From owner-freebsd-hackers Mon Feb 24 06:50:16 1997 Return-Path: Received: (from root@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id GAA22281 for hackers-outgoing; Mon, 24 Feb 1997 06:50:16 -0800 (PST) Received: from rover.village.org (rover.village.org [204.144.255.49]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id GAA22174; Mon, 24 Feb 1997 06:45:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from rover.village.org [127.0.0.1] by rover.village.org with esmtp (Exim 0.56 #1) id E0vz1df-0004dM-00; Mon, 24 Feb 1997 07:44:23 -0700 To: Adrian Chadd Subject: Re: disallow setuid root shells? Cc: Jake Hamby , hackers@freebsd.org, auditors@freebsd.org In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 08 Jan 1996 04:35:15 +0800." References: Date: Mon, 24 Feb 1997 07:44:23 -0700 From: Warner Losh Message-Id: Sender: owner-hackers@freebsd.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk In message Adrian Chadd writes: : Since i'm reviewing /bin/sh and /bin/csh, it might make an interesting : addition. Anyone see any use for +s'ed shells ? Anything it can do, sudo : can do (and sudo AFAIK is much smaller, so less code to screw around : with), and I think its a good idea. : : Suggestions ? That might not be a bad idea. However, it is fairly easy to work around if I can make a /bin/sh setuid, I can make anything I anything I want setuid and then do a setuid(0); exec /bin/sh (or /bin/csh). It would help firewall somethings, but it wouldn't solve the problem. sudo isn't a shell. It doesn't run scripts or read commands from anything but the command line. Warner