Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Sun, 4 Dec 2016 19:37:31 +0000 (UTC)
From:      Jason Unovitch <junovitch@FreeBSD.org>
To:        ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-branches@freebsd.org
Subject:   svn commit: r427796 - in branches/2016Q4: emulators/xen-kernel emulators/xen-kernel/files sysutils/xen-tools sysutils/xen-tools/files
Message-ID:  <201612041937.uB4JbVBk065617@repo.freebsd.org>

next in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
Author: junovitch
Date: Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016
New Revision: 427796
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/427796

Log:
  MFH: r427568
  
  xen: update to 4.7.1
  
  Xen 4.7.1 contains the following XSAs: 184, 185, 186, 187, 188 and 190 which
  where missing in the previous package. Additionally XSAs 191, 192, 193, 194,
  195, 197 and 198 are also applied.
  
  PR:             214936
  Approved by:	bapt
  Approved by:	ports-secteam (with hat)
  Sponsored by:	Citrix Systems R&D
  Security:       CVE-2016-7092
  Security:       CVE-2016-7093
  Security:       CVE-2016-7094
  Security:       CVE-2016-7154
  Security:       CVE-2016-7777
  Security:       CVE-2016-9379
  Security:       CVE-2016-9380
  Security:       CVE-2016-9381
  Security:       CVE-2016-9382
  Security:       CVE-2016-9383
  Security:       CVE-2016-9384
  Security:       CVE-2016-9385
  Security:       CVE-2016-9386
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/45ca25b5-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/49211361-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/4aae54be-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/4d7cf654-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/50ac2e96-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/523bb0b7-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/53dbd096-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/5555120d-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/56f0f11e-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/58685e23-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html
  Security:       https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/59f79c99-ba4d-11e6-ae1b-002590263bf5.html

Added:
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa191.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa191.patch
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa192.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa192.patch
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa193-4.7.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa193-4.7.patch
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa194.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa194.patch
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa195.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa195.patch
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-libxl-fix-creation-of-pkgconf-install-dir.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-libxl-fix-creation-of-pkgconf-install-dir.patch
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-tools-configure-fix-pkg-config-install-path-for-Free.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-tools-configure-fix-pkg-config-install-path-for-Free.patch
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa197-qemuu.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa197-qemuu.patch
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa198.patch
     - copied unchanged from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa198.patch
Deleted:
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch
Modified:
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
  branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/distinfo
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/distinfo
  branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/pkg-plist
Directory Properties:
  branches/2016Q4/   (props changed)

Modified: branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile	Sun Dec  4 19:35:14 2016	(r427795)
+++ branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796)
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	xen
 PKGNAMESUFFIX=	-kernel
-PORTVERSION=	4.7.0
-PORTREVISION=   3
+PORTVERSION=	4.7.1
+PORTREVISION=   0
 CATEGORIES=	emulators
-MASTER_SITES=	http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/
+MASTER_SITES=	http://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${PORTVERSION}/
 
 MAINTAINER=	royger@FreeBSD.org
 COMMENT=	Hypervisor using a microkernel design
@@ -40,9 +40,11 @@ PLIST_FILES=	/boot/xen \
 EXTRA_PATCHES=	${FILESDIR}/0001-xen-logdirty-prevent-preemption-if-finished.patch:-p1 \
 		${FILESDIR}/0002-xen-rework-paging_log_dirty_op-to-work-with-hvm-gues.patch:-p1 \
 		${FILESDIR}/kconf_arch.patch:-p1 \
-		${FILESDIR}/xsa182-unstable.patch:-p1 \
-		${FILESDIR}/xsa183-unstable.patch:-p1
-
+		${FILESDIR}/xsa191.patch \
+		${FILESDIR}/xsa192.patch \
+		${FILESDIR}/xsa193-4.7.patch \
+		${FILESDIR}/xsa194.patch \
+		${FILESDIR}/xsa195.patch
 
