, reliable, sequence-preserving data stream service. The underlying simple and potentially unreliable IP datagram communication protocol may deliver segments out of order, therefore, the TCP receiver would need to reassemble the segments into their original sequence to provide a reliable octet stream. Because the reassembly requires additional resources to keep the queued segments, historically resource exhaustion in the TCP reassembly path has been prevented by limiting the total number of segments that could belong to reassembly queues to a small fraction (1/16) of the total number of mbuf clusters in the system. VNET is a technique to virtualize the network stack, first introduced in FreeBSD 8.0. It changes global resources in the network stack into per network stack resources, so that a virtual network stack can be attached to a jailed prison and the prison can have unrestricted access to the virtual network stack. VNET is not enabled by default and has to be enabled by recompiling the kernel. II. Problem Description There is a mistake with the introduction of VNET, which converted the global limit on the number of segments that could belong to reassembly queues into a per-VNET limit. Because mbufs are allocated from a global pool, in the presence of a sufficient number of VNETs, the total number of mbufs attached to reassembly queues can grow to the total number of mbufs in the system, at which point all network traffic would cease. III. Impact An attacker who can establish concurrent TCP connections across a sufficient number of VNETs and manipulate the inbound packet streams such that the maximum number of mbufs are enqueued on each reassembly queue can cause mbuf cluster exhaustion on the target system, resulting in a Denial of Service condition. As the default per-VNET limit on the number of segments that can belong to reassembly queues is 1/16 of the total number of mbuf clusters in the system, only systems that have 16 or more VNET instances are vulnerable. IV. Workaround FreeBSD 8.x, 9.x and 10.x systems that do not make use of VNETs (option VIMAGE) are not affected. The support has to be specifically compiled into a custom kernel, so its use is not common. For affected systems, the system administrators may consider reducing the net.inet.tcp.reass.maxsegments tunable to the value of kern.ipc.nmbclusters divided by one greater than the total number of VNETs that are going to be used in the system in order to prevent a Denial of Service via this vulnerability. For example, if there are 16 VNETs in the system, the net.inet.tcp.reass.maxsegments tunable should be set to kern.ipc.nmbclusters / 17. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot the system. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install And reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 10.2] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp.patch.asc # gpg --verify tcp.patch.asc [FreeBSD 9.3 and 10.1] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-9.3-10.1.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-9.3-10.1.patch.asc # gpg --verify tcp-9.3-10.1.patch.asc [FreeBSD 8.4] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-8.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-8.patch.asc # gpg --verify tcp-8.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r285977 releng/8.4/ r285980 stable/9/ r285977 releng/9.3/ r285980 stable/10/ r285976 releng/10.1/ r285979 releng/10.2/ r285978 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.6 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVt+FcAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnOAgQAKw0jR1Eb/USmcXlFpfMrmUr Z6UWHsPqE9CwDJaFddrFBRyjCsbeBv4LmPyVcOKJoqspEb8P52GtBNDe9vqcco1U C+KpcQQKWTQmu170AdLAIRVvLjoNEX0C09ig4XMbKpisrmQ8zLXavTbTw8FlbPXq o9t0nFgPKsDfaXJF3Oas41K/NsBj4hdqnfx+R7KeOaJ6sSwiFGbRxqQ+GG3k+79a RI+KVLpw4QV/IkhXKzl416o6uk7eWnJu72GohdrxPvXYWHBVSBkSiT7pLl3O5C7r 7+dpYyF9f4K0gnXLuATNixNS2/lL2WaJANb75ku7WnY2I5Yjx1oM2r5kE2eJ6Z/c WXGnDE9/8SOVURqMwnpQgzVGopKZags0+X7FJAYKeW4/nWyUEAmDlQ+9dY7o/I0M urFD+bsSxnrlGLLzjX55zKM1qyGlhNokowSusVeNlSEOl8/QV57CuyQDZ0wdAiUd R2yl+fFxRKn4AeCMuKkEsoExLhISI7Uuz8Hjia7g0yJWfYjEjAWLcFpan/QmhwcP 4PMg+2ZuPC0uUoXqCMBqu3d0NAaae4cOCzx8WCZUaaF3DwhRnUcld+XesV/h3SNo kn3ygFyOVWrCd7bSsEd00qqUwUN/cp/uYTqlbI9im89Emaa7/mYR/i3sq2/MRagr 2oio8OdZ8wwRuER4Jpq9 =PC1V -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 20:30:26 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 709239ADD39 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206c::16:87]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66A19BA1; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1035) id 65F9F1768; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:17.bind Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20150728203026.65F9F1768@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:17.bind Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: