From owner-freebsd-security Wed Sep 6 11:29:35 1995 Return-Path: security-owner Received: (from majordom@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.6.11/8.6.6) id LAA29600 for security-outgoing; Wed, 6 Sep 1995 11:29:35 -0700 Received: from jli (jli.portland.or.us [199.2.111.1]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.6.11/8.6.6) with SMTP id LAA29573 for ; Wed, 6 Sep 1995 11:29:32 -0700 Received: from cumulus by jli with uucp (Smail3.1.29.1 #3) id m0sqPDV-0001bBC; Wed, 6 Sep 95 11:28 PDT Message-Id: To: Brian Tao cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Do we *really* need logger(1)? References: In-reply-to: Your message of Thu, 07 Sep 1995 00:36:42 +0800. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <6828.810412160.1@cloud.rain.com> Date: Wed, 06 Sep 1995 11:29:20 -0700 From: Bill Trost Sender: security-owner@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Brian Tao writes: it dawned on me that logger(1) could be a hacker's dream. Logger requires no special permissions to run; anyone can run such a program. Better yet, anyone could run such a program anywhere on the Internet, so syslogd(8) can also be used as a remote disk-filling service. (And, since it's UDP-based, you can't tcp-wrap it...). Since syslogd runs as root.... Gads, why? Require that files specified in syslog.conf be writeable by user syslog, and put user syslog in group tty (to handle broadcasts to all users), and syslogd can setuid to syslog as soon as it has its sockets open. All these root-level daemons floating around is a disaster waiting to happen. Certainly something as simple as syslog doesn't need that kind of privilege.