 .include <bsd.port.options.mk>
 

Modified: branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/distinfo
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/distinfo	Sun Dec  4 19:35:14 2016	(r427795)
+++ branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/distinfo	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796)
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1467644898
-SHA256 (xen-4.7.0.tar.gz) = be5876144d49729572ae06142e0bb93f1c1f2695578141eff2931995add24623
-SIZE (xen-4.7.0.tar.gz) = 20702550
+TIMESTAMP = 1480690512
+SHA256 (xen-4.7.1.tar.gz) = e87f4b0575e78657ee23d31470a15ecf1ce8c3a92a771cda46bbcd4d0d671ffe
+SIZE (xen-4.7.1.tar.gz) = 20706864

Copied: branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa191.patch (from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa191.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa191.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa191.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Subject: x86/hvm: Fix the handling of non-present segments
+
+In 32bit, the data segments may be NULL to indicate that the segment is
+ineligible for use.  In both 32bit and 64bit, the LDT selector may be NULL to
+indicate that the entire LDT is ineligible for use.  However, nothing in Xen
+actually checks for this condition when performing other segmentation
+checks.  (Note however that limit and writeability checks are correctly
+performed).
+
+Neither Intel nor AMD specify the exact behaviour of loading a NULL segment.
+Experimentally, AMD zeroes all attributes but leaves the base and limit
+unmodified.  Intel zeroes the base, sets the limit to 0xfffffff and resets the
+attributes to just .G and .D/B.
+
+The use of the segment information in the VMCB/VMCS is equivalent to a native
+pipeline interacting with the segment cache.  The present bit can therefore
+have a subtly different meaning, and it is now cooked to uniformly indicate
+whether the segment is usable or not.
+
+GDTR and IDTR don't have access rights like the other segments, but for
+consistency, they are treated as being present so no special casing is needed
+elsewhere in the segmentation logic.
+
+AMD hardware does not consider the present bit for %cs and %tr, and will
+function as if they were present.  They are therefore unconditionally set to
+present when reading information from the VMCB, to maintain the new meaning of
+usability.
+
+Intel hardware has a separate unusable bit in the VMCS segment attributes.
+This bit is inverted and stored in the present field, so the hvm code can work
+with architecturally-common state.
+
+This is XSA-191.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c                 |  8 ++++++++
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c             |  4 ++++
+ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c             | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c |  4 ++++
+ 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+index 704fd64..deb1783 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+@@ -2512,6 +2512,10 @@ bool_t hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr(
+          */
+         addr = (uint32_t)(addr + reg->base);
+ 
++        /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
++        if ( !reg->attr.fields.p )
++            goto out;
++
+         switch ( access_type )
+         {
+         case hvm_access_read:
+@@ -2767,6 +2771,10 @@ static int hvm_load_segment_selector(
+     hvm_get_segment_register(
+         v, (sel & 4) ? x86_seg_ldtr : x86_seg_gdtr, &desctab);
+ 
++    /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
++    if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p )
++        goto fail;
++
+     /* Check against descriptor table limit. */
+     if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit )
+         goto fail;
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+index 16427f6..4cba406 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+@@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ static void svm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
+     {
+     case x86_seg_cs:
+         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->cs, sizeof(*reg));
++        reg->attr.fields.p = 1;
+         reg->attr.fields.g = reg->limit > 0xFFFFF;
+         break;
+     case x86_seg_ds:
+@@ -660,13 +661,16 @@ static void svm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
+     case x86_seg_tr:
+         svm_sync_vmcb(v);
+         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->tr, sizeof(*reg));
++        reg->attr.fields.p = 1;
+         reg->attr.fields.type |= 0x2;
+         break;
+     case x86_seg_gdtr:
+         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->gdtr, sizeof(*reg));
++        reg->attr.bytes = 0x80;
+         break;
+     case x86_seg_idtr:
+         memcpy(reg, &vmcb->idtr, sizeof(*reg));
++        reg->attr.bytes = 0x80;
+         break;
+     case x86_seg_ldtr:
+         svm_sync_vmcb(v);
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+index 9a8f694..a652c52 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+@@ -1035,10 +1035,12 @@ void vmx_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
+     reg->sel = sel;
+     reg->limit = limit;
+ 
+-    reg->attr.bytes = (attr & 0xff) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00);
+-    /* Unusable flag is folded into Present flag. */
+-    if ( attr & (1u<<16) )
+-        reg->attr.fields.p = 0;
++    /*
++     * Fold VT-x representation into Xen's representation.  The Present bit is
++     * unconditionally set to the inverse of unusable.
++     */
++    reg->attr.bytes =
++        (!(attr & (1u << 16)) << 7) | (attr & 0x7f) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00);
+ 
+     /* Adjust for virtual 8086 mode */
+     if ( v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmx_realmode && seg <= x86_seg_tr 
+@@ -1118,11 +1120,11 @@ static void vmx_set_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    attr = ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff);
+-
+-    /* Not-present must mean unusable. */
+-    if ( !reg->attr.fields.p )
+-        attr |= (1u << 16);
++    /*
++     * Unfold Xen representation into VT-x representation.  The unusable bit
++     * is unconditionally set to the inverse of present.
++     */
++    attr = (!(attr & (1u << 7)) << 16) | ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff);
+ 
+     /* VMX has strict consistency requirement for flag G. */
+     attr |= !!(limit >> 20) << 15;
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+index 7a707dc..7cb6f98 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+@@ -1367,6 +1367,10 @@ protmode_load_seg(
+                                  &desctab, ctxt)) )
+         return rc;
+ 
++    /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */
++    if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p )
++        goto raise_exn;
++
+     /* Check against descriptor table limit. */
+     if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit )
+         goto raise_exn;