BIND remote denial of service vulnerability Category: contrib Module: bind Announced: 2015-07-28 Credits: ISC Affects: FreeBSD 8.x and FreeBSD 9.x. Corrected: 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p21) 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p35) CVE Name: CVE-2015-5477 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server. II. Problem Description An error in the handling of TKEY queries can be exploited by an attacker for use as a denial-of-service vector, as a constructed packet can use the defect to trigger a REQUIRE assertion failure, causing BIND to exit. III. Impact A remote attacker can trigger a crash of a name server. Both recursive and authoritative servers are affected, and the exposure can not be mitigated by either ACLs or configuration options limiting or denying service because the exploitable code occurs early in the packet handling, before checks enforcing those boundaries. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems that are not running BIND are not vulnerable. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. The named service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is recommended but not required. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install The named service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is recommended but not required. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:17/bind.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:17/bind.patch.asc # gpg --verify bind.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r285977 releng/8.4/ r285980 stable/9/ r285977 releng/9.3/ r285980 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.6 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVt+FdAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnmAQQAK66bHEYirTecgswG+eiePfU lcX46GdLU/OQ/3MHpmc6XQKz9kpJ+Inh8K8IvAJ1SXH41zk/xOtUgqbkUcgkGrS1 gBVKUC8SF82ll/1FUlORoJc+g+TQgax00Il/GweRVoL0RpU9S/YSnc6OLc0nWzBq osweYaHBNRL6lBmUtAHYu1tyvGvHLlfTNk6NCtUxtWeXKe+urYFx4ViJKCU8dJ+U F26nQb/3vH93WOEaNjSDHYWypl9qtous5hpOtXr76ofhID67EyOKmPPEC5+6jP/6 wkdMu7loVewI5K7ZF+zaNxr8CQESurCRkMX3qJSBNCfSw55sdcfKl4BO65SCxLH7 vXoh+B+Wbof2n3xAcEJNufOdiRQfTxlP1UMWIy00wvdB+VcOCDdD7TUB1kksxzpy aXxePRdKLjvkPDiWy17BBpxq8JIfy+41a+N7Fm/hDgUJOYGDAMr27WJLx8MHzY3k +B014IVvTnHkf0yo5ue5raTpgUr0TVCfwD3eqJOM9iUuOI8vj9h44FpP6R8KNyQA mVI/wikVJfYAgmAkHqqRVEHeA8aWJsVNkmrKLHFDkLDdw6umr7oOHfXQo1hk7k7V +2JEa09kp2AYNGYZkiFG/7jiCZ9GLCvAzKW1v1g8fRsBl+QA1PjW0Rg7HcRmZiwM VfNsARSWl2y/t8Gnrfgx =40iD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 20:30:26 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6331F9ADD34 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206c::16:87]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58A5CB9D; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1035) id 58055175C; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:16.openssh Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20150728203026.58055175C@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:30:26 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:16.openssh Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: OpenSSH multiple vulnerabilities Category: contrib Module: openssh Announced: 2015-07-28 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-PRERELEASE) 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-BETA2-p2) 2015-07-28 19:59:04 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RC1-p1) 2015-07-28 19:59:11 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p16) 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p21) 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p35) CVE Name: CVE-2014-2653, CVE-2015-5600 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background OpenSSH is an implementation of the SSH protocol suite, providing an encrypted and authenticated transport for a variety of services, including remote shell access. The security of the SSH connection relies on the server authenticating itself to the client as well as the user authenticating itself to the server. SSH servers uses host keys to verify their identity. RFC 4255 has defined a method of verifying SSH host keys using Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC), by publishing the key fingerprint using DNS with "SSHFP" resource record. RFC 6187 has defined methods to use a signature by a trusted certification authority to bind a given public key to a given digital identity with X.509v3 certificates. The PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) library provides a flexible framework for user authentication and session setup / teardown. OpenSSH uses PAM for password authentication by default. II. Problem Description