From owner-freebsd-questions Tue Sep 9 12:57:13 1997 Return-Path: Received: (from root@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.7/8.8.7) id MAA01472 for questions-outgoing; Tue, 9 Sep 1997 12:57:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dumbwinter.ecomotor.it (mod14.logic.it [195.120.151.30] (may be forged)) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.7/8.8.7) with SMTP id MAA01452 for ; Tue, 9 Sep 1997 12:56:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: (qmail 787 invoked by uid 1000); 9 Sep 1997 19:50:50 -0000 Date: Tue, 9 Sep 1997 21:50:49 +0200 (MET DST) From: Marco Molteni X-Sender: molter@dumbwinter.ecomotor.it To: Samara McCord cc: freebsd-questions@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Attacks on IMAP Daemon - Security Weakness? In-Reply-To: <199709090716.AAA27574@syzygy.zytek.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-questions@FreeBSD.ORG X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Samara McCord wrote: > I've noticed a number of suspicious error messages since we installed > an IMAP server (running on port 143), and I'm wondering if these people > are trying to hack into imapd using a known weakness. We have since > installed tcp_wrapper and have turned off all access to imapd outside > of our network, but I'm curious just the same. Hi Samara, I'm including a CERT bullettin regarding IMAP attacks. I suggest you to subscribe to the CERT mailing list and to security@freebsd.org. Marco Molteni Computer Science student at the Universita' degli studi di Milano, Italy. UNIX _is_ user friendly. It's just selective about who its friends are. --------BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE----------------------------------------- >From cert-advisory@cert.org Tue Sep 9 21:45:13 1997 Date: Mon, 4 Aug 1997 14:29:00 -0400 From: CERT Advisory Reply-To: cert-advisory-request@cert.org To: cert-advisory@cert.org Subject: CERT Summary CS-97.04 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CERT* Summary CS-97.04 - SPECIAL EDITION August 4, 1997 This special edition of the CERT Summary highlights large-scale attacks involving a vulnerability in certain implementations of IMAP. This vulnerability and corrective actions are described in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-97.09.imap_pop Because attacks have been occurring since the release of this advisory, we urge you to take immediate action to address this vulnerability. The vulnerability lies in the implementation of this particular IMAP server, not with the protocol. Preliminary data from one current incident indicates that probes were made to thousands of hosts, and approximately 40% of those hosts appear to be vulnerable. In addition to this large incident, we have been receiving numerous reports of root compromises as a result of this vulnerability. If you discover that your site has been probed for this vulnerability, we encourage you to check your systems for signs of compromise using our Intruder Detection Checklist, available at ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/intruder_detection_checklist This document will help you methodically check your systems for signs of compromise and offers pointers to other resources and suggestions on how to proceed in the event of a compromise. On one machine where large-scale scans were launched, the intruders installed a Trojan Horse identd server. This Trojan identd allowed intruders to connect to the identd server and obtain root access. If you are running identd, we encourage you to verify the integrity of your identd executable with the distribution. If you discover that you have suffered a root compromise as a result, we encourage you to recover by taking the steps outlined in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/root_compromise This will help you recover from the incident, and offers pointers to other resources that may help you secure your systems against future compromise. If, during the course of your investigation, you discover evidence indicating that other sites are involved, we encourage you to contact those sites directly and to include cert@cert.org on the CC line of any messages you exchange. If you are represented by another incident response team in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), we encourage you to follow up with that team. More information about FIRST can be found at http://www.first.org/ Due to the large volume of messages we anticipate, we will not be able to respond to each report individually. However, your reports will help us determine the scope of the problem and coordinate activity in response. Past CERT Summaries are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_summaries/ - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- How to Contact the CERT Coordination Center Email cert@cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your email address to cert-advisory-request@cert.org In the subject line, type SUBSCRIBE your-email-address CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET news group comp.security.announce CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other security-related information are available for anonymous FTP from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise you to encrypt your message. We can support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT staff for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1997 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and credit is given to the CERT Coordination Center. * Registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBM+YFEHVP+x0t4w7BAQFFawQAqa7j84TnrDs9v0SIILYsFNDObg/+sqMz KVah/RRPOaUPrWZ2NRkWg5FUT0c0LMuxVRjvmIkdHSB6S71IRdoS/LFJwfFPvoSA iTNGaTVwP2vRvat4TqxmA356J2fGVEQjPq1THE6qNLeQX9IqabRBLcG8cVoXr/Ku 9CIVs1GbSIY= =hMAh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----