Copied: branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa192.patch (from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa192.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa192.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa192.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/HVM: don't load LDTR with VM86 mode attrs during task switch
+
+Just like TR, LDTR is purely a protected mode facility and hence needs
+to be loaded accordingly. Also move its loading to where it
+architecurally belongs.
+
+This is XSA-192.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+@@ -2728,17 +2728,16 @@ static void hvm_unmap_entry(void *p)
+ }
+ 
+ static int hvm_load_segment_selector(
+-    enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel)
++    enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel, unsigned int eflags)
+ {
+     struct segment_register desctab, cs, segr;
+     struct desc_struct *pdesc, desc;
+     u8 dpl, rpl, cpl;
+     bool_t writable;
+     int fault_type = TRAP_invalid_tss;
+-    struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+     struct vcpu *v = current;
+ 
+-    if ( regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM )
++    if ( eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM )
+     {
+         segr.sel = sel;
+         segr.base = (uint32_t)sel << 4;
+@@ -2986,6 +2985,8 @@ void hvm_task_switch(
+     if ( rc != HVMCOPY_okay )
+         goto out;
+ 
++    if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt, 0) )
++        goto out;
+ 
+     if ( hvm_set_cr3(tss.cr3, 1) )
+         goto out;
+@@ -3008,13 +3009,12 @@ void hvm_task_switch(
+     }
+ 
+     exn_raised = 0;
+-    if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt) ||
+-         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es) ||
+-         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs) ||
+-         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss) ||
+-         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds) ||
+-         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs) ||
+-         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs) )
++    if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es, tss.eflags) ||
++         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs, tss.eflags) ||
++         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss, tss.eflags) ||
++         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds, tss.eflags) ||
++         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs, tss.eflags) ||
++         hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs, tss.eflags) )
+         exn_raised = 1;
+ 
+     rc = hvm_copy_to_guest_virt(

