From owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Sun Feb 24 00:03:47 2008 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14DC016A40B; Sun, 24 Feb 2008 00:03:47 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ap@bnc.net) Received: from bis.bonn.org (www.bis.bonn.org [217.110.117.102]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61AEE13C4CE; Sun, 24 Feb 2008 00:03:45 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ap@bnc.net) X-Junk-Score: 2 [X] X-SpamCatcher-Score: 2 [X] X-Junk-Score: 0 [] X-Cloudmark-Score: 0 [] Received: from [194.39.192.125] (account bnc-mail@mailrelay.mailomat.net HELO bnc.net) by bis.bonn.org (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.2c4) with ESMTPSA id 9480312; Sun, 24 Feb 2008 00:05:53 +0100 X-SpamCatcher-Score: 2 [X] Received: from [194.39.194.142] (account ap HELO wasabi.wlan.bnc.net) by bnc.net (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.2.0) with ESMTPSA id 3077324; Sun, 24 Feb 2008 00:03:35 +0100 Message-Id: <31648FC5-26B9-4359-ACC8-412504D3257B@bnc.net> From: Achim Patzner To: "David E. Thiel" In-Reply-To: <20080223222733.GI12067@redundancy.redundancy.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary=Apple-Mail-3-14831615; micalg=sha1; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v919.2) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 00:03:32 +0100 References: <20080223010856.7244.qmail@smasher.org> <20080223222733.GI12067@redundancy.redundancy.org> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.919.2) X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.5 Cc: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Security Flaw in Popular Disk Encryption Technologies X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2008 00:03:47 -0000 --Apple-Mail-3-14831615 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed; delsp=yes Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >> article below. does anyone know how this affects eli/geli? > > There's fairly little any disk crypto system can do to thoroughly > defend > against this. Hm. Strange. Serious hardware is very well suited to do that (usually by adding well defended crypto hardware). Keys don't have to be stored in unsafe places. Achim Patzner --Apple-Mail-3-14831615--