From owner-freebsd-security Mon Jan 29 12:51:34 2001 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 758) id B149137B69D; Mon, 29 Jan 2001 12:51:06 -0800 (PST) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-01:12.periodic Reply-To: security-advisories@freebsd.org Message-Id: <20010129205106.B149137B69D@hub.freebsd.org> Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2001 12:51:06 -0800 (PST) Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-01:12 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: periodic uses insecure temporary files Category: core Module: periodic Announced: 2001-01-29 Credits: dynamo Affects: FreeBSD 4.1-STABLE after 2000-09-20, 4.1.1-RELEASE, and 4.1.1-STABLE prior to the correction date. No FreeBSD 3.x versions are affected. Corrected: 2000-11-11 FreeBSD only: Yes I. Background periodic is a program to run periodic system functions. II. Problem Description A vulnerability was inadvertently introduced into periodic that caused temporary files with insecure file names to be used in the system's temporary directory. This may allow a malicious local user to cause arbitrary files on the system to be corrupted. By default, periodic is normally called by cron for daily, weekly, and monthly maintenance. Because these scripts run as root, an attacker may potentially corrupt any file on the system. FreeBSD 4.1-STABLE after 2000-09-20, 4.1.1-RELEASE, and 4.1.1-STABLE prior to the correction date are vulnerable. The problem was corrected prior to the release of FreeBSD 4.2. III. Impact Malicious local users can cause arbitrary files on the system to be corrupted. IV. Workaround Do not allow periodic to be used in untrusted multi-user environments. Disable the normal periodic system maintenance scripts by either commenting-out or removing the periodic entries in /etc/crontab. V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade the vulnerable FreeBSD system to 4.1.1-STABLE after the correction date. 2) Affected FreeBSD 4.x systems prior to the correction date: Download the patch and the detached PGP signature from the following locations, and verify the signature using your PGP utility. ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:12/periodic.patch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:12/periodic.patch.asc Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/periodic # patch -p < /path/to/patch # make depend && make all install -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.4 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iQCVAwUBOnXXDlUuHi5z0oilAQF2ngP6AoaNPtHkCuJwT07dKfayh9GH14G1HXsK SN3LznlLG3CyK4WBVGnx32p5Ct3zP0sO0QS+UAY9hMDMBprkUN6ewfuJ7gjczffv GgVBeWRxOOdH+/wpYkcTsg7sxKFWqg+xSZAzJEDBAqiFigf/xIrrrCtrDiDvGED2 8/9DxH59f0g= =ZUss -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message