Copied: branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa193-4.7.patch (from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa193-4.7.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa193-4.7.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa193-4.7.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86/PV: writes of %fs and %gs base MSRs require canonical addresses
+
+Commit c42494acb2 ("x86: fix FS/GS base handling when using the
+fsgsbase feature") replaced the use of wrmsr_safe() on these paths
+without recognizing that wr{f,g}sbase() use just wrmsrl() and that the
+WR{F,G}SBASE instructions also raise #GP for non-canonical input.
+
+Similarly arch_set_info_guest() needs to prevent non-canonical
+addresses from getting stored into state later to be loaded by context
+switch code. For consistency also check stack pointers and LDT base.
+DR0..3, otoh, already get properly checked in set_debugreg() (albeit
+we discard the error there).
+
+The SHADOW_GS_BASE check isn't strictly necessary, but I think we
+better avoid trying the WRMSR if we know it's going to fail.
+
+This is XSA-193.
+
+Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+@@ -890,7 +890,13 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
+     {
+         if ( !compat )
+         {
+-            if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.eip) ||
++            if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rip) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rsp) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->kernel_sp) ||
++                 (c.nat->ldt_ents && !is_canonical_address(c.nat->ldt_base)) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->fs_base) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_kernel) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_user) ||
+                  !is_canonical_address(c.nat->event_callback_eip) ||
+                  !is_canonical_address(c.nat->syscall_callback_eip) ||
+                  !is_canonical_address(c.nat->failsafe_callback_eip) )
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+@@ -2723,19 +2723,22 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
+         switch ( regs->_ecx )
+         {
+         case MSR_FS_BASE:
+-            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
++            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
+                 goto fail;
+             wrfsbase(msr_content);
+             v->arch.pv_vcpu.fs_base = msr_content;
+             break;
+         case MSR_GS_BASE:
+-            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
++            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
+                 goto fail;
+             wrgsbase(msr_content);
+             v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_kernel = msr_content;
+             break;
+         case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE:
+-            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
++            if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
++                 !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
+                 goto fail;
+             if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, msr_content) )
+                 goto fail;

Copied: branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa194.patch (from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa194.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa194.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa194.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 71096b016f7fd54a72af73576948cb25cf42ebcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 15:02:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] libelf: fix stack memory leak when loading 32 bit symbol
+ tables
+
+The 32 bit Elf structs are smaller than the 64 bit ones, which means that
+when loading them there's some padding left uninitialized at the end of each
+struct (because the size indicated in e_ehsize and e_shentsize is
+smaller than the size of elf_ehdr and elf_shdr).
+
+Fix this by introducing a new helper that is used to set
+[caller_]xdest_{base/size} and that takes care of performing the appropriate
+memset of the region. This newly introduced helper is then used to set and
+unset xdest_{base/size} in elf_load_bsdsyms. Now that the full struct
+is zeroed, there's no need to specifically zero the undefined section.
+
+This is XSA-194.
+
+Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+
+Also remove the open coded (and redundant with the earlier
+elf_memset_unchecked()) use of caller_xdest_* from elf_init().
+
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+---
+ xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c | 14 +++-----------
+ xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c  | 11 +++++++++--
+ xen/include/xen/libelf.h          | 15 +++++++++------
+ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+index 4d3ae4d..bc1f87b 100644
+--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
++++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-loader.c
+@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ elf_errorstatus elf_init(struct elf_binary *elf, const char *image_input, size_t
+     elf->ehdr = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_ehdr, (elf_ptrval)image_input);
+     elf->class = elf_uval_3264(elf, elf->ehdr, e32.e_ident[EI_CLASS]);
+     elf->data = elf_uval_3264(elf, elf->ehdr, e32.e_ident[EI_DATA]);
+-    elf->caller_xdest_base = NULL;
+-    elf->caller_xdest_size = 0;
+ 
+     /* Sanity check phdr. */
+     offset = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_phoff) +
+@@ -284,9 +282,8 @@ do {                                                                \
+ #define SYMTAB_INDEX    1
+ #define STRTAB_INDEX    2
+ 
+-    /* Allow elf_memcpy_safe to write to symbol_header. */
+-    elf->caller_xdest_base = &header;
+-    elf->caller_xdest_size = sizeof(header);
++    /* Allow elf_memcpy_safe to write to header. */
++    elf_set_xdest(elf, &header, sizeof(header));
+ 
+     /*
+      * Calculate the position of the various elements in GUEST MEMORY SPACE.
+@@ -319,11 +316,7 @@ do {                                                                \
+     elf_store_field_bitness(elf, header_handle, e_phentsize, 0);
+     elf_store_field_bitness(elf, header_handle, e_phnum, 0);
+ 
+-    /* Zero the undefined section. */
+-    section_handle = ELF_MAKE_HANDLE(elf_shdr,
+-                     ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(&header.elf_header.section[SHN_UNDEF]));
+     shdr_size = elf_uval(elf, elf->ehdr, e_shentsize);
+-    elf_memset_safe(elf, ELF_HANDLE_PTRVAL(section_handle), 0, shdr_size);
+ 
+     /*
+      * The symtab section header is going to reside in section[SYMTAB_INDEX],
+@@ -404,8 +397,7 @@ do {                                                                \
+     }
+ 
+     /* Remove permissions from elf_memcpy_safe. */
+-    elf->caller_xdest_base = NULL;
+-    elf->caller_xdest_size = 0;
++    elf_set_xdest(elf, NULL, 0);
+ 
+ #undef SYMTAB_INDEX
+ #undef STRTAB_INDEX
+diff --git a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+index 5a4757b..e73e729 100644
+--- a/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
++++ b/xen/common/libelf/libelf-tools.c
+@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@ bool elf_access_ok(struct elf_binary * elf,
+         return 1;
+     if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->dest_base, elf->dest_size) )
+         return 1;
+-    if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size,
+-                             elf->caller_xdest_base, elf->caller_xdest_size) )
++    if ( elf_ptrval_in_range(ptrval, size, elf->xdest_base, elf->xdest_size) )
+         return 1;
+     elf_mark_broken(elf, "out of range access");
+     return 0;
+@@ -373,6 +372,14 @@ bool elf_phdr_is_loadable(struct elf_binary *elf, ELF_HANDLE_DECL(elf_phdr) phdr
+     return ((p_type == PT_LOAD) && (p_flags & (PF_R | PF_W | PF_X)) != 0);
+ }
+ 
++void elf_set_xdest(struct elf_binary *elf, void *addr, uint64_t size)
++{
++    elf->xdest_base = addr;
++    elf->xdest_size = size;
++    if ( addr != NULL )
++        elf_memset_safe(elf, ELF_REALPTR2PTRVAL(addr), 0, size);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Local variables:
+  * mode: C
+diff --git a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+index 95b5370..cf62bc7 100644
+--- a/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/libelf.h
+@@ -210,13 +210,11 @@ struct elf_binary {
+     uint64_t bsd_symtab_pend;
+ 
+     /*
+-     * caller's other acceptable destination
+-     *
+-     * Again, these are trusted and must be valid (or 0) so long
+-     * as the struct elf_binary is in use.
++     * caller's other acceptable destination.
++     * Set by elf_set_xdest.  Do not set these directly.
+      */
+-    void *caller_xdest_base;
+-    uint64_t caller_xdest_size;
++    void *xdest_base;
++    uint64_t xdest_size;
+ 
+ #ifndef __XEN__
+     /* misc */
+@@ -494,5 +492,10 @@ static inline void ELF_ADVANCE_DEST(struct elf_binary *elf, uint64_t amount)
+     }
+ }
+ 
++/* Specify a (single) additional destination, to which the image may
++ * cause writes.  As with dest_base and dest_size, the values provided
++ * are trusted and must be valid so long as the struct elf_binary
++ * is in use or until elf_set_xdest(,0,0) is called. */
++void elf_set_xdest(struct elf_binary *elf, void *addr, uint64_t size);
+ 
+ #endif /* __XEN_LIBELF_H__ */
+-- 
+2.1.4
+

