From owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Mar 3 21:37:17 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [8.8.178.115]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6466FEE0 for ; Mon, 3 Mar 2014 21:37:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bigwig.baldwin.cx (bigwig.baldwin.cx [IPv6:2001:470:1f11:75::1]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3DCB639C for ; Mon, 3 Mar 2014 21:37:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from jhbbsd.localnet (unknown [209.249.190.124]) by bigwig.baldwin.cx (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 30A55B96B; Mon, 3 Mar 2014 16:37:16 -0500 (EST) From: John Baldwin To: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Feature Proposal: Transparent upgrade of crypt() algorithms Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 15:28:19 -0500 User-Agent: KMail/1.13.5 (FreeBSD/8.4-CBSD-20130906; KDE/4.5.5; amd64; ; ) References: <530FE2E9.5010902@allanjude.com> In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <201403031528.19273.jhb@freebsd.org> X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (bigwig.baldwin.cx); Mon, 03 Mar 2014 16:37:16 -0500 (EST) Cc: Eitan Adler X-BeenThere: freebsd-current@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussions about the use of FreeBSD-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 03 Mar 2014 21:37:17 -0000 On Friday, February 28, 2014 4:58:29 pm Eitan Adler wrote: > On 27 February 2014 20:14, Allan Jude wrote: > > With r262501 > > (http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=262501) importing > > the upgraded bcrypt from OpenBSD and eventually changing the default > > identifier for bcrypt to $2b$ it reminded me of a feature that is often > > seen in Forum software and other web apps. > > > > Transparent algorithm upgrade. > ... > > I would strongly support this > > > I think Nick's point is you do want passwords using the "old" hash to expire > are some point if they haven't been auto-converted. > > Password expiry is an orthogonal issue and should be up to administrator policy. Yes, but if you are moving to a different algorithm to improve security, not coupling it with an eventual expiration of non-migrated accounts gives a false sense of security. Any admin worth his/her salt is going to want the option of enforcing that sort of policy along with the transparent update. They should really be implemented together is all. -- John Baldwin