OpenSSH clients does not correctly verify DNS SSHFP records when a server offers a certificate. [CVE-2014-2653] OpenSSH servers which are configured to allow password authentication using PAM (default) would allow many password attempts. III. Impact A malicious server may be able to force a connecting client to skip DNS SSHFP record check and require the user to perform manual host verification of the host key fingerprint. This could allow man-in-the-middle attack if the user does not carefully check the fingerprint. [CVE-2014-2653] A remote attacker may effectively bypass MaxAuthTries settings, which would enable them to brute force passwords. [CVE-2015-5600] IV. Workaround Systems that do not use OpenSSH are not affected. There is no workaround for CVE-2014-2653, but the problem only affects networks where DNSsec and SSHFP is properly configured. Users who uses SSH should always check server host key fingerprints carefully when prompted. System administrators can set: UsePAM no In their /etc/ssh/sshd_config and restart sshd service to workaround the problem described as CVE-2015-5600 at expense of losing features provided by the PAM framework. We recommend system administrators to disable password based authentication completely, and use key based authentication exclusively in their SSH server configuration, when possible. This would eliminate the possibility of being ever exposed to password brute force attack. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. SSH service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is recommended but not required. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install SSH service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is recommended but not required. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 9.3, 10.1, 10.2] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssh.patch.asc [FreeBSD 8.4] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh-8.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh-8.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssh-8.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart the SSH service, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r285977 releng/8.4/ r285980 stable/9/ r285977 releng/9.3/ r285980 stable/10/ r285976 releng/10.1/ r285979 releng/10.2/ r285978 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.6 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVt+FdAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnPxEQAIFMhBzUuAEEeG3GoO6o6DQn 7ZVPdd+EdijDk0VAZbaa3NyeVGTNSEQhjpL/lSkIQUQT+yEAUUsUCVWu0T8OpCN0 UT6JlYhV+AwQVyWujlTjspQ3Ba3Kn3o76MCzvdIQWPTzD1yCZqRmpZ1eSjonmySZ ts+kVDCV2ZJyWACOdG2GXHSmTraIErn0J1YaLg++c8nHUvb+TNo2/8viBGJINhdP bvA6fzYPpAzgaq5EEKevySLUnUfUE2Nx5LGD2CUx/hMu7K8y2h4SR2fKmpyBauNS 4VHSssX6KjxZCYctCEsUgCokWYzt9fepyBsCiS9Vx4mTwat8Vuiz2zB1lCOwM97v iDbkcmR/ixElrXSBb5+wrhOpBLnYtHFTNPx8dRz39wdb1MxJQqyOOb8KtDSlFMmQ l5Lk1vTEcZQjWvmCV9XjVlPqcHnX4wNnV+IgUnQTnhQlbe0YgszdLAi5XZDGBmtA DHuLfBy1091KYBoP641GRuldsq6/r6DUzyZuQJ+p30BDUEfkUAptIEnQWA2l3Y8W /10eels29WJhV9N7WWo4pbADA54+DLvi0T/46R9WRbM9bA/dsqK9G5wmREaKCqmX ccQUFrruxJTn7TV4QbN69ABEkOFCyQjqecP2GqA2N/5AAUsV47WC/VtKgOPp4FZ6 E0SkAoNzIighyNk54U9p =6PBw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Tue Jul 28 20:51:35 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 404B59AD556 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:51:35 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from freebsd-security@m.gmane.org) Received: from plane.gmane.org (plane.gmane.org [80.91.229.3]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 03C2E1E90 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:51:34 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from freebsd-security@m.gmane.org) Received: from list by plane.gmane.org with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1ZKBqO-0007eQ-Me for freebsd-security@freebsd.org; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:51:24 +0200 Received: from c-98-240-227-76.hsd1.mn.comcast.net ([98.240.227.76]) by main.gmane.org with esmtp (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:51:24 +0200 Received: from josh.cepek by c-98-240-227-76.hsd1.mn.comcast.net with local (Gmexim 0.1 (Debian)) id 1AlnuQ-0007hv-00 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:51:24 +0200 X-Injected-Via-Gmane: http://gmane.org/ To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org From: Josh Cepek Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:16.openssh Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 15:51:12 -0500 Lines: 34 Message-ID: References: <20150728203026.58055175C@freefall.freebsd.