From owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Fri May 21 01:14:33 2004 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC76716A4CE; Fri, 21 May 2004 01:14:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from cell.sick.ru (cell.sick.ru [217.72.144.68]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1AE4843D1F; Fri, 21 May 2004 01:14:33 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from glebius@cell.sick.ru) Received: from cell.sick.ru (glebius@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by cell.sick.ru (8.12.9/8.12.8) with ESMTP id i4L8EKvw089369 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 21 May 2004 12:14:20 +0400 (MSD) (envelope-from glebius@cell.sick.ru) Received: (from glebius@localhost) by cell.sick.ru (8.12.9/8.12.6/Submit) id i4L8EJo6089368; Fri, 21 May 2004 12:14:19 +0400 (MSD) Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 12:14:19 +0400 From: Gleb Smirnoff To: Pawel Jakub Dawidek Message-ID: <20040521081419.GB89262@cell.sick.ru> References: <20040520220145.GN4567@genius.tao.org.uk> <20040521080218.GY845@darkness.comp.waw.pl> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=koi8-r Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20040521080218.GY845@darkness.comp.waw.pl> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6i cc: Josef Karthauser cc: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Call for a hacker.... security.bsd.see_other_uids in jails only X-BeenThere: freebsd-current@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions about the use of FreeBSD-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 08:14:34 -0000 On Fri, May 21, 2004 at 10:02:18AM +0200, Pawel Jakub Dawidek wrote: P> Implementation wouldn't be probably too hard, but I can't agree it should P> be committed. We need to know where jail's virtualization ends and I think P> it is too far. Of course it will be cool to have those sysctl on per-jail P> basics, as well as others from security.bsd. tree P> (like security.bsd.suser_enabled), but I'm not sure this is the right way P> to go. P> P> Any other opinions? If someone convince me we should do it, I can do it. A more general solution will be better, but harder to implement: make some sysctl branches (e.g. security.bsd) local per jail, and possibility to change them only from host machine. -- Totus tuus, Glebius. GLEBIUS-RIPN GLEB-RIPE