From owner-freebsd-security-notifications Fri Oct 13 9:11:57 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 758) id 7839537B503; Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:11:49 -0700 (PDT) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:54.fingerd Message-Id: <20001013161149.7839537B503@hub.freebsd.org> Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:11:49 -0700 (PDT) Sender: owner-freebsd-security-notifications@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk Reply-To: postmaster@freebsd.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-00:54 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: fingerd allows remote reading of filesystem Category: core Module: fingerd Announced: 2000-10-13 Credits: NIIMI Satoshi Affects: FreeBSD 4.1.1-RELEASE Corrected: 2000-10-05 (4.1.1-STABLE) FreeBSD only: Yes I. Background The finger service is used to provide information about users on the system to remote clients. II. Problem Description Shortly before the release of FreeBSD 4.1.1, code was added to finger(1) intended to allow the utility to send the contents of administrator-specified files in response to a finger request. However the code incorrectly allowed users to specify a filename directly, the contents of which would be returned to the user. The finger daemon usually runs as user 'nobody' and invokes the finger(1) command in response to a remote request, meaning it does not have access to privileged files on the system (such as the hashed password file /etc/master.passwd), however the vulnerability may be used to read arbitrary files to which the 'nobody' user has read permission. This may disclose internal information including information which may be used to mount further attacks against the system. Note that servers running web and other services often incorrectly run these as the 'nobody' user, meaning this vulnerability may be used to read internal web server data such as web server password files, the source code to cgi-bin scripts, etc. FreeBSD 4.1-RELEASE, 4.0-RELEASE, 3.5.1-RELEASE and FreeBSD 4.1-STABLE systems dated before 2000-09-01 or after 2000-10-05 are unaffected by this vulnerability. III. Impact Remote users can obtain read access (as the 'nobody' user) to large parts of the local filesystem on systems running a vulnerable fingerd. This may disclose confidential information and may facilitate further attacks on the system. IV. Workaround Disable the finger protocol in /etc/inetd.conf: make sure the /etc/inetd.conf file does not contain the following entry uncommented (i.e. if present in the inetd.conf file it should be commented out as shown below:) #finger stream tcp nowait/3/10 nobody /usr/libexec/fingerd fingerd -s On IPv6-connected systems, be sure to disable the IPv6 instance of the finger daemon as well: #finger stream tcp6 nowait/3/10 nobody /usr/libexec/fingerd fingerd -s V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable FreeBSD system to 4.1.1-STABLE dated after the correction date. 2) Apply the patch below and rebuild your fingerd binary. Either save this advisory to a file, or download the patch and detached PGP signature from the following locations, and verify the signature using your PGP utility. ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:54/fingerd.patch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:54/fingerd.patch.asc # cd /usr/src/usr.bin/finger # patch -p < /path/to/patch_or_advisory # make all install # cd /usr/src/libexec/fingerd # make all install Patch for vulnerable 4.1.x systems: Index: finger.c =================================================================== RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/usr.bin/finger/finger.c,v retrieving revision 1.15.2.3 retrieving revision 1.21 diff -u -r1.15.2.3 -r1.21 --- finger.c 2000/09/15 21:51:00 1.15.2.3 +++ finger.c 2000/10/05 15:56:13 1.21 @@ -293,6 +293,16 @@ goto net; /* + * Mark any arguments beginning with '/' as invalid so that we + * don't accidently confuse them with expansions from finger.conf + */ + for (p = argv, ip = used; *p; ++p, ++ip) + if (**p == '/') { + *ip = 1; + warnx("%s: no such user", *p); + } + + /* * Traverse the finger alias configuration file of the form * alias:(user|alias), ignoring comment lines beginning '#'. */ @@ -323,11 +333,11 @@ * gathering the traditional finger information. */ if (mflag) - for (p = argv; *p; ++p) { - if (**p != '/' || !show_text("", *p, "")) { + for (p = argv, ip = used; *p; ++p, ++ip) { + if (**p != '/' || *ip == 1 || !show_text("", *p, "")) { if (((pw = getpwnam(*p)) != NULL) && !hide(pw)) enter_person(pw); - else + else if (!*ip) warnx("%s: no such user", *p); } } -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBOebB4FUuHi5z0oilAQEE1AP+I7zDBn5TagYJEELea7ltGkNZ5h3nZi5E FwxqYekriycAzOqctwzu7lO2AO7KoPTzAfu4OCd+s+ijK+zpXkt+eOAttbhPwENJ RMAJPwcGr139mIT2ofuEUhtE9NZ66gg7WNh+8ixjtovKbZl1W/slX+wOqlaCcbLm U4t3bj6bx5M= =fg83 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security-notifications" in the body of the message From owner-freebsd-security-notifications Fri Oct 13 9:12:35 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 758) id 9A1EF37B66D; Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:12:02 -0700 (PDT) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Ports Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:55.xpdf Message-Id: <20001013161202.9A1EF37B66D@hub.freebsd.org> Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:12:02 -0700 (PDT) Sender: owner-freebsd-security-notifications@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk Reply-To: postmaster@freebsd.