Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 07:34:17 +0000 From: bugzilla-noreply@freebsd.org To: freebsd-stable@FreeBSD.org Subject: [Bug 207463] [patch] stable/10/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c:pfioctl(DIOCRSETADDRS) buffer overflow Message-ID: <bug-207463-8075-qQyiapchij@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/> In-Reply-To: <bug-207463-8075@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/> References: <bug-207463-8075@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/>
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https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D207463 --- Comment #3 from commit-hook@freebsd.org --- A commit references this bug: Author: kp Date: Thu Feb 25 07:33:59 UTC 2016 New revision: 296025 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/296025 Log: pf: Fix possible out-of-bounds write In the DIOCRSETADDRS ioctl() handler we allocate a table for struct pfr_addrs, which is processed in pfr_set_addrs(). At the users request we also provi= de feedback on the deleted addresses, by storing them after the new list ('bcopy(&ad, addr + size + i, sizeof(ad));' in pfr_set_addrs()). This means we write outside the bounds of the buffer we've just allocated. We need to look at pfrio_size2 instead (i.e. the size the user reserved f= or our feedback). That'd allow a malicious user to specify a smaller pfrio_size2 than pfrio_size though, in which case we'd still read outside of the allocated buffer. Instead we allocate the largest of the two values. Reported By: Paul J Murphy <paul@inetstat.net> PR: 207463 MFC after: 5 days Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5426 Changes: head/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.=
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