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit X-Complaints-To: usenet@ger.gmane.org X-Gmane-NNTP-Posting-Host: c-98-240-227-76.hsd1.mn.comcast.net User-Agent: KNode/4.13.3 X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 20:51:35 -0000 FYI, the sys/conf/newvers.sh file still reports a version of RELEASE-p15 for the 10.1 releng SVN branch. Since some parts of the buildsystem use this value for those building from source, that should probably get bumped too. 9.3 is fine here. Thanks, -- Josh FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote: > ============================================================================= > FreeBSD-SA-15:16.openssh Security > Advisory > The FreeBSD > Project > > Topic: OpenSSH multiple vulnerabilities > > Category: contrib > Module: openssh > Announced: 2015-07-28 > Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. > Corrected: 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-PRERELEASE) > 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-BETA2-p2) > 2015-07-28 19:59:04 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RC1-p1) > 2015-07-28 19:59:11 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p16) > 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) > 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p21) > 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) > 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p35) > CVE Name: CVE-2014-2653, CVE-2015-5600 From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Wed Jul 29 05:51:01 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A43D9AE3F8 for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 05:51:01 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from roger@softridge.com) Received: from mail-ig0-f170.google.com (mail-ig0-f170.google.com [209.85.213.170]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1A14B6B7 for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 05:51:00 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from roger@softridge.com) Received: by iggf3 with SMTP id f3so5881769igg.1 for ; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:50:53 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:message-id:date:from:user-agent:mime-version:to :subject:references:in-reply-to:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=kMR3pjLUSbyBqYsDqeYsL5U3FuT8/kYo7GnVtywcpe0=; b=ExqZQIE5Nd2phhIuzIeq3vJ/0tuddKkaEUJz7kSVuDJKApUzbRsj+EBdPqqT1Hqi35 e3mla0jZI4IZx8EmvvN2fwfWvsiwA30i3Il3UklxNm9wg6+NURc1FSiJ5ou+pWxHra63 Q8eZnR2m/HyBxFN5dTgwUbX2MmEnTOWWdmgJ9/5cv4mklowoPtShLI0ORa4jN+vbPzwk MC0e0Q84VZNB4KEr0ceQlh0P8FpWQFQodWIfwIhEp1gkKszUgIAWv0dwwbFla2eN2a4c TyY1q2h0jctiwNd0p42dcTX5YEmmfw06z+A77IELHSYXK1/UyO1zP1jNYgWQ5Lh7JkZO l04Q== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkbIG88RN5jJKQfs4UUz6AglDaMVDQVL0a+syxGcJzxuzhcZelvN7BNSRKDv7RgTyENosKD X-Received: by 10.50.61.234 with SMTP id t10mr2369742igr.19.1438149053820; Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:50:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from earth.local (c-73-153-237-205.hsd1.co.comcast.net. [73.153.237.205]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id c20sm15288605ioe.36.2015.07.28.22.50.52 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 28 Jul 2015 22:50:52 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <55B869BB.5070304@softridge.com> Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 23:50:51 -0600 From: Roger Wilson User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.10; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:15.tcp References: <20150728203026.4D19C1754@freefall.freebsd.org> In-Reply-To: <20150728203026.4D19C1754@freefall.freebsd.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 11:24:46 +0000 X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 05:51:01 -0000 Probably not an issue; but would not hurt to patch anyway if it can be done as part of other patches. Roger Ben Wilson 303-579-5521, cell roger@softridge.com On 07/28/2015 14:30 , FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA512 > > ============================================================================= > FreeBSD-SA-15:15.tcp Security Advisory > The FreeBSD Project > > Topic: Resource exhaustion in TCP reassembly > > Category: core > Module: inet > Announced: 2015-07-28 > Credits: Patrick Kelsey (Norse Corporation) > Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. > Corrected: 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-PRERELEASE) > 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-BETA2-p2) > 2015-07-28 19:59:04 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RC1-p1) > 2015-07-28 19:59:11 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p16) > 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) > 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p21) > 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) > 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p35) > CVE Name: CVE-2015-1417 > > For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, > including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the > following sections, please visit . > > I. Background > > The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) of the TCP/IP protocol suite > provides a connection-oriented, reliable, sequence-preserving data > stream service. > > The underlying simple and potentially unreliable IP datagram > communication protocol may deliver segments out of order, therefore, > the TCP receiver would need to reassemble the segments into their > original sequence to provide a reliable octet stream. Because the > reassembly requires additional resources to keep the queued segments, > historically resource exhaustion in the TCP reassembly path has been > prevented by limiting the total number of segments that could belong > to reassembly queues to a small fraction (1/16) of the total number of > mbuf clusters in the system. > > VNET is a technique to virtualize the network stack, first introduced in > FreeBSD 8.0. It changes global resources in the network stack into per > network stack resources, so that a virtual network stack can be attached > to a jailed prison and the prison can have unrestricted access to the > virtual network stack. VNET is not enabled by default and has to be > enabled by recompiling the kernel. > > II. Problem Description > > There is a mistake with the introduction of VNET, which converted the > global limit on the number of segments that could belong to reassembly > queues into a per-VNET limit. Because mbufs are allocated from a > global pool, in the presence of a sufficient number of VNETs, the > total number of mbufs attached to reassembly queues can grow to the > total number of mbufs in the system, at which point all network > traffic would cease. > > III. Impact > > An attacker who can establish concurrent TCP connections across a > sufficient number of VNETs and manipulate the inbound packet streams > such that the maximum number of mbufs are enqueued on each reassembly > queue can cause mbuf cluster exhaustion on the target system, resulting > in a Denial of Service condition. > > As the default per-VNET limit on the number of segments that can > belong to reassembly queues is 1/16 of the total number of mbuf > clusters in the system, only systems that have 16 or more VNET > instances are vulnerable. > > IV. Workaround > > FreeBSD 8.x, 9.x and 10.x systems that do not make use of VNETs > (option VIMAGE) are not affected. The support has to be specifically > compiled into a custom kernel, so its use is not common. > > For affected systems, the system administrators may consider reducing > the net.inet.tcp.reass.maxsegments tunable to the value of > kern.ipc.nmbclusters divided by one greater than the total number of > VNETs that are going to be used in the system in order to prevent a > Denial of Service via this vulnerability. For example, if there are > 16 VNETs in the system, the net.inet.tcp.reass.maxsegments tunable > should be set to kern.ipc.nmbclusters / 17. > > V. Solution > > Perform one of the following: > > 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or > release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, > and reboot the system. > > 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: > > Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 > platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: > > # freebsd-update fetch > # freebsd-update install > > And reboot the system. > > 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: > > The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable > FreeBSD release branches. > > a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the > detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. > > [FreeBSD 10.2] > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp.patch > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp.patch.asc > # gpg --verify tcp.patch.asc > > [FreeBSD 9.3 and 10.1] > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-9.3-10.1.patch > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-9.3-10.1.patch.asc > # gpg --verify tcp-9.3-10.1.patch.asc > > [FreeBSD 8.4] > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-8.patch > # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:15/tcp-8.patch.asc > # gpg --verify tcp-8.patch.asc > > b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: > > # cd /usr/src > # patch < /path/to/patch > > c) Recompile your kernel as described in > and reboot the > system. > > VI. Correction details > > The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each > affected branch. > > Branch/path Revision > - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > stable/8/ r285977 > releng/8.4/ r285980 > stable/9/ r285977 > releng/9.3/ r285980 > stable/10/ r285976 > releng/10.1/ r285979 > releng/10.2/ r285978 > - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the > following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a > machine with Subversion installed: > > # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base > > Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: > > > > VII. References > > > > The latest revision of this advisory is available at > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.1.6 (FreeBSD) > > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVt+FcAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnOAgQAKw0jR1Eb/USmcXlFpfMrmUr > Z6UWHsPqE9CwDJaFddrFBRyjCsbeBv4LmPyVcOKJoqspEb8P52GtBNDe9vqcco1U > C+KpcQQKWTQmu170AdLAIRVvLjoNEX0C09ig4XMbKpisrmQ8zLXavTbTw8FlbPXq > o9t0nFgPKsDfaXJF3Oas41K/NsBj4hdqnfx+R7KeOaJ6sSwiFGbRxqQ+GG3k+79a > RI+KVLpw4QV/IkhXKzl416o6uk7eWnJu72GohdrxPvXYWHBVSBkSiT7pLl3O5C7r > 7+dpYyF9f4K0gnXLuATNixNS2/lL2WaJANb75ku7WnY2I5Yjx1oM2r5kE2eJ6Z/c > WXGnDE9/8SOVURqMwnpQgzVGopKZags0+X7FJAYKeW4/nWyUEAmDlQ+9dY7o/I0M > urFD+bsSxnrlGLLzjX55zKM1qyGlhNokowSusVeNlSEOl8/QV57CuyQDZ0wdAiUd > R2yl+fFxRKn4AeCMuKkEsoExLhISI7Uuz8Hjia7g0yJWfYjEjAWLcFpan/QmhwcP > 4PMg+2ZuPC0uUoXqCMBqu3d0NAaae4cOCzx8WCZUaaF3DwhRnUcld+XesV/h3SNo > kn3ygFyOVWrCd7bSsEd00qqUwUN/cp/uYTqlbI9im89Emaa7/mYR/i3sq2/MRagr > 2oio8OdZ8wwRuER4Jpq9 > =PC1V > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org mailing list > http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security-notifications > To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-notifications-unsubscribe@freebsd.org" From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Wed Jul 29 16:11:05 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EED499AE836; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 16:11:05 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (gate2.funkthat.com [208.87.223.18]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "gold.funkthat.com", Issuer "gold.funkthat.com" (not verified)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B66DD1FDD; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 16:11:05 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6TGB5WB007653 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 29 Jul 2015 09:11:05 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: (from jmg@localhost) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5/Submit) id t6TGB4ZO007652; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 09:11:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 09:11:04 -0700 From: John-Mark Gurney To: George Neville-Neil Cc: Adrian Chadd , freebsd-security@freebsd.org, Daniel Plominski , FreeBSD Net Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... Message-ID: <20150729161103.GJ78154@funkthat.com> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> <20150728060740.GP78154@funkthat.com> <55B768DC.6020009@Plominski.eu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 9.1-PRERELEASE amd64 X-PGP-Fingerprint: 54BA 873B 6515 3F10 9E88 9322 9CB1 8F74 6D3F A396 X-Files: The truth is out there X-URL: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/ X-Resume: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/resume.html X-TipJar: bitcoin:13Qmb6AeTgQecazTWph4XasEsP7nGRbAPE X-to-the-FBI-CIA-and-NSA: HI! HOW YA DOIN? can i haz chizburger? User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (gold.funkthat.com [127.0.0.1]); Wed, 29 Jul 2015 09:11:05 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 16:11:06 -0000 George Neville-Neil wrote this message on Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 10:35 -0400: > That's fine so long as its removed in HEAD now, and then the warning can > go into 10 aka 10.3. As I said, setkey doesn't support it.. and I looked at the ports for racoon2 and strongswan (has it in their library, but, and neither support it... Are there any other programs (besides custom software) that can do secdb manipulations that could possibly create a skipjack sdb entry? If not, putting warning into 9 and 10 seems excessive for a feature that people can't even use... > On 28 Jul 2015, at 13:25, Adrian Chadd wrote: > > > I'd put together a deprecation plan, which starts with the kernel > > warning that this stuff is being removed, MFC that to stable/10 and > > stable/9 so people aren't surprised when they upgrade, and then have > > it removed in 11. -- John-Mark Gurney Voice: +1 415 225 5579 "All that I will do, has been done, All that I have, has not." From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Wed Jul 29 17:10:54 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FD9B9AE068; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 17:10:54 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (gate2.funkthat.com [208.87.223.18]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "gold.funkthat.com", Issuer "gold.funkthat.com" (not verified)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA5CD1E07; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 17:10:53 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: from gold.funkthat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id t6THAqAj013028 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Wed, 29 Jul 2015 10:10:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg@gold.funkthat.com) Received: (from jmg@localhost) by gold.funkthat.com (8.14.5/8.14.5/Submit) id t6THAqva013027; Wed, 29 Jul 2015 10:10:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from jmg) Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 10:10:52 -0700 From: John-Mark Gurney To: George Neville-Neil Cc: Adrian Chadd , freebsd-security@freebsd.org, Daniel Plominski , FreeBSD Net Subject: Re: remove IPsec SKIPJACK support... Message-ID: <20150729171052.GK78154@funkthat.com> References: <20150728005730.GL78154@funkthat.com> <1DB60250-D362-4115-92F6-E27B7A5897C3@netgate.com> <20150728034157.GO78154@funkthat.com> <5E419103-3111-4ADC-A49F-B703BBBC9C5F@netgate.com> <20150728060740.GP78154@funkthat.com> <55B768DC.6020009@Plominski.eu> <20150729161103.GJ78154@funkthat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20150729161103.GJ78154@funkthat.com> X-Operating-System: FreeBSD 9.1-PRERELEASE amd64 X-PGP-Fingerprint: 54BA 873B 6515 3F10 9E88 9322 9CB1 8F74 6D3F A396 X-Files: The truth is out there X-URL: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/ X-Resume: http://resnet.uoregon.edu/~gurney_j/resume.html X-TipJar: bitcoin:13Qmb6AeTgQecazTWph4XasEsP7nGRbAPE X-to-the-FBI-CIA-and-NSA: HI! HOW YA DOIN? can i haz chizburger? User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (gold.funkthat.com [127.0.0.1]); Wed, 29 Jul 2015 10:10:53 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 17:10:54 -0000 John-Mark Gurney wrote this message on Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 09:11 -0700: > George Neville-Neil wrote this message on Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 10:35 -0400: > > That's fine so long as its removed in HEAD now, and then the warning can > > go into 10 aka 10.3. > > As I said, setkey doesn't support it.. and I looked at the ports for > racoon2 and strongswan (has it in their library, but, and neither support it... Are there any other > programs (besides custom software) that can do secdb manipulations that > could possibly create a skipjack sdb entry? Checked the other two IKE daemons in ports, and ipsec-tools does not use it, and isakmpd has a define in the OpenBSD specific headers (which we don't use), but doesn't use it for anything... > If not, putting warning into 9 and 10 seems excessive for a feature that > people can't even use... > > > On 28 Jul 2015, at 13:25, Adrian Chadd wrote: > > > > > I'd put together a deprecation plan, which starts with the kernel > > > warning that this stuff is being removed, MFC that to stable/10 and > > > stable/9 so people aren't surprised when they upgrade, and then have > > > it removed in 11. -- John-Mark Gurney Voice: +1 415 225 5579 "All that I will do, has been done, All that I have, has not." From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Thu Jul 30 10:28:58 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8389A9AB6D2 for ; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:28:58 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206c::16:87]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7889A182; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:28:58 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 1035) id 7778F1263; Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:28:58 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-15:16.openssh [REVISED] Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20150730102858.7778F1263@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:28:58 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 10:28:58 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-15:16.openssh Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: OpenSSH multiple vulnerabilities Category: contrib Module: openssh Announced: 2015-07-28, revised on 2015-07-30 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-PRERELEASE) 2015-07-28 19:58:44 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-BETA2-p2) 2015-07-28 19:59:04 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RC1-p1) 2015-07-28 19:59:11 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p16) 2015-07-28 19:58:54 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE) 2015-07-28 19:59:22 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p21) 2015-07-30 10:09:07 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2015-07-30 10:09:31 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p36) CVE Name: CVE-2014-2653, CVE-2015-5600 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . 