From owner-svn-ports-all@freebsd.org Tue Jul 17 15:29:25 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-all@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 198001044086; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:29:25 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from joneum@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BFEB98E073; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:29:24 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from joneum@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C6F555DA; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:29:24 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from joneum@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id w6HFTOWX006487; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:29:24 GMT (envelope-from joneum@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from joneum@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id w6HFTO6A006486; Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:29:24 GMT (envelope-from joneum@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201807171529.w6HFTO6A006486@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: joneum set sender to joneum@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Jochen Neumeister Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:29:24 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r474803 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head X-SVN-Commit-Author: joneum X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 474803 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: ports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.27 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 15:29:25 -0000 Author: joneum Date: Tue Jul 17 15:29:24 2018 New Revision: 474803 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/474803 Log: Document vulberability for typo3-7 and typo3-8 Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Tue Jul 17 15:01:56 2018 (r474802) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Tue Jul 17 15:29:24 2018 (r474803) @@ -58,6 +58,64 @@ Notes: * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.) --> + + typo3 -- multiple vulnerabilities + + + typo3-7 + 7.6.30 + + + typo3-8 + 8.7.17 + + + + +

Typo3 core team reports:

+
It has been discovered that TYPO3’s Salted Password system extension (which is a mandatory system component) + is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass when using hashing methods which are related by PHP class inheritance. + In standard TYPO3 core distributions stored passwords using the blowfish hashing algorithm can be overridden + when using MD5 as the default hashing algorithm by just knowing a valid username. + Per default the Portable PHP hashing algorithm (PHPass) is used which is not vulnerable.
+
Phar files (formerly known as "PHP archives") can act als self extracting archives which leads to the fact + that source code is executed when Phar files are invoked. The Phar file format is not limited to be stored + with a dedicated file extension - "bundle.phar" would be valid as well as "bundle.txt" would be. This way, + Phar files can be obfuscated as image or text file which would not be denied from being uploaded and persisted + to a TYPO3 installation. Due to a missing sanitization of user input, those Phar files can be invoked by + manipulated URLs in TYPO3 backend forms. A valid backend user account is needed to exploit this vulnerability. + In theory the attack vector would be possible in the TYPO3 frontend as well, however no functional exploit + has been identified so far.
+
Failing to properly dissociate system related configuration from user generated configuration, + the Form Framework (system extension "form") is vulnerable to SQL injection and Privilege Escalation. + Basically instructions can be persisted to a form definition file that were not configured to be modified - + this applies to definitions managed using the form editor module as well as direct file upload using the regular + file list module. A valid backend user account as well as having system extension form activated are needed + in order to exploit this vulnerability.
+
It has been discovered that the Form Framework (system extension "form") is vulnerable to Insecure Deserialization + when being used with the additional PHP PECL package “yaml”, which is capable of unserializing YAML contents + to PHP objects. A valid backend user account as well as having PHP setting "yaml.decode_php" enabled is needed + to exploit this vulnerability.
+

+ + + + CORE-SA-2018-001 + CORE-SA-2018-002 + CORE-SA-2018-003 + CORE-SA-2018-004 + https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-001/ + https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-002/ + https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-003/ + https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-004/ + + + 2018-07-12 + 2018-07-17 + + + Several Security Defects in the Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs