Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 16:29:46 +0200 From: Jan Bramkamp <crest@rlwinm.de> To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-19:07.mds Message-ID: <4d441f47-b81c-bcde-c7e2-a8906c4d134b@rlwinm.de> In-Reply-To: <cdf6982694db447985b15e9170256fe5@exch-02.redcom.com> References: <20190515000302.44CBB1AB79@freefall.freebsd.org> <cdf6982694db447985b15e9170256fe5@exch-02.redcom.com>
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On 15.05.19 14:18, Wall, Stephen wrote: >> New CPU microcode may be available in a BIOS update from your system vendor, >> or by installing the devcpu-data package or sysutils/devcpu-data port. >> Ensure that the BIOS update or devcpu-data package is dated after 2014-05-14. >> >> If using the package or port the microcode update can be applied at boot time >> by adding the following lines to the system's /boot/loader.conf: >> >> cpu_microcode_load="YES" >> cpu_microcode_name="/boot/firmware/intel-ucode.bin" > Is this applicable in a virtualized environment, or only on bare metal? > If not applicable in a VM, is it at least harmless? Afaik you can't modify the microcode inside a VM, but give them time. I'm sure Intel optimized that security check away as well in some corner case yet to be discovered.home | help
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