From owner-freebsd-ports-bugs@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Jan 21 07:10:01 2010 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-ports-bugs@hub.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BDA9106566C for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:10:01 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from gnats@FreeBSD.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::28]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1BBEA8FC12 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:10:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.14.3/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o0L7A0Ki057524 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:10:00 GMT (envelope-from gnats@freefall.freebsd.org) Received: (from gnats@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.14.3/8.14.3/Submit) id o0L7A0BC057523; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:10:00 GMT (envelope-from gnats) Resent-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:10:00 GMT Resent-Message-Id: <201001210710.o0L7A0BC057523@freefall.freebsd.org> Resent-From: FreeBSD-gnats-submit@FreeBSD.org (GNATS Filer) Resent-To: freebsd-ports-bugs@FreeBSD.org Resent-Reply-To: FreeBSD-gnats-submit@FreeBSD.org, Andrei Lavreniyuk Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 144901065670 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:07:27 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from nobody@FreeBSD.org) Received: from www.freebsd.org (www.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::21]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0227F8FC17 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:07:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from www.freebsd.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by www.freebsd.org (8.14.3/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o0L77QFj099892 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:07:26 GMT (envelope-from nobody@www.freebsd.org) Received: (from nobody@localhost) by www.freebsd.org (8.14.3/8.14.3/Submit) id o0L77Qwj099891; Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:07:26 GMT (envelope-from nobody) Message-Id: <201001210707.o0L77Qwj099891@www.freebsd.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:07:26 GMT From: Andrei Lavreniyuk To: freebsd-gnats-submit@FreeBSD.org X-Send-Pr-Version: www-3.1 Cc: Subject: ports/143050: [UPDATE] ports/security/tor-devel to version 0.2.2.7-alpha X-BeenThere: freebsd-ports-bugs@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: Ports bug reports List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2010 07:10:01 -0000 >Number: 143050 >Category: ports >Synopsis: [UPDATE] ports/security/tor-devel to version 0.2.2.7-alpha >Confidential: no >Severity: non-critical >Priority: medium >Responsible: freebsd-ports-bugs >State: open >Quarter: >Keywords: >Date-Required: >Class: sw-bug >Submitter-Id: current-users >Arrival-Date: Thu Jan 21 07:10:00 UTC 2010 >Closed-Date: >Last-Modified: >Originator: Andrei Lavreniyuk >Release: FreeBSD 8.0-STABLE >Organization: Technica-03, Inc. >Environment: FreeBSD datacