From owner-freebsd-questions@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Aug 29 02:31:42 2011 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83ECB106564A for ; Mon, 29 Aug 2011 02:31:42 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bonomi@mail.r-bonomi.com) Received: from mail.r-bonomi.com (mx-out.r-bonomi.com [204.87.227.120]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 19C668FC08 for ; Mon, 29 Aug 2011 02:31:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (from bonomi@localhost) by mail.r-bonomi.com (8.14.4/rdb1) id p7T2X1Ho046001 for freebsd-questions@freebsd.org; Sun, 28 Aug 2011 21:33:01 -0500 (CDT) Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 21:33:01 -0500 (CDT) From: Robert Bonomi Message-Id: <201108290233.p7T2X1Ho046001@mail.r-bonomi.com> To: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: wireless access point in FreeBSD 8.2p2 X-BeenThere: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: User questions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 02:31:42 -0000 > From owner-freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Sun Aug 28 20:41:41 2011 > From: Paul Beard > Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2011 18:39:41 -0700 > To: Warren Block > Cc: "freebsd-questions@FreeBSD. ORG" > Subject: Re: wireless access point in FreeBSD 8.2p2 > > > I'll read through that and see if it helps me at all. > > I found this "'Hidden' SSIDs are not really hidden. They make network > setup more difficult and provide no real security benefits." > interesting. I assume you could figure them out from wardriving? Hidden SSIDs just mean that the access point doesn't broadcast/announce it. The client machine has to transmit it, so that _AN_ access point can tell whether or not the client is tryint to connect to _it_. With something that snoops _all_ the wireless traffic, all you have to do is wait for somebody, _anybody_, to connect to that access point, and bingo, you've got the SSID. 'Hiding' the ID does nothing to deter the "determined" attacker, but it is quite effective at stopping the 'casual' leech. It also means that boxes that 'automatically" connect to the strongest signal in range, when none of their 'favored' networks are in range -- such boxes wil _not_ attempt to a system that doesn't "publish" it's SSID. This can be beneficial.