Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1998 14:45:56 -0500 From: Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org> To: Robert Watson <robert+freebsd@cyrus.watson.org>, Thomas Valentino Crimi <tcrimi+@andrew.cmu.edu> Cc: Terry Lambert <tlambert@primenet.com>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Would this make FreeBSD more secure? Message-ID: <19981116144556.A11685@weathership.homeport.org> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.3.96.981116124210.15576A-100000@fledge.watson.org>; from Robert Watson on Mon, Nov 16, 1998 at 12:46:24PM -0500 References: <0qI4qUS00YUq09JbU0@andrew.cmu.edu> <Pine.BSF.3.96.981116124210.15576A-100000@fledge.watson.org>
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My understanding of Dobbertin's attack is that he generates both halves of a collision pair, not finds an arbitrary match to a pre-existing value. If he has the latter, that may or may not transform into an attack on the password system. You'll need to find a printable (<9 character?) value that collides if you want to attack the password system via this route. Adam On Mon, Nov 16, 1998 at 12:46:24PM -0500, Robert Watson wrote: | On Mon, 16 Nov 1998, Thomas Valentino Crimi wrote: | > And then we have md5 passwords, arguably broken, now, but orders of | > magnitudes better than DES. | | I don't think I would consider md5 broken exactly. Just subject to | intermittent collisions. Is there a deterministic (and fast) way to | detect whether one is employing a hash subject to the described collision | attack? If so, perhaps we can add a piece of code that attempts a number | of values of salt, resulting in a more friendly hash. | | I prefer one-time passwords for security applications; on the other hand I | eagerly await a nice (scalable) PK authentication system used with | hardware keys. -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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