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-00:55 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: xpdf contains multiple vulnerabilities Category: ports Module: xpdf Announced: 2000-10-13 Credits: Unknown Affects: Ports collection prior to the correction date. Corrected: 2000-09-04 (4.1.1-RELEASE) Vendor status: Updated version released FreeBSD only: NO I. Background xpdf is a PDF viewer for X Windows. II. Problem Description The xpdf port, versions prior to 0.91, contains a race condition due to improper handing of temporary files that may allow a local user to overwrite arbitrary files owned by the user running xpdf. Additionally, when handling URLs in documents no checking was done for shell metacharacters before starting the browser. This makes it possible to construct a document which cause xpdf to run arbitrary commands when the user views an URL. The xpdf port is not installed by default, nor is it "part of FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection, which contains nearly 4000 third-party applications in a ready-to-install format. The ports collections shipped with FreeBSD 3.5.1 and 4.1 contain this problem since it was discovered after the releases, but it was corrected prior to the release of FreeBSD 4.1.1. FreeBSD makes no claim about the security of these third-party applications, although an effort is underway to provide a security audit of the most security-critical ports. III. Impact Local users, using a symlink attack, can cause arbitrary files owned by the user running xpdf to be overwritten. Also, malicious PDFs can cause arbitrary code to be executed. If you have not chosen to install the xpdf port/package, then your system is not vulnerable to this problem. IV. Workaround Deinstall the xpdf port/package, if you you have installed it. V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade your entire ports collection and rebuild the xpdf port. 2) Deinstall the old package and install a new package dated after the correction date, obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/graphics/xpdf-0.91.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/graphics/xpdf-0.91.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/graphics/xpdf-0.91.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/graphics/xpdf-0.91.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/graphics/xpdf-0.91.tgz 3) download a new port skeleton for the cvsweb port from: http://www.freebsd.org/ports/ and use it to rebuild the port. 4) Use the portcheckout utility to automate option (3) above. The portcheckout port is available in /usr/ports/devel/portcheckout or the package can be obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBOebCfVUuHi5z0oilAQEcuAP8DYr3RrCnnysWYS3eVyNJ1sokvXOXZdhZ hI8ialbbpKY+kEtnL0DrUmeJ9c5xsVb70XJQ3D80n8O2N8I9ZAbfiHadY+omZPZX Hpk47MuA3R4G6jXldnyq545/QdK3+uKMLkNiGG63P5VcyUsQ3bpB1uIRIX/a9U6Z rdQfL0s3N0k= =qh/t -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security-notifications" in the body of the message From owner-freebsd-security-notifications Fri Oct 13 9:13:15 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 758) id 1DC8B37B670; Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:12:03 -0700 (PDT) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Ports Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:56.lprng Message-Id: <20001013161203.1DC8B37B670@hub.freebsd.org> Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:12:03 -0700 (PDT) Sender: owner-freebsd-security-notifications@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk Reply-To: postmaster@freebsd.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-00:56 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: LPRng contains potential root compromise Category: ports Module: LPRng Announced: 2000-10-13 Credits: Chris Evans Affects: Ports collection prior to the correction date. Corrected: 2000-10-13 Vendor status: Updated version released FreeBSD only: NO I. Background LPRng is a popular printer daemon. II. Problem Description The LPRng port, versions prior to 3.6.24, contains a potential vulnerability which may allow root compromise from both local and remote systems. The vulnerability is due to incorrect usage of the syslog(3) function. Local and remote users can send string-formatting operators to the printer daemon to corrupt the daemon's execution, potentially gaining root access. The LPRng port is not installed by default, nor is it "part of FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection, which contains nearly 4000 third-party applications in a ready-to-install format. The ports collections shipped with FreeBSD 3.5.1, 4.1 and 4.1.1 contain this problem since it was discovered after the releases. FreeBSD makes no claim about the security of these third-party applications, although an effort is underway to provide a security audit of the most security-critical ports. III. Impact Local and remote users may potentially gain root privileges on systems using LPRng. If you have not chosen to install the LPRng port/package, then your system is not vulnerable to this problem. IV. Workaround Deinstall the LPRng port/package, if you you have installed it. V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade your entire ports collection and rebuild the LPRng port. 2) Deinstall the old package and install a new package dated after the correction date, obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/sysutils/LPRng-3.6.25.