From owner-freebsd-security  Tue May  4 10: 9:47 1999
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Date: Tue, 04 May 1999 10:08:51 -0700
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From: David Honig <honig@sprynet.com>
Subject: BSD & /dev/random web page
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I've posted a small collection of my BSD and 
crypto-randomness-related pages at
http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Code/4704/

This includes MUST code in C (and a PDF copy of Maurer's paper), How to
instrument BSD with sysctl,How to Verify your IPsec, and studies of
/dev/random.  The site collects in a permenant place the hacks 
that I've posted in various fora.  

I've included a modified BSD random_machdep.c file on the web site
which includes  sysctl  switches for various parts of
the /dev/random system.  With this, I've observed: 

By replacing the MD5 hash with an insecure version, 
(so you can 'see' into the random pool)
you can monitor, in real-time, the entropy of your
random pool ("cat /dev/urandom | uliscan")
and see the effect of various interrupts
as they temporarily boost the entropy.  This study is
in progress.










  






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