Copied: branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa195.patch (from r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa195.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa195.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa195.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: x86emul: fix huge bit offset handling
+
+We must never chop off the high 32 bits.
+
+This is XSA-195.
+
+Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+@@ -2549,6 +2549,12 @@ x86_emulate(
+         else
+         {
+             /*
++             * Instructions such as bt can reference an arbitrary offset from
++             * their memory operand, but the instruction doing the actual
++             * emulation needs the appropriate op_bytes read from memory.
++             * Adjust both the source register and memory operand to make an
++             * equivalent instruction.
++             *
+              * EA       += BitOffset DIV op_bytes*8
+              * BitOffset = BitOffset MOD op_bytes*8
+              * DIV truncates towards negative infinity.
+@@ -2560,14 +2566,15 @@ x86_emulate(
+                 src.val = (int32_t)src.val;
+             if ( (long)src.val < 0 )
+             {
+-                unsigned long byte_offset;
+-                byte_offset = op_bytes + (((-src.val-1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes-1));
++                unsigned long byte_offset =
++                    op_bytes + (((-src.val - 1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L));
++
+                 ea.mem.off -= byte_offset;
+                 src.val = (byte_offset << 3) + src.val;
+             }
+             else
+             {
+-                ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1);
++                ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L);
+                 src.val &= (op_bytes << 3) - 1;
+             }
+         }

