From owner-freebsd-security Fri Dec 18 23:49:46 1998 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id XAA08189 for freebsd-security-outgoing; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 23:49:46 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from gatekeeper.tsc.tdk.com (gatekeeper.tsc.tdk.com [207.113.159.21]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id XAA08183 for ; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 23:49:45 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from gdonl@tsc.tdk.com) Received: from sunrise.gv.tsc.tdk.com (root@sunrise.gv.tsc.tdk.com [192.168.241.191]) by gatekeeper.tsc.tdk.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id XAA26811; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 23:44:36 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from gdonl@tsc.tdk.com) Received: from salsa.gv.tsc.tdk.com (salsa.gv.tsc.tdk.com [192.168.241.194]) by sunrise.gv.tsc.tdk.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id WAA24356; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 22:43:08 -0800 (PST) Received: (from gdonl@localhost) by salsa.gv.tsc.tdk.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) id WAA11564; Fri, 18 Dec 1998 22:41:45 -0800 (PST) From: Don Lewis Message-Id: <199812190641.WAA11564@salsa.gv.tsc.tdk.com> Date: Fri, 18 Dec 1998 22:41:45 -0800 In-Reply-To: Poul-Henning Kamp "Re: A better explanation (was: buffer overflows and chroot)" (Dec 18, 9:00pm) X-Mailer: Mail User's Shell (7.2.6 alpha(3) 7/19/95) To: Poul-Henning Kamp , "Marco Molteni" Subject: Re: A better explanation (was: buffer overflows and chroot) Cc: "Jordan K. Hubbard" , freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org On Dec 18, 9:00pm, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote: } Subject: Re: A better explanation (was: buffer overflows and chroot) } I have a set of patches which makes a chroot jail escape proof. These } were developed under contract and will end up in FreeBSD sometime over } the next year. My client wants to get a head start, and that is only } fair. A year or so ago I implemented a more limited scheme to prevent access to the filesystem outside the chroot area. I'm in the process of cleaning it up and hope to post my patches soon. } The basic concept is that root is only root in a jail if the filesystem } protects the rest of the system, otherwise he isn't. For instance he } can change the owner or modes on a file, but he cannot change IP# on } an interface. He can bind to a priviledged TCP port, but only on the } IP# which belongs to the jail. And so forth. Works pretty well. The IP restrictions would be very handy for some of the stuff that I do. Can a process in jail kill() a process outside jail? Can the compartments nest? To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message