From owner-freebsd-security Thu Jan 6 8:37: 0 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from overcee.netplex.com.au (overcee.netplex.com.au [202.12.86.7]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCEB71571C; Thu, 6 Jan 2000 08:35:34 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from peter@netplex.com.au) Received: from netplex.com.au (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by overcee.netplex.com.au (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A79D1CA0; Fri, 7 Jan 2000 00:35:31 +0800 (WST) (envelope-from peter@netplex.com.au) X-Mailer: exmh version 2.1.1 10/15/1999 To: Dag-Erling Smorgrav Cc: Brian Fundakowski Feldman , security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: OpenSSH protocol 1.6 proposal In-Reply-To: Message from Dag-Erling Smorgrav of "06 Jan 2000 14:50:39 +0100." Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2000 00:35:31 +0800 From: Peter Wemm Message-Id: <20000106163531.1A79D1CA0@overcee.netplex.com.au> Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Dag-Erling Smorgrav wrote: > Brian Fundakowski Feldman writes: > > I've been thinking what the best way to make OpenSSH more secure would be, > > and now it seems to be a change in the protocol. What change? Well, > > SSH version 1.5 and below (all versions so far) have been vulnerable to > > attacks based upon properties of the highly insecure CRC32 hash used. > > Which part of "ssh 1.2.25 fixes the problem" did you not understand? Well, the 'crc compensation attack detection' is an *attempt* to detect likely insertion attacks. It would be far better to not have to try and detect hints of this this and to *know* if it was valid or not without a doubt. Cheers, -Peter To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message