Modified: branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile	Sun Dec  4 19:35:14 2016	(r427795)
+++ branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796)
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	xen
 PKGNAMESUFFIX=	-tools
-PORTVERSION=	4.7.0
-PORTREVISION=   4
+PORTVERSION=	4.7.1
+PORTREVISION=   0
 CATEGORIES=	sysutils emulators
-MASTER_SITES=	http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/
+MASTER_SITES=	http://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${PORTVERSION}/
 
 MAINTAINER=	royger@FreeBSD.org
 COMMENT=	Xen management tool, based on LibXenlight
@@ -43,7 +43,10 @@ QEMU_ARGS=	--disable-gtk \
 		--disable-curl \
 		--cxx=c++
 
-EXTRA_PATCHES=	${FILESDIR}/var_paths.patch:-p1
+EXTRA_PATCHES=	${FILESDIR}/var_paths.patch:-p1 \
+		${FILESDIR}/xsa198.patch:-p1 \
+		${FILESDIR}/0001-libxl-fix-creation-of-pkgconf-install-dir.patch \
+		${FILESDIR}/0001-tools-configure-fix-pkg-config-install-path-for-Free.patch
 
 CONFIGURE_ARGS+=	--with-extra-qemuu-configure-args="${QEMU_ARGS}" \
 			--with-system-seabios=${LOCALBASE}/share/seabios/bios.bin

Modified: branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/distinfo
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/distinfo	Sun Dec  4 19:35:14 2016	(r427795)
+++ branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/distinfo	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796)
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1467644940
-SHA256 (xen-4.7.0.tar.gz) = be5876144d49729572ae06142e0bb93f1c1f2695578141eff2931995add24623
-SIZE (xen-4.7.0.tar.gz) = 20702550
+TIMESTAMP = 1480690512
+SHA256 (xen-4.7.1.tar.gz) = e87f4b0575e78657ee23d31470a15ecf1ce8c3a92a771cda46bbcd4d0d671ffe
+SIZE (xen-4.7.1.tar.gz) = 20706864

Copied: branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-libxl-fix-creation-of-pkgconf-install-dir.patch (from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-libxl-fix-creation-of-pkgconf-install-dir.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-libxl-fix-creation-of-pkgconf-install-dir.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-libxl-fix-creation-of-pkgconf-install-dir.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 45434adc3c94f5229744beaa12028aa23f63b9e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 16:56:39 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] libxl: fix creation of pkgconf install dir
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+When PKG_INSTALLDIR was introduced the creation of the previous pkgconf install
+directory was not changed. Fix this by correctly using PKG_INSTALLDIR for the
+directory creation in libxl Makefile.
+
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
+Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
+---
+ tools/libxl/Makefile | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/libxl/Makefile b/tools/libxl/Makefile
+index f5053a0..ef01785 100644
+--- a/tools/libxl/Makefile
++++ b/tools/libxl/Makefile
+@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ install: all
+ 	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(includedir)
+ 	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(BASH_COMPLETION_DIR)
+ 	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC_BIN)
+-	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(SHAREDIR)/pkgconfig
++	$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(PKG_INSTALLDIR)
+ 	$(INSTALL_PROG) xl $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+ 	$(INSTALL_PROG) libxl-save-helper $(DESTDIR)$(LIBEXEC_BIN)
+ 	$(INSTALL_SHLIB) libxenlight.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)
+-- 
+2.9.3 (Apple Git-75)
+

