Date: Sat, 19 Dec 1998 05:35:27 -0500 From: Garance A Drosihn <drosih@rpi.edu> To: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@critter.freebsd.dk>, "Marco Molteni" <molter@tin.it> Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: A better explanation (was: buffer overflows and chroot) Message-ID: <v04011702b2a12f242936@[128.113.24.47]> In-Reply-To: <11082.914011256@critter.freebsd.dk> References: Your message of "Fri, 18 Dec 1998 19:57:07 %2B0100." <Pine.BSF.3.96.981218193124.339A-100000@nympha>
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At 9:00 PM +0100 12/18/98, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote: > The basic concept is that root is only root in a jail if the > filesystem protects the rest of the system, otherwise he isn't. > For instance he can change the owner or modes on a file, but he > cannot change IP# on an interface. He can bind to a priviledged > TCP port, but only on the IP# which belongs to the jail. And so > forth. Works pretty well. I can see that this could be very useful in many chroot-ish situations. Given the nature of the research Marco described, though, I would expect "Bob" would want to test many programs which are doing privileged operations. I would think it would be a lot of work to setup a chroot jail which could run all those programs. (or at least, if *I* were the "Bob" in this example, I know what *I* would mean by "I want to research buffer overflows in setuid programs"...) Your changes do sound pretty interesting, though. --- Garance Alistair Drosehn = gad@eclipse.its.rpi.edu Senior Systems Programmer or drosih@rpi.edu Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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