From owner-freebsd-chat@FreeBSD.ORG Sun Jun 22 00:46:50 2003 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-chat@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF8A537B401; Sun, 22 Jun 2003 00:46:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mta05-svc.ntlworld.com (mta05-svc.ntlworld.com [62.253.162.45]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43D5243FA3; Sun, 22 Jun 2003 00:46:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from colin.percival@wadham.ox.ac.uk) Received: from piii600.wadham.ox.ac.uk ([81.103.196.4]) by mta05-svc.ntlworld.comESMTP <20030622074647.JRYY28183.mta05-svc.ntlworld.com@piii600.wadham.ox.ac.uk>; Sun, 22 Jun 2003 08:46:47 +0100 Message-Id: <5.0.2.1.1.20030622084009.01c8d600@popserver.sfu.ca> X-Sender: cperciva@popserver.sfu.ca X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.0.2 Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2003 08:46:45 +0100 To: David Schultz From: Colin Percival In-Reply-To: <20030622055900.GA60949@HAL9000.homeunix.com> References: <5.0.2.1.1.20030622044124.02cc0948@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622022111.02c1cdf8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621193449.02c91ce8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621175853.02c92e00@popserver.sfu.ca> <20030621163835.GA18653@tulip.epweb.co.za> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621175853.02c92e00@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030621193449.02c91ce8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622022111.02c1cdf8@popserver.sfu.ca> <5.0.2.1.1.20030622044124.02cc0948@popserver.sfu.ca> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed cc: chat@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: Cryptographically enabled ports tree. X-BeenThere: freebsd-chat@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Non technical items related to the community List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2003 07:46:51 -0000 At 22:59 21/06/2003 -0700, David Schultz wrote: >If you just want to know that the bits you have came from >freebsd.org, that's another thing. The technology to do that >already exists in cvsup, as long as you trust the mirrors. (Most >of them probably don't use authentication right now, but that can >be fixed, I'm sure, if enough people are concerned about it.) Well, sort of. The authentication in cvsup relies upon starting with a shared secret, which isn't an option for the general public. >If your whole point is that you don't trust the mirrors, then maybe >you have a case for signing deltas on the master... Exactly. I might, grudgingly, be willing to trust the people who run the cvsup mirrors -- although I'd really rather not -- but trusting the security, physical and electronic, of the mirrors is quite a different matter. Colin Percival