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Date:      Tue, 13 Mar 2001 16:18:52 +0100
From:      Terje Elde <terje@thinksec.no>
To:        Borja Marcos <borjamar@sarenet.es>
Cc:        Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@critter.freebsd.dk>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: iButton Development
Message-ID:  <20010313161852.G9762@thinksec.com>
In-Reply-To: <3AAE3809.F795A6A5@sarenet.es>; from borjamar@sarenet.es on Tue, Mar 13, 2001 at 04:08:57PM %2B0100
References:  <3AADB1D3.C70E00C@colltech.com> <20010313155046.E9762@thinksec.com> <3AAE3809.F795A6A5@sarenet.es>

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On Tue, Mar 13, 2001 at 04:08:57PM +0100, Borja Marcos wrote:
> > Also a obvious extension.  One idea we've been playing with is to not o=
nly
> > keep the keys on the button, but never to let them be anywhere else.  T=
he java
> > iButton for example, could handle the cryptographic functions for you. =
 It
> > features cool things like rapid destroying of the content should you tr=
y to
> > tamper with it.
>=20
> 	This would be the ideal system; when used for ssh, for example,
> the button stores the private part of the RSA key, and the challenge is=
=20
> sent by the ssh-agent to the button. It encrypts the challenge and
> returns the answer.
>=20
> 	If the key is kept inside the button, it can be useful even
> in hostile environments. I understand that now there are buttons
> capable of running small prograams.

As Poul-Henning points out, doing this isn't for everyone.  It pretty much
boils down to what you trust the most.  The security of your hardware/softw=
are
and your ability to set it up, or the iButtons.

In the case of my private workstation, I'd normally prefer running the cryp=
to
on the workstation itself, not allowing the iButtons to be as much of a weak
link.  Should I ever have the need for ssh'ing from public company terminals
to note quite secure systems on the other hand, this would be a good idea.


A toolkit to pick what one likes from, not enforcing the way I want it one
everyone else.

Terje

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