From owner-freebsd-security Mon Aug 11 12:34:19 1997 Return-Path: Received: (from root@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id MAA24877 for security-outgoing; Mon, 11 Aug 1997 12:34:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from shell.firehouse.net (brian@shell.firehouse.net [209.42.203.45]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id MAA24867; Mon, 11 Aug 1997 12:34:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (brian@localhost) by shell.firehouse.net (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id PAA23926; Mon, 11 Aug 1997 15:31:58 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 15:31:58 -0400 (EDT) From: Brian Mitchell To: Sean Eric Fagan cc: ache@nagual.pp.ru, bde@zeta.org.au, current@FreeBSD.ORG, security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: procfs patch In-Reply-To: <199708111545.IAA08497@kithrup.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk On Mon, 11 Aug 1997, Sean Eric Fagan wrote: > >Just close the procfs file descriptors on exec? > > I thought about doing that. But I decided it was both too invasive, and too > bothersome -- a root process would gets its fd's close, and it probably > shouldn't. Maybe not. If you are root and execute a setuid program, is P_SUGID set? I would think not, but I have not checked. > > As I said, what I've got now should provide no more risks than dumping core > does. Well, it allows for some greater control -- my truss program is not > SUID root, and needs to be able to read process memory. But since the > process should be owned by the user, I don't have a problem with it. > > Sean. > Now -- how about disallowing access if the binary is unreadable :)