From nobody Wed Feb 14 07:07:06 2024 X-Original-To: freebsd-security-notifications@mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4TZTlb1Nnlz5BBjt for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2024 07:07:07 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6074::16:84]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "freefall.freebsd.org", Issuer "R3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4TZTlb0Dkrz4d2p; Wed, 14 Feb 2024 07:07:07 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=freebsd.org; s=dkim; t=1707894427; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc; bh=2xJN0uQIbWl8KXcQn/h3cH3oE6pQ16Tnw7zQbGu30h8=; b=Kv5wnl0RngyySxZgSoU/BTMU66Iki9OT+i9ksfcJpLdQ0FTHdLKCweEUaBz6KAQrAf+Hd5 5ZOqPR6hd1xc3mwzBBlANt60HzJqkab37OI9wrN4er4hmefG6mTLy/vuQ3e/uaibyWk/Mz nE8muM+ofJcoCyyg4nuiANEQygUYPigwJOJBc05+36id2cZpUrVfoXrtG+L3IujmjQ0YRg 459w+ZCMgirh26wWLmZgFuSZLpDvp9V1jCKejRjUzcDQHDeA64oOz6jrcrgBqZgwbqQLNO cF/H7OCtgPjOPHMmGbrZJqGCbu0HHbZhuyzaZp8QuN/2qaREc9SOtcngGTCNFA== ARC-Seal: i=1; s=dkim; d=freebsd.org; t=1707894427; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=J1E6GP/yqNUfFPMTcdGJQQRy+5MmXZhtDY2PYbosALH6d8czQeNnT5hxQp3styf1OM+3zT PjZNUw5ZHH5lCQG+7jQhxQXHWn2dReRbxsZi4pYWHrofkTa2+k6oDdOuQnwXnxyQ5XNCCY cj39oL665+8lfxscRJ0OeoYAdehZGbIF0tNWjowqIODVrz6Ya7E9fcDO1BpPIJcKXUPjlm X9sSesu5aPApjvfg4W6n7qzIyvi41t6tK07kRN4d0aQNCKpZDpdteq8Ocih04PwXrUBz5U F0qO07zheN7TGAQK4a2724mZN3wRoMAButWIy01YAm0TI2g8o9V8c15Bmss98Q== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx1.freebsd.org; none ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=freebsd.org; s=dkim; t=1707894427; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc; bh=2xJN0uQIbWl8KXcQn/h3cH3oE6pQ16Tnw7zQbGu30h8=; b=L7SwNieTl3vpvgwVrw5sptoiNTegkm6rR+C8AzwF6OnQ3MVBjmXct7r97cIy6ZqwI3mwvu 2JHBcRbVzSnXrZvVc3KqFJ9lk9qixU6nG1T824P5n2ufF2orypzUjowZhX1jP1gYjGCIam uBmOTa6i1SmHl1dqh4x9rmGRLoiJZyw/vXNhanavKy84HRJ9Gxut4BKZM3ePZJ6aX+TulE xhXXm1PC1lfuJO+ANY8Uxc+IEmBkJm2v5lca3pkieDSn6tMo8wSij2v7AyxkBGY13a9AdM 9G/NeU2KXwd4E2ko9tZP4MY/UIz+ygWGg0skl3o3uNooP1FZ3PxrlEe0pRY4bw== Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 945) id C6CD226744; Wed, 14 Feb 2024 07:07:06 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-24:01.bhyveload Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20240214070706.C6CD226744@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 07:07:06 +0000 (UTC) List-Id: Moderated Security Notifications [moderated, low volume] List-Archive: https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/freebsd-security-notifications List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Sender: owner-freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org X-BeenThere: freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-24:01.bhyveload Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: bhyveload(8) host file access Category: core Module: bhyeload Announced: 2024-02-14 Credits: The water cooler. (Note, this is the requested credit) Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2024-01-15 22:27:59 UTC (stable/14, 14.0-STABLE) 2024-02-14 06:05:44 UTC (releng/14.0, 14.0-RELEASE-p5) 2024-01-15 23:11:38 UTC (stable/13, 13.2-STABLE) 2024-02-14 06:06:00 UTC (releng/13.2, 13.2-RELEASE-p10) CVE Name: CVE-2024-25940 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background bhyveload(8) is used to load a FreeBSD guest into a bhyve virtual machine. II. Problem Description `bhyveload -h ` may be used to grant loader access to the directory tree on the host. Affected versions of bhyveload(8) do not make any attempt to restrict loader's access to , allowing the loader to read any file the host user has access to. III. Impact In the bhyveload(8) model, the host supplies a userboot.so to boot with, but the loader scripts generally come from the guest image. A maliciously crafted script could be used to exfiltrate sensitive data from the host accessible to the user running bhyhveload(8), which is often the system root. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but guests that do not use `bhyveload -h` are not impacted. Common VM solutions that use bhyveload(8) do not usually use the - -h option. V. Solution Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. Perform one of the following: 1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms, or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 14.0] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-24:01/bhyveload-14.0.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-24:01/bhyveload-14.0.patch.asc # gpg --verify bhyveload-14.0.patch.asc [FreeBSD 13.2] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-24:01/bhyveload-13.2.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-24:01/bhyveload-13.2.patch.asc # gpg --verify bhyveload-13.2.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Virtual machines that have been booted with bhyveload(8) do not need to be rebooted. VI. Correction details This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the following stable and release branches: Branch/path Hash Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/14/ 426b28fdf700 stable/14-n266333 releng/14.0/ f5bb597829e1 releng/14.0-n265406 stable/13/ 78345dbd7a00 stable/13-n257186 releng/13.2/ 48598b1670ce releng/13.2-n254657 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Run the following command to see which files were modified by a particular commit: # git show --stat Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash: To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against nNNNNNN in the table above), run: # git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEthUnfoEIffdcgYM7bljekB8AGu8FAmXMYRAACgkQbljekB8A Gu8KwRAAxCnMsCQbp/CZ1O2GYxDTCOt1M5CZaFBD8r3b4xSN1gFB79z3aHAmSX0a kTGpp5QSbxx1UtA9eZoZTa/wpmMAo1AZ7ry0OK1VuRFtF2D+IM64l07m91HW5ncU YCsbeQ6wuXHeVlZ/t7eu/X03YltYIuMu/wIzpsPYtMvTB+ZI50nm0pUGaQnH9ZA2 jMGhLcWQSaHi46pMJ1o2iXWbaFZh4S6fHhNXSEFxaWuQf/o//whSgeqtFnhozfZ4 vbx0pyF3HrkjPRLwc9QDRNcFnG0F9DCOmiGlAAZD4/XRNOd5PgSvmHxDPrc1UkJO K8CcU7vIgloKdETS43HhlDhT34/adV1dMpwCLpr9JZ3FmfTtIor1q8w9l0nLohln VeLUbhaMZAXYqQp5wcDso26n9moD8l/izJZZ0gWu8xsooKmE2DY0t7ASXdcvnSq8 VKlpZP0DHcdZdeePiCF6XovAvv3fAq5hvIdCccBIJHbFIWEL2Psq9hYqFISb+mFb gAoX5gyo4S+lWgn33aUCzjYuR0MhelJPRFIndjr5+Dn0AgQniNre7uRt4k97jvT1 Q9h+f4uyNFafuD5YMqfRhsk8EN93bEc3Bkq47KCYDSTJujd99pYFPE1SzvNAPmNY CYxqYjkfjklarfellifxvqdKrOWoeOkK4a3Ckd5+4Y8BaaTzWCY= =LOMD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----