From owner-freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Tue Sep 8 19:22:06 2015 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-hackers@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D8139CCE04 for ; Tue, 8 Sep 2015 19:22:06 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bmvince1@asu.edu) Received: from mail-ig0-f176.google.com (mail-ig0-f176.google.com [209.85.213.176]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00A95198F for ; Tue, 8 Sep 2015 19:22:05 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bmvince1@asu.edu) Received: by igcpb10 with SMTP id pb10so87122002igc.1 for ; Tue, 08 Sep 2015 12:21:59 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=l/X+1nkgmkvxpayP/M9vo60O3llKivsK+z7FwlRhP34=; b=Yhf4s+A99ZqjBVClMSk4EzV1Tyk7T/i0XgBThIuhLl0uZyhjci0sb3owySXeiPXLdG qN13d0aghdyyyYJiEn+fDA62CkqkxhDqykPcmDYY6aGygFyz0IotlFfWklvVFLOkv8d0 AHl8bk6oCofzav3NNCYFD2T6zW4ObBxxEqiei1ff0MtETxNP5+kyCis+o3YLY78/pRm6 fN+LifzHzSXHdhLaGXTsHcs7EcbzF9OuknfbquSm2iEMYt9lhg/O34NutZku8whewmxy GkZLGrBqQemRQJ77Pv6QXLwU8Z9HlveXJ5jdIXGSbjD/MIuvdInEUFXYWsR5Wg2YXKXW H2Qg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlvxHf+XrHIBJQa3JqjqulYSA7hZZHM4Ci4VHtYTZnwbkVxIKKuVuP7uL9FW17SK8K1tUSZ MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.56.113 with SMTP id z17mr36495427igp.4.1441740119637; Tue, 08 Sep 2015 12:21:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.36.71.18 with HTTP; Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:21:59 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <8B7FEE2E-500E-49CF-AC5E-A2FA3054B152@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:21:59 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: Passphraseless Disk Encryption Options? From: Brandon Vincent To: Igor Mozolevsky Cc: "Li, Xiao" , Hackers freeBSD , Analysiser Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2015 19:22:06 -0000 On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 11:51 AM, Igor Mozolevsky wrote: > I think you're missing the point- I suspect Apple's login *is* the decrypt > process- OS X needs something from the user to give access to the data; > without the user typing in their password, the data on the disk (as I said) > is just a source of entropy. Analysiser, Backing up what Igor has stated, the underlying principles behind FileVault 2 is no different than those employed by commercially available FDE software and open source solutions such as LUKS on GNU/Linux. When FileVault 2 is enabled on OS X, the system loads additional EFI code from the unencrypted recovery partition during startup and then references a file (on the unencrypted recovery partition) which has the volume master key encrypted with a intermediary key (essentially each user's password). When you enable FileVault 2 for the first time, you have to enter the system password for each user who you want to have the ability to decrypt the hard drive on startup. After this point, if a user on the system decides to update their password, OS X seamlessly updates the intermediary key required to decrypt the key-encryption-key for the volume. Essentially, the engineers at Apple have elegantly streamlined the process to minimize user frustration and interruption. Most open source FDE is not quite polished similarly. Brandon Vincent