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Date:      Sat, 15 Feb 2003 22:22:24 -0800
From:      David Schultz <dschultz@uclink.Berkeley.EDU>
To:        John Hay <jhay@icomtek.csir.co.za>
Cc:        Charles Sprickman <spork@inch.com>, security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: chrooted non-priv ntpd
Message-ID:  <20030216062224.GA1646@HAL9000.homeunix.com>
In-Reply-To: <20030216052534.GA50026@zibbi.icomtek.csir.co.za>
References:  <20030215025035.F80945@shell.inch.com> <20030216043634.GB733@HAL9000.homeunix.com> <20030216052534.GA50026@zibbi.icomtek.csir.co.za>

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Thus spake John Hay <jhay@icomtek.csir.co.za>:
> Well I don't want to comment on the chroot part, but did you also bring
> these problems under the attention of the ntp people? I can't remember
> having seen anything about it on bugs@ntp.org. Preferably with patches
> against the development version. :-)))

I sent a note to David Mills back in October, but I didn't get a
response.  Most of the implementation problems (in my eyes,
anyway) are going to be a major pain in the butt to fix, e.g. the
hundreds of uses of sprintf() and strcpy().  I assume people know
about these, and there's a reason why nobody has bothered to fix
them.

The crypto problem is probably not known, but simpler to fix.
There's basically an off-by-one error where the last key[1] in the
session key sequence generated by ntpd isn't based on the shared
secret from the Diffie-Hellman exchange; it's just a random value
from a PRNG seeded off of the system time.  I expect it would be
nearly impossible to exploit, but I could be wrong.  One of these
days I'll see if I still have my notes on ntpd and send off a
report to bugs@ntp.org.


[1]	IIRC, the keys are used in reverse order for the same
	reason that you use S/Key passwords in reverse order,
	so it's really the first key in the sequence.

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