Copied: branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-tools-configure-fix-pkg-config-install-path-for-Free.patch (from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-tools-configure-fix-pkg-config-install-path-for-Free.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-tools-configure-fix-pkg-config-install-path-for-Free.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/0001-tools-configure-fix-pkg-config-install-path-for-Free.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 4000a7c7d7b0e01837abd3918e393f289c07d68c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2016 11:53:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tools/configure: fix pkg-config install path for FreeBSD
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+pkg-config from FreeBSD ports doesn't have ${prefix}/share/pkgconfig in the
+default search path, fix this by having a PKG_INSTALLDIR variable that can
+be changed on a per-OS basis.
+
+It would be best to use PKG_INSTALLDIR as defined by the pkg.m4 macro, but
+sadly this also reports a wrong value on FreeBSD (${libdir}/pkgconfig, which
+expands to /usr/local/lib/pkgconfig by default, and is also _not_ part of
+the default pkg-config search path).
+
+This patch should not change the behavior for Linux installs.
+
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Reported-by: Alexander Nusov <alexander.nusov@nfvexpress.com>
+Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
+Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
+---
+ config/FreeBSD.mk    | 1 +
+ config/Paths.mk.in   | 2 ++
+ tools/libxl/Makefile | 4 ++--
+ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/config/FreeBSD.mk b/config/FreeBSD.mk
+index bb3a5d0..afeaefb 100644
+--- a/config/FreeBSD.mk
++++ b/config/FreeBSD.mk
+@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ include $(XEN_ROOT)/config/StdGNU.mk
+ 
+ # No wget on FreeBSD base system
+ WGET = ftp
++PKG_INSTALLDIR = ${prefix}/libdata/pkgconfig
+diff --git a/config/Paths.mk.in b/config/Paths.mk.in
+index 62cea48..a603295 100644
+--- a/config/Paths.mk.in
++++ b/config/Paths.mk.in
+@@ -56,3 +56,5 @@ XENFIRMWAREDIR           := @XENFIRMWAREDIR@
+ 
+ XEN_CONFIG_DIR           := @XEN_CONFIG_DIR@
+ XEN_SCRIPT_DIR           := @XEN_SCRIPT_DIR@
++
++PKG_INSTALLDIR           := ${SHAREDIR}/pkgconfig
+diff --git a/tools/libxl/Makefile b/tools/libxl/Makefile
+index 79e4019..af0a3ad 100644
+--- a/tools/libxl/Makefile
++++ b/tools/libxl/Makefile
+@@ -320,8 +320,8 @@ install: all
+ 	$(INSTALL_DATA) libxlutil.a $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)
+ 	$(INSTALL_DATA) libxl.h libxl_event.h libxl_json.h _libxl_types.h _libxl_types_json.h _libxl_list.h libxl_utils.h libxl_uuid.h libxlutil.h $(DESTDIR)$(includedir)
+ 	$(INSTALL_DATA) bash-completion $(DESTDIR)$(BASH_COMPLETION_DIR)/xl.sh
+-	$(INSTALL_DATA) xenlight.pc $(DESTDIR)$(SHAREDIR)/pkgconfig/
+-	$(INSTALL_DATA) xlutil.pc $(DESTDIR)$(SHAREDIR)/pkgconfig/
++	$(INSTALL_DATA) xenlight.pc $(DESTDIR)$(PKG_INSTALLDIR)
++	$(INSTALL_DATA) xlutil.pc $(DESTDIR)$(PKG_INSTALLDIR)
+ 
+ .PHONY: clean
+ clean:
+-- 
+2.9.3 (Apple Git-75)
+

Copied: branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa197-qemuu.patch (from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa197-qemuu.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa197-qemuu.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa197-qemuu.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: xen: fix ioreq handling
+
+Avoid double fetches and bounds check size to avoid overflowing
+internal variables.
+
+This is XSA-197.
+
+Reported-by: yanghongke <yanghongke@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+
+--- a/xen-hvm.c
++++ b/xen-hvm.c
+@@ -810,6 +810,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_pio(ioreq_t *req)
+     trace_cpu_ioreq_pio(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
+                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
+ 
++    if (req->size > sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++        hw_error("PIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
++    }
++
+     if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
+         if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
+             req->data = do_inp(req->addr, req->size);
+@@ -846,6 +850,10 @@ static void cpu_ioreq_move(ioreq_t *req)
+     trace_cpu_ioreq_move(req, req->dir, req->df, req->data_is_ptr, req->addr,
+                          req->data, req->count, req->size);
+ 
++    if (req->size > sizeof(req->data)) {
++        hw_error("MMIO: bad size (%u)", req->size);
++    }
++
+     if (!req->data_is_ptr) {
+         if (req->dir == IOREQ_READ) {
+             for (i = 0; i < req->count; i++) {
+@@ -1010,11 +1018,13 @@ static int handle_buffered_iopage(XenIOS
+         req.df = 1;
+         req.type = buf_req->type;
+         req.data_is_ptr = 0;
++        xen_rmb();
+         qw = (req.size == 8);
+         if (qw) {
+             buf_req = &buf_page->buf_ioreq[(rdptr + 1) %
+                                            IOREQ_BUFFER_SLOT_NUM];
+             req.data |= ((uint64_t)buf_req->data) << 32;
++            xen_rmb();
+         }
+ 
+         handle_ioreq(state, &req);
+@@ -1045,7 +1055,11 @@ static void cpu_handle_ioreq(void *opaqu
+ 
+     handle_buffered_iopage(state);
+     if (req) {
+-        handle_ioreq(state, req);
++        ioreq_t copy = *req;
++
++        xen_rmb();
++        handle_ioreq(state, &copy);
++        req->data = copy.data;
+ 
+         if (req->state != STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS) {
+             fprintf(stderr, "Badness in I/O request ... not in service?!: "

