From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Nov 24 22:17:22 2008 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EB4610656A5 for ; Mon, 24 Nov 2008 22:17:22 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from stas@FreeBSD.org) Received: from smtp.ht-systems.ru (mr0.ht-systems.ru [78.110.50.55]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C56558FC0A for ; Mon, 24 Nov 2008 22:17:21 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from stas@FreeBSD.org) Received: from [85.21.245.235] (helo=orion.SpringDaemons.com) by smtp.ht-systems.ru with esmtpa (Exim 4.62) (envelope-from ) id 1L4jQ1-0001h4-8W; Tue, 25 Nov 2008 00:56:33 +0300 Received: from orion (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by orion.SpringDaemons.com (Postfix) with SMTP id A5530398F4; Tue, 25 Nov 2008 00:57:59 +0300 (MSK) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2008 00:57:55 +0300 From: Stanislav Sedov To: Nate Eldredge Message-Id: <20081125005755.d962ddf0.stas@FreeBSD.org> In-Reply-To: References: <200811241747.mAOHlDSE034716@freefall.freebsd.org> Organization: The FreeBSD Project X-XMPP: ssedov@jabber.ru X-Voice: +7 916 849 20 23 X-PGP-Fingerprint: F21E D6CC 5626 9609 6CE2 A385 2BF5 5993 EB26 9581 X-Mailer: carrier-pigeon Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:11.arc4random X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2008 22:17:22 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Mon, 24 Nov 2008 10:07:18 -0800 (PST) Nate Eldredge mentioned: > Upon reading this, my first question was whether the weakness applies to > the random numbers supplied by /dev/random. If it does, then userspace has > been getting non-random values, and things like PGP and SSH keys could be > compromised. It might be good for secteam to clarify this, IMHO. > Userland applications are unaffected ssh keys included. /dev/[u]?random receives entropy from Yarrow, not from arc4random and feeded with saved entropy upon boot by /etc/rc.d/initrandom. Only kernel services that rely on arc4random(9) is vulnerable. - -- Stanislav Sedov ST4096-RIPE -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iEYEARECAAYFAkkrI2cACgkQK/VZk+smlYGvrwCfTEuy+4AIk/b6l6bxRX0tcVs0 PZMAniLO3ltjq5232cErhAtB7u5SJI4J =UmVN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----