Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 22:06:30 -0600 From: Alan Somers <asomers@freebsd.org> To: Konstantin Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com> Cc: "freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org" <hackers@freebsd.org> Subject: Re: How does the stack's guard page work on amd64? Message-ID: <CAOtMX2iS2uoUC7oJTvw3nB1j9Tx_Gj4ULDaKqou3j5nyLjiRXw@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <YGRbLLeyqsYa9fp7@kib.kiev.ua> References: <CAOtMX2i5d0c9E=W=S6aKp1j5JczaaTqKDX8kW=2NqF=i35dWog@mail.gmail.com> <YGLwv%2BKkmhxeeJUp@kib.kiev.ua> <CAOtMX2gM9n%2BnYEErtv_FmQkJAB5JJ4tpXGydB6oo8qoEjq57yg@mail.gmail.com> <YGRbLLeyqsYa9fp7@kib.kiev.ua>
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On Wed, Mar 31, 2021 at 5:21 AM Konstantin Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 08:28:09PM -0600, Alan Somers wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 3:35 AM Konstantin Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Mar 29, 2021 at 11:06:36PM -0600, Alan Somers wrote: > > > > Rust tries to detect stack overflow and handles it differently than > other > > > > segfaults, but it's currently broken on FreeBSD/amd64. I've got a > patch > > > > that fixes the problem, but I would like someone to confirm my > reasoning. > > > > > > > > It seems like FreeBSD's main thread stacks include a guard page at > the > > > > bottom. However, when Rust tries to create its own guard page (by > > > > re-mmap()ping and mprotect()ing it), it seems like FreeBSD's guard > page > > > > automatically moves up into the un-remapped region. At least, > that's how > > > > it behaves, based on the addresses that segfault. Is that correct? > > > Show the facts. For instance, procstat -v (and a note which > > > mapping was established by runtime for the 'guard') would tell the > whole > > > story. > > > > > > My guess would be that procctl(PROC_STACKGAP_CTL, > &PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE) > > > would be enough. Cannot tell without specific data. > > > > > > > > > > > For other threads, Rust doesn't try to remap the guard page, it just > > > relies > > > > on the guard page created by libthr in _thr_stack_alloc. > > > > > > > > Finally, what changed in between FreeBSD 10.3 and 11.4? Rust's stack > > > > overflow detection worked in 10.3. > > > > > > > > -Alan > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org mailing list > > > > https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-hackers > > > > To unsubscribe, send any mail to " > > > freebsd-hackers-unsubscribe@freebsd.org" > > > > > > > Here is the relevant portion of procstat -v for a test program built with > > the buggy rustc: > > 651 0x801554000 0x80155d000 rw- 0 17 3 0 ----- > df > > 651 0x801600000 0x801e00000 rw- 30 30 1 0 ----- > df > > 651 0x7fffdfffd000 0x7fffdfffe000 --- 0 0 0 0 ----- > -- > > 651 0x7fffdfffe000 0x7fffdffff000 --- 0 0 0 0 ----- > -- > > <--- What Rustc thinks is the guard page > > 651 0x7fffdffff000 0x7fffe0000000 --- 0 0 0 0 ----- > -- > > <--- Where did this come from? > This is the stack grow area, occupied by 'elastic' guard entry. > It serves two purposes: > 1. it keeps the space, preventing other non-fixed mappings from selecting > the grow area for mapping. > 2. it prevents stack from growing down to the next mapping below it, > preventing issues like StackClash. > > See mmap(2) esp. MAP_STACK part of it. > I saw that. And I even saw where libthr uses MAP_STACK when creating new threads. However, this program is single-threaded. Where does the stack get created for a process's main thread? I couldn't find that. > > > 651 0x7fffe0000000 0x7fffe001e000 rw- 30 30 1 0 ---D- > df > > 651 0x7fffe001e000 0x7fffe003e000 rw- 32 32 1 0 ---D- > df > > > > Rustc tries to create that guard page by finding the base address of the > > stack, reallocating one page, then mprotect()ing it, like this: > > > mmap(0x7fffdfffe000,0x1000,0x3<PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE>,0x1012<MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANON>,0xffffffff,0) > > mprotect(0x7fffdfffe000,0x1000,0<PROT_NONE>) > > > > If I patch rustc to not attempt to allocate a guard page, then its memory > > map looks like this. Notice that 0x7fffdffff000 is now accessible > It is accessible because stack grown down into this address. > > > 662 0x801531000 0x80155b000 rw- 3 17 3 0 ----- > df > > 662 0x801600000 0x801e00000 rw- 30 30 1 0 ----- > df > > 662 0x7fffdfffd000 0x7fffdfffe000 --- 0 0 0 0 ----- > -- > > 662 0x7fffdfffe000 0x7fffdffff000 --- 0 0 0 0 ----- > -- > > 662 0x7fffdffff000 0x7fffe001e000 rw- 31 31 1 0 ---D- > df > > 662 0x7fffe001e000 0x7fffe003e000 rw- 32 32 1 0 ---D- > df > > > > So the real question is, why does 0x7fffdffff000 become protected when > > rustc protects 0x7fffdfffe000 ? > See above. > > As I said in earlier response, if you want fully shrinkable stack guard, > set procctl(PROC_STACKGAP_CTL, &PROC_STACKGAP_DISABLE) during runtime > initialization. > > Or better, do not create custom guard page at all, relying on system guard. > That's what my patch does. But I've only tested it on amd64, and I don't have access to alternative architectures. Does every architecture create a stack guard this way? -Alan
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