Copied: branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa198.patch (from r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa198.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null	00:00:00 1970	(empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa198.patch	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796, copy of r427568, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa198.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 71a389ae940bc52bf897a6e5becd73fd8ede94c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2016 16:37:40 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pygrub: Properly quote results, when returning them to the
+ caller:
+
+* When the caller wants sexpr output, use `repr()'
+  This is what Xend expects.
+
+  The returned S-expressions are now escaped and quoted by Python,
+  generally using '...'.  Previously kernel and ramdisk were unquoted
+  and args was quoted with "..." but without proper escaping.  This
+  change may break toolstacks which do not properly dequote the
+  returned S-expressions.
+
+* When the caller wants "simple" output, crash if the delimiter is
+  contained in the returned value.
+
+  With --output-format=simple it does not seem like this could ever
+  happen, because the bootloader config parsers all take line-based
+  input from the various bootloader config files.
+
+  With --output-format=simple0, this can happen if the bootloader
+  config file contains nul bytes.
+
+This is XSA-198.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+Tested-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+---
+ tools/pygrub/src/pygrub | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
+index 40f9584..dd0c8f7 100755
+--- a/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
++++ b/tools/pygrub/src/pygrub
+@@ -721,14 +721,17 @@ def sniff_netware(fs, cfg):
+     return cfg
+ 
+ def format_sxp(kernel, ramdisk, args):
+-    s = "linux (kernel %s)" % kernel
++    s = "linux (kernel %s)" % repr(kernel)
+     if ramdisk:
+-        s += "(ramdisk %s)" % ramdisk
++        s += "(ramdisk %s)" % repr(ramdisk)
+     if args:
+-        s += "(args \"%s\")" % args
++        s += "(args %s)" % repr(args)
+     return s
+                 
+ def format_simple(kernel, ramdisk, args, sep):
++    for check in (kernel, ramdisk, args):
++        if check is not None and sep in check:
++            raise RuntimeError, "simple format cannot represent delimiter-containing value"
+     s = ("kernel %s" % kernel) + sep
+     if ramdisk:
+         s += ("ramdisk %s" % ramdisk) + sep
+-- 
+2.1.4
+

Modified: branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/pkg-plist
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/pkg-plist	Sun Dec  4 19:35:14 2016	(r427795)
+++ branches/2016Q4/sysutils/xen-tools/pkg-plist	Sun Dec  4 19:37:31 2016	(r427796)
@@ -514,8 +514,8 @@ sbin/xl
 %%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/misc/xl-psr.html
 %%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/misc/xsm-flask.txt
 %%PORTDOCS%%%%DOCSDIR%%/html/misc/livepatch.html
-share/pkgconfig/xenlight.pc
-share/pkgconfig/xlutil.pc
+libdata/pkgconfig/xenlight.pc
+libdata/pkgconfig/xlutil.pc
 share/qemu-xen/qemu/QEMU,cgthree.bin
 share/qemu-xen/qemu/QEMU,tcx.bin
 share/qemu-xen/qemu/acpi-dsdt.aml



Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?201612041937.uB4JbVBk065617>