From owner-freebsd-stable Mon Aug 28 17:10:42 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Received: from cybercable.fr (r121m50.cybercable.tm.fr [195.132.121.50]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6FD137B424 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2000 17:10:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from mux@localhost) by cybercable.fr (8.11.0/8.11.0) id e7T0D2W01514 for freebsd-stable@freebsd.org; Tue, 29 Aug 2000 02:13:02 +0200 (CEST) (envelope-from mux) Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2000 02:13:02 +0200 From: Maxime Henrion To: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Subject: [security-advisories@freebsd.org: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:42.linux] Message-ID: <20000829021302.A1506@cybercable.fr> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i Sender: owner-freebsd-stable@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG I didn't see this in freebsd-stable so i forward it. ----- Forwarded message from FreeBSD Security Advisories ----- Approved-By: aleph1@SECURITYFOCUS.COM Delivered-To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2000 12:03:08 -0700 Reply-To: security-advisories@freebsd.org Comments: RFC822 error: Incorrect or incomplete address field found and ignored. From: FreeBSD Security Advisories Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:42.linux To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM X-UIDL: %3\!!Tfhd97Pfd99XIe9 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-00:42 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: Linux binary compatability mode can cause system compromise Category: core Module: kernel Announced: 2000-08-28 Credits: Boris Nikolaus Affects: FreeBSD 3.x, 4.x and 5.x prior to the correction date Corrected: 2000-07-23 (FreeBSD 5.0-CURRENT) 2000-07-29 (FreeBSD 4.1-STABLE) 2000-08-24 (FreeBSD 3.5-STABLE) FreeBSD only: Yes I. Background FreeBSD is binary-compatible with the Linux operating system through a loadable kernel module/optional kernel component. II. Problem Description The linux binary-compatability module implements a "shadow" filesystem hierarchy rooted in /compat/linux, which is overlayed against the regular filesystem hierarchy so that Linux binaries "see" files in the shadow hierarchy which can mask the native files. Filenames in this shadow hierarchy are treated incorrectly by the linux kernel module under certain circumstances, and a kernel stack overflow leading to a system compromise by an unprivileged user may be possible when very long filenames are used. This is only possible when the linux kernel module is loaded, or the equivalent functionality is statically compiled into the kernel. It is not enabled by default. This vulnerability was fixed just after the release of FreeBSD 4.1-RELEASE, and 3.5-RELEASE is also vulnerable. III. Impact Local users may be able to obtain root privileges on the system when linux compatability mode is enabled. IV. Workaround To determine whether the linux compatability module has been loaded, execute the following command as root and look for a 'linux.ko' entry: # kldstat Id Refs Address Size Name 1 7 0xc0100000 270be0 kernel 2 1 0xc0371000 5540 vesa.ko 3 1 0xc0377000 10094 randomdev.ko 4 1 0xc0e17000 4e000 nfs.ko 5 1 0xc0e83000 11000 linux.ko If present, unload the "linux" module by executing the following command as root: # kldunload linux For safety, remove the /modules/linux.ko file to prevent it being reloaded accidentally, and add or change the following line in /etc/rc.conf: linux_enable="NO" # Linux binary compatibility loaded at startup (or NO). If the module is not loaded, to determine whether the functionality has been statically compiled into the kernel, check the kernel configuration file for the following line: options COMPAT_LINUX If present, remove and recompile the kernel as described in http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the system. V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable FreeBSD system to 3.5-STABLE, 4.1-STABLE or 5.0-CURRENT after the respective correction dates. 2) Apply the patch below and recompile your kernel. Either save this advisory to a file, or download the patch and detached PGP signature from the following locations, and verify the signature using your PGP utility. ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:42/linux.patch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:42/linux.patch.asc # cd /usr/src/sys/i386/linux # patch -p < /path/to/patch_or_advisory [ Recompile your kernel as described in http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the system ] Index: linux_misc.c =================================================================== RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/i386/linux/linux_misc.c,v retrieving revision 1.77.2.3 retrieving revision 1.77.2.4 diff -u -r1.77.2.3 -r1.77.2.4 --- linux_misc.c 2000/07/20 05:31:56 1.77.2.3 +++ linux_misc.c 2000/07/30 05:36:11 1.77.2.4 @@ -954,6 +954,8 @@ tv[1].tv_usec = 0; /* so that utimes can copyin */ tvp = (struct timeval *)stackgap_alloc(&sg, sizeof(tv)); + if (tvp == NULL) + return (ENAMETOOLONG); if ((error = copyout(tv, tvp, sizeof(tv)))) return error; bsdutimes.tptr = tvp; Index: linux_util.c =================================================================== RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/i386/linux/linux_util.c,v retrieving revision 1.9.2.1 retrieving revision 1.9.2.2 diff -u -r1.9.2.1 -r1.9.2.2 --- linux_util.c 2000/07/07 01:23:45 1.9.2.1 +++ linux_util.c 2000/07/30 05:36:11 1.9.2.2 @@ -162,7 +162,10 @@ else { sz = &ptr[len] - buf; *pbuf = stackgap_alloc(sgp, sz + 1); - error = copyout(buf, *pbuf, sz); + if (*pbuf != NULL) + error = copyout(buf, *pbuf, sz); + else + error = ENAMETOOLONG; free(buf, M_TEMP); } Index: linux_util.h =================================================================== RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/i386/linux/linux_util.h,v retrieving revision 1.10 retrieving revision 1.10.2.1 diff -u -r1.10 -r1.10.2.1 --- linux_util.h 1999/12/04 11:10:22 1.10 +++ linux_util.h 2000/07/30 05:36:11 1.10.2.1 @@ -56,29 +56,27 @@ static __inline caddr_t stackgap_init(void); static __inline void *stackgap_alloc(caddr_t *, size_t); +#define szsigcode (*(curproc->p_sysent->sv_szsigcode)) + static __inline caddr_t stackgap_init() { -#define szsigcode (*(curproc->p_sysent->sv_szsigcode)) return (caddr_t)(PS_STRINGS - szsigcode - SPARE_USRSPACE); } - static __inline void * stackgap_alloc(sgp, sz) caddr_t *sgp; size_t sz; { - void *p = (void *) *sgp; - *sgp += ALIGN(sz); + void *p = (void *) *sgp; + + sz = ALIGN(sz); + if (*sgp + sz > (caddr_t)(PS_STRINGS - szsigcode)) + return NULL; + *sgp += sz; return p; } - -#ifdef DEBUG_LINUX -#define DPRINTF(a) printf a; -#else -#define DPRINTF(a) -#endif extern const char linux_emul_path[]; -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBOaq1wFUuHi5z0oilAQFcVQQAlYhhDM6T/qEDqVTvG9yr9mv++LVGqqRE SI4MEbmwbV5NvmFqTM2OzGpKsUaAy9gEfA5mjVKR+PRFoY7g68heFGAKWSRHmgs5 ramrzVxBHOeviaHeAXpH7LgJOdFo8EwhqehLtv+M0I5n9JJjPvAEWXG9cdiYXTto pKJAPVXr9NU= =r8gN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- End forwarded message ----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-stable" in the body of the message