From owner-freebsd-fs@FreeBSD.ORG Fri Apr 28 13:00:38 2006 Return-Path: X-Original-To: freebsd-fs@freebsd.org Delivered-To: freebsd-fs@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18DD716A401 for ; Fri, 28 Apr 2006 13:00:38 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from kostikbel@gmail.com) Received: from fw.zoral.com.ua (ll-227.216.82.212.sovam.net.ua [212.82.216.227]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36B8943D45 for ; Fri, 28 Apr 2006 13:00:36 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from kostikbel@gmail.com) Received: from deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua (root@deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua [10.1.1.148]) by fw.zoral.com.ua (8.13.4/8.13.4) with ESMTP id k3SD0VWw024180 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO) for ; Fri, 28 Apr 2006 16:00:31 +0300 (EEST) (envelope-from kostikbel@gmail.com) Received: from deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua (kostik@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id k3SD0UPU002874 for ; Fri, 28 Apr 2006 16:00:30 +0300 (EEST) (envelope-from kostikbel@gmail.com) Received: (from kostik@localhost) by deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua (8.13.6/8.13.6/Submit) id k3SD0UPr002873 for freebsd-fs@freebsd.org; Fri, 28 Apr 2006 16:00:30 +0300 (EEST) (envelope-from kostikbel@gmail.com) X-Authentication-Warning: deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua: kostik set sender to kostikbel@gmail.com using -f Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 16:00:30 +0300 From: Kostik Belousov To: freebsd-fs@freebsd.org Message-ID: <20060428130030.GC1270@deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2.1i X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV version 0.88.1, clamav-milter version 0.88.1 on fw.zoral.com.ua X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.4 required=5.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED autolearn=failed version=3.1.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.1.1 (2006-03-10) on fw.zoral.com.ua Subject: vn_lock & ffs_snapremove X-BeenThere: freebsd-fs@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: Filesystems List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 13:00:38 -0000 Look at the two code fragments 1. from vn_lock(9): error = VOP_LOCK(vp, flags | LK_INTERLOCK, td); flags &= ~LK_INTERLOCK; KASSERT((flags & LK_RETRY) == 0 || error == 0, ("LK_RETRY set with incompatible flags %d\n", flags)); /* * Callers specify LK_RETRY if they wish to get dead vnodes. * If RETRY is not set, we return ENOENT instead. */ if (error == 0 && vp->v_iflag & VI_DOOMED && (flags & LK_RETRY) == 0) { VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); error = ENOENT; break; } 2. ffs_snapremove(9): (vp->v_vnlock for snapshot vnode vp points to sn_snlock) lkp = vp->v_vnlock; vp->v_vnlock = &vp->v_lock; Is there anything that would prevent these two fragments to intervene ? Esp. bad looks the situation where VOP_LOCK() from vn_lock executed and locked doomed snapshot vnode, after that ffs_snapremove replaces vnode lock and VOP_UNLOCK attempted on _another_ lock. If this scenario can happen (as it seems), then, probably, some measures like transferlockers(9) are needed ?