From owner-svn-ports-all@freebsd.org Mon Feb 24 17:21:38 2020 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-all@mailman.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DC0C23BF59; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:21:38 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48R84K5fmBz45Yy; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:21:37 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9BFF8AC2; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:21:37 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 01OHLbvo057239; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:21:37 GMT (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from tijl@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id 01OHLbrJ057238; Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:21:37 GMT (envelope-from tijl@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <202002241721.01OHLbrJ057238@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: tijl set sender to tijl@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Tijl Coosemans Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:21:37 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r527003 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head X-SVN-Commit-Author: tijl X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 527003 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: ports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 17:21:38 -0000 Author: tijl Date: Mon Feb 24 17:21:36 2020 New Revision: 527003 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/527003 Log: Document Mbed TLS vulnerabilities 2019-12 and 2020-02. Security: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2019-12 Security: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02 Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Mon Feb 24 17:13:34 2020 (r527002) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Mon Feb 24 17:21:36 2020 (r527003) @@ -58,6 +58,69 @@ Notes: * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.) --> + + Mbed TLS -- Cache attack against RSA key import in SGX + + + mbedtls + 2.16.5 + + + + +

Janos Follath reports:

+
If Mbed TLS is running in an SGX enclave and the adversary has + control of the main operating system, they can launch a side + channel attack to recover the RSA private key when it is being + imported.
+
The attack only requires access to fine grained measurements to + cache usage. Therefore the attack might be applicable to a scenario + where Mbed TLS is running in TrustZone secure world and the + attacker controls the normal world or possibly when Mbed TLS is + part of a hypervisor and the adversary has full control of a guest + OS.
+

+ + + + https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02 + + + 2020-02-18 + 2020-02-24 + + + + + Mbed TLS -- Side channel attack on ECDSA + + + mbedtls + 2.16.4 + + + + +

Janos Follath reports:

+
Our bignum implementation is not constant time/constant trace, so + side channel attacks can retrieve the blinded value, factor it (as + it is smaller than RSA keys and not guaranteed to have only large + prime factors), and then, by brute force, recover the key.
+

+ + + + https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2019-12 + CVE-2019-18222 + + + 2019-10-25 + 2020-02-24 + + + WeeChat -- Multiple vulnerabilities