From owner-freebsd-current Mon Jun 19 23:21:40 1995 Return-Path: current-owner Received: (from majordom@localhost) by freefall.cdrom.com (8.6.10/8.6.6) id XAA28552 for current-outgoing; Mon, 19 Jun 1995 23:21:40 -0700 Received: from grunt.grondar.za (grunt.grondar.za [196.7.18.129]) by freefall.cdrom.com (8.6.10/8.6.6) with ESMTP id XAA28520 ; Mon, 19 Jun 1995 23:21:25 -0700 Received: from grumble.grondar.za (grumble.grondar.za [196.7.18.130]) by grunt.grondar.za (8.6.11/8.6.9) with ESMTP id IAA00723; Tue, 20 Jun 1995 08:21:08 +0200 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by grumble.grondar.za (8.6.11/8.6.9) with SMTP id IAA01213; Tue, 20 Jun 1995 08:21:06 +0200 Message-Id: <199506200621.IAA01213@grumble.grondar.za> X-Authentication-Warning: grumble.grondar.za: Host localhost didn't use HELO protocol To: Poul-Henning Kamp cc: terry@cs.weber.edu (Terry Lambert), wollman@halloran-eldar.lcs.mit.edu, current@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Crypto code - an architectural proposal. Date: Tue, 20 Jun 1995 08:21:05 +0200 From: Mark Murray Sender: current-owner@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk > > I agree that the hack-attack prevention is a poor reason for slowing down > > crypt(). > > The MD5 based crypt() I wrote for 2.0 had this in mind. It is sufficiently > slow that brute-force attacks are not fun, and it is frustrated by a > millisecond timestamp so dictionary attacks become very bulky. The timestamp can be stripped down by anyone with access to the source. OK, this does not help anyone bashing at the front door, but there are those hackers who with a Sparc or an Alpha and the MD5 source will really clobber a password file using Crack... > Ten years from now it will probably have to be slowed down again :-( Who says some clever Maths/Crypto boffin hasn't got a faster algorithm _now_? Look at fcrypt versus Classic crypt(3). M -- Mark Murray 46 Harvey Rd, Claremont, Cape Town 7700, South Africa +27 21 61-3768 GMT+0200