From owner-freebsd-security Wed Jul 7 8:21:20 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from ns1.yes.no (ns1.yes.no [195.204.136.10]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17C1614D85 for ; Wed, 7 Jul 1999 08:21:17 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from eivind@bitbox.follo.net) Received: from bitbox.follo.net (bitbox.follo.net [195.204.143.218]) by ns1.yes.no (8.9.1a/8.9.1) with ESMTP id RAA02064; Wed, 7 Jul 1999 17:21:16 +0200 (CEST) Received: (from eivind@localhost) by bitbox.follo.net (8.8.8/8.8.6) id RAA44576; Wed, 7 Jul 1999 17:21:16 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Wed, 7 Jul 1999 17:21:15 +0200 From: Eivind Eklund To: Peter Wemm Cc: Kris Kennaway , security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Improved libcrypt ready for testing Message-ID: <19990707172115.D44021@bitbox.follo.net> References: <19990706175814.3A9CE78@overcee.netplex.com.au> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Mailer: Mutt 0.95.1i In-Reply-To: <19990706175814.3A9CE78@overcee.netplex.com.au>; from Peter Wemm on Wed, Jul 07, 1999 at 01:58:14AM +0800 Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org On Wed, Jul 07, 1999 at 01:58:14AM +0800, Peter Wemm wrote: > Kris Kennaway wrote: > > On Tue, 6 Jul 1999, Peter Wemm wrote: > > > > > I'd strongly suggest encoding the number of rounds as well, ie: > > > $token$salt$rounds$password > > > > For the two algorithms which currently support variable rounds, it's > > already encoded into the password: > > > > $Blowfish$xy$ following the OpenBSD format (xy = log2 rounds) > , > > and > > > > _ for New-DES. ( encoded as a base-64 binary > > value). > > Say... you wouldn't like to impliment an NT-style password hash, would you? > *NOT* the LAN-Manager (LAN-damager?) hash with the 2 chunks of 7 characters > weak method that gets decoded in what seems like seconds according to > bugtraq. The NT hash is 128 character etc. It's also unicode and not case > sensitive, but that shouldn't be a problem to implement. > > The reason I ask is that there are a number of protocols that have this > embedded in it, including PPP's MS-CHAP and SMB. If we want to support protocol-embedded authentication data properly, we need at least the ability to store several different types of hashes for each user in the password file, and the ability to store clear-text passwords. We should also, IMO, be switching our default password file format to SRP or similar - something that allow challenges against it without being the cleartext. Eivind. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message