0. Revision history v1.0 2015-02-25 Initial release. v1.1 2015-07-30 Revised patch for FreeBSD 8.x to address regression when keyboard interactive authentication is used. I. Background OpenSSH is an implementation of the SSH protocol suite, providing an encrypted and authenticated transport for a variety of services, including remote shell access. The security of the SSH connection relies on the server authenticating itself to the client as well as the user authenticating itself to the server. SSH servers uses host keys to verify their identity. RFC 4255 has defined a method of verifying SSH host keys using Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC), by publishing the key fingerprint using DNS with "SSHFP" resource record. RFC 6187 has defined methods to use a signature by a trusted certification authority to bind a given public key to a given digital identity with X.509v3 certificates. The PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) library provides a flexible framework for user authentication and session setup / teardown. OpenSSH uses PAM for password authentication by default. II. Problem Description OpenSSH clients does not correctly verify DNS SSHFP records when a server offers a certificate. [CVE-2014-2653] OpenSSH servers which are configured to allow password authentication using PAM (default) would allow many password attempts. III. Impact A malicious server may be able to force a connecting client to skip DNS SSHFP record check and require the user to perform manual host verification of the host key fingerprint. This could allow man-in-the-middle attack if the user does not carefully check the fingerprint. [CVE-2014-2653] A remote attacker may effectively bypass MaxAuthTries settings, which would enable them to brute force passwords. [CVE-2015-5600] IV. Workaround Systems that do not use OpenSSH are not affected. There is no workaround for CVE-2014-2653, but the problem only affects networks where DNSsec and SSHFP is properly configured. Users who uses SSH should always check server host key fingerprints carefully when prompted. System administrators can set: UsePAM no In their /etc/ssh/sshd_config and restart sshd service to workaround the problem described as CVE-2015-5600 at expense of losing features provided by the PAM framework. We recommend system administrators to disable password based authentication completely, and use key based authentication exclusively in their SSH server configuration, when possible. This would eliminate the possibility of being ever exposed to password brute force attack. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. SSH service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is recommended but not required. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install SSH service has to be restarted after the update. A reboot is recommended but not required. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 9.3, 10.1, 10.2] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssh.patch.asc [FreeBSD 8.4] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh-8.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh-8.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssh-8.patch.asc # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh-8-errata.patc # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:16/openssh-8-errata.patch.asc # gpg --verify openssh-8-errata.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart the SSH service, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/8/ r286067 releng/8.4/ r286068 stable/9/ r285977 releng/9.3/ r285980 stable/10/ r285976 releng/10.1/ r285979 releng/10.2/ r285978 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.1.6 (FreeBSD) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVufuCAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnHHAQALfjXH/WyrgpHxw1YFipwFSD bl+HLbdvMVbfBxLV7eVBK9RPQiyoxwocmU0uMdiNEIWt2llczTLEl/wtUjj6f4Ko K6E7AAOgOX4zdQxBd2502FvXC1oNbDEvK8X3M4MzPHAG4QRgXNffRGYvClmbayck 2i+bjcHdKAEwFJjHk4wXOQ0yhdF6Q36bH0N3kPV9z7sAt3tuzSWhvtX6QQSyeuCJ ie2db9CdSUnFhYELJnVMpVTf3ppMqUT6QEe45LmsGA6F8yWdMaW2vtMdJq6xFVYP INCUVyOlDRu0TibjLUpXu4KugeDgyTXy9oz4SRdnpcUWz33fM6aSgOkpiM1h05ja BJrs0HZbkjCwtD+8a0buoyIKb9NBIsDKbrec5g8AEDkAHjRzraLGAXUYwkFeyqYJ j+ll5r5iu5fc4s8QM+ySlGCW8V9Ix8FX7Rr7FhAWLSKEldDsnCRjG4EfrAcd1HiC PleAnLv4uKwfSugIBIEs5ls7+TzWytW8nnEpMEerXUD894suFIycOT6eoUYF/CCT I1nHWSITw4HSj8+wBvrhxwZCRqIMOAZB+3jzrwRE+QZkghoWnPnqrCn9uLkdndq5 ewgz6PiuYC8Zx0Z6trA72oV+XjTKu2d6eO5tRpe9aAmhPmfBWg3fXYltVzTzF9IE r0z98qmTEPiTDi8dr+K/ =GsXJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----