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/sysutils/LPRng-3.6.25.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/sysutils/LPRng-3.6.25.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/sysutils/LPRng-3.6.25.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/sysutils/LPRng-3.6.25.tgz NOTE: It may be several days before updated packages are available. 3) download a new port skeleton for the cvsweb port from: http://www.freebsd.org/ports/ and use it to rebuild the port. 4) Use the portcheckout utility to automate option (3) above. The portcheckout port is available in /usr/ports/devel/portcheckout or the package can be obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBOebCc1UuHi5z0oilAQGIrwP+I0aP9pZOMT4FbOar8NpMExmeQXNr74+e euwWeJZszDNe4p0a2yGB9Xn4CrkQZNhwZKUoDzk1K9RrDxNwjwT7gouKMGgn38Lr OIQLi2FZqgT0cbnGusdK4sxbQZl2AnPkEunQOskeXhCbZX97wMQOjDid72ZXxNAR l+KW/XexpuQ= =Ew7y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security-notifications" in the body of the message From owner-freebsd-security-notifications Fri Oct 13 9:13:54 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 758) id 2F2AA37B672; Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:12:04 -0700 (PDT) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Ports Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:57.muh Message-Id: <20001013161204.2F2AA37B672@hub.freebsd.org> Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2000 09:12:04 -0700 (PDT) Sender: owner-freebsd-security-notifications@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk Reply-To: postmaster@freebsd.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-00:57 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: muh IRC bouncer remote vulnerability Category: ports Module: muh Announced: 2000-10-13 Credits: Maxime Henrion Affects: Ports collection prior to the correction date. Corrected: 2000-09-10 (4.1.1-RELEASE) Vendor status: Updated version released FreeBSD only: NO I. Background muh is an IRC bouncer, a program that allows a host to act as a relay between an IRC client on a local/remote machine and the IRC server. II. Problem Description The muh port, versions 2.05c and before, contains a vulnerability which allows remote users to gain the privileges of the user running muh. This is accomplished by sending a carefully crafted exploit string containing string format operators to a user using muh but who is not connected. When the user reconnects and executes '/muh read', muh will allow the remote attacker to execute arbitrary code as the local user. The muh port is not installed by default, nor is it "part of FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection, which contains nearly 4000 third-party applications in a ready-to-install format. The ports collections shipped with FreeBSD 3.5.1 and 4.1 contain this problem since it was discovered after the releases, but it was corrected prior to the release of FreeBSD 4.1.1. FreeBSD makes no claim about the security of these third-party applications, although an effort is underway to provide a security audit of the most security-critical ports. III. Impact Remote IRC users can cause arbitrary code to be executed as the user running muh. If you have not chosen to install the muh port/package, then your system is not vulnerable to this problem. IV. Workaround Deinstall the muh port/package, if you you have installed it. V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade your entire ports collection and rebuild the muh port. 2) Deinstall the old package and install a new package dated after the correction date, obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/irc/muh-2.05c.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/irc/muh-2.05c.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/irc/muh-2.05c.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/irc/muh-2.05c.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/irc/muh-2.05c.tgz NOTE: It may be several days before updated packages are available. 3) download a new port skeleton for the cvsweb port from: http://www.freebsd.org/ports/ and use it to rebuild the port. 4) Use the portcheckout utility to automate option (3) above. The portcheckout port is available in /usr/ports/devel/portcheckout or the package can be obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-3-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/alpha/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBOebDhVUuHi5z0oilAQE/3wP+K6oPSZ4jsnLAILhZD3fjdp+3bW7IhDmQ PoXpqSyEypJ6TlP0wLaZwhz1VPThAN9yVaUTzA7W8MVQyKCdIDBWu86WmcZ4CsY9 v7ku77tshEcxza+ggegy9PkSWYDfaQIyGzRyZht280qxn5XUFIeEvXkx+YHKvffo Rm4dlo/akzA= =0bP+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security-notifications" in the body of the message