From owner-freebsd-security Fri Feb 14 11:24:08 1997 Return-Path: Received: (from root@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id LAA25469 for security-outgoing; Fri, 14 Feb 1997 11:24:08 -0800 (PST) Received: from grackle.grondar.za (8t4c8Xiq/cPn8HFYbswzZFsHNPL+WA25@grackle.grondar.za [196.7.18.131]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id LAA25417 for ; Fri, 14 Feb 1997 11:24:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from grackle.grondar.za (fenPMqkpI2FSVH8sAFmQHeT2W/SgiGzb@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by grackle.grondar.za (8.8.5/8.8.4) with ESMTP id VAA18249; Fri, 14 Feb 1997 21:23:10 +0200 (SAT) Message-Id: <199702141923.VAA18249@grackle.grondar.za> X-Mailer: exmh version 2.0gamma 1/27/96 To: Poul-Henning Kamp cc: security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: blowfish passwords in FreeBSD Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Date: Fri, 14 Feb 1997 21:23:05 +0200 From: Mark Murray Sender: owner-security@freebsd.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk Poul-Henning Kamp wrote: > In message , Warner Losh writes: > > > >OpenBSD just committed a new encryption method using blowfish. This > >has a much larger salt space as well as a much harder to break > >encryption scheme. Preliminary indications are that it looks really > >good. They implemented this much like md5, but with its own code. > > > >I think we should bring this into FreeBSD. What do others think? > > We already have a submission for SSH (?) passwords in a PR, they > should be merged and documented. You mean SHA (secure hash algorithm). I have this FreeBSD ready. This method expands on PHK's MD5 passwd(5) scheme where an encrypted passwd that is not DES looks like $n$sssss$pppppppppp. Where n is a number 1=MD5 2=SHA 3-??= sssss is salt ppppppppp is the encrypred passwd. The code has hooks to make it extensible for other hash types. How does the OpenBSD Blowfish method fit into _that_? FWIW, our _current_ DES passwd scheme has a method that extends the salt dramatically. (this is documented). if the salt begins with an "_" underscore char, then the next 8 (!) chars are salt. They are (sort of) uudecoded to provide two 24 bit numbers. One is common-or- garden salt, the other is iteration count. You want someone to work hard do crack your password? Set the count high. Look in the secure/lib/libcrypt/test dir for test code and check out the secure crypt(3) manpage for docs. M -- Mark Murray PGP key fingerprint = 80 36 6E 40 83 D6 8A 36 This .sig is umop ap!sdn. BC 06 EA 0E 7A F2 CE CE