From owner-freebsd-current Sun Jan 20 16:17:49 2002 Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from flood.ping.uio.no (flood.ping.uio.no [129.240.78.31]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25BFE37B416 for ; Sun, 20 Jan 2002 16:17:46 -0800 (PST) Received: by flood.ping.uio.no (Postfix, from userid 2602) id AD4A3533B; Mon, 21 Jan 2002 01:17:44 +0100 (CET) X-URL: http://www.ofug.org/~des/ X-Disclaimer: The views expressed in this message do not necessarily coincide with those of any organisation or company with which I am or have been affiliated. To: "Andrey A. Chernov" Cc: Mark Murray , current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Step5, pam_opie OPIE auth fix for review References: <20020120220254.GA25886@nagual.pp.ru> <200201202314.g0KNEDt34526@grimreaper.grondar.org> <20020120233050.GA26913@nagual.pp.ru> <20020121000446.GB27206@nagual.pp.ru> From: Dag-Erling Smorgrav Date: 21 Jan 2002 01:17:44 +0100 In-Reply-To: <20020121000446.GB27206@nagual.pp.ru> Message-ID: Lines: 30 User-Agent: Gnus/5.0808 (Gnus v5.8.8) Emacs/21.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk List-ID: List-Archive: (Web Archive) List-Help: (List Instructions) List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG "Andrey A. Chernov" writes: > The basic OPIE/S-KEY idea under that was that normally only one-time > password is allowed, i.e. user is not allowed to type plaintext passwords > at all because connection treated as totally insecured one. > > But for very special cases configured by sysadmin, like working in the > same machine or trusted subnet, OPIE/S-KEY additionally allows plaintext > password too, depending on its own configuration. That's what PAM is for. If fixed (not necessary plaintext!) passwords are allowed, the admin will mark pam_opie as "sufficient" and place pam_unix below it; if they're not, he'll just remove pam_unix. The current system, BTW, leaves the policy in the hands of the user, as she can create or remove ~/.opie_always at will. A security policy which is based on letting the user decide what is sufficient authentication and what is not is not a proper security policy. > > In any case, if I understand what you're trying to do, it can be done > > by [...] > It sounds good, I'll run a test case and inform you about results. Actually, that idea won't work, because PAM will ignore PAM_AUTH_ERR from a "sufficient" module. A "requisite" helper module, placed after pam_opie, which fails if ~/.opie_always exists would do the trick, if one really wanted this. DES -- Dag-Erling Smorgrav - des@ofug.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message