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Date:      Wed, 19 Dec 2018 20:52:22 +0000 (UTC)
From:      FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
To:        FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Subject:   [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-18:15.bootpd
Message-ID:  <20181219205222.0C0A519B48@freefall.freebsd.org>

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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-18:15.bootpd                                     Security Advisory
                                                          The FreeBSD Project

Topic:          bootpd buffer overflow

Category:       core
Module:         bootpd
Announced:      2018-12-19
Credits:        Reno Robert
Affects:        All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected:      2018-12-19 18:17:59 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE)
                2018-12-19 18:21:07 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p1)
                2018-12-19 18:19:15 UTC (stable/11, 11.2-STABLE)
                2018-12-19 18:22:25 UTC (releng/11.2, 11.2-RELEASE-p7)
CVE Name:       CVE-2018-17161

For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.

I.   Background

The bootpd utility implements an Internet Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP)
server as defined in RFC951, RFC1532, and RFC1533.

II.  Problem Description

Due to insufficient validation of network-provided data it may be possible
for a malicious attacker to craft a bootp packet which could cause a stack
buffer overflow.

III. Impact

It is possible that the buffer overflow could lead to a Denial of Service
or remote code execution.

IV.  Workaround

Firewall rules may be used to limit reception of bootp packets to only
trusted networks or hosts.  Note that the bootp protocol is typically
limited to a common layer 2 broadcast domain, although the bootpgw gateway
can forward bootp requests and responses between subnets.

V.   Solution

Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Restart bootpd if it is running in standalone mode.

Perform one of the following:

1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:

Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:

# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install

2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:

The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.

a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:15/bootpd.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:15/bootpd.patch.asc
# gpg --verify bootpd.patch.asc

b) Apply the patch.  Execute the following commands as root:

# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch

c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.

Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system.

VI.  Correction details

The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.

Branch/path                                                      Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/                                                        r342228
releng/12.0/                                                      r342230
stable/11/                                                        r348229
releng/11.2/                                                      r342231
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:

# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base

Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:

<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>;

VII. References

<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-17161>;

The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-18:15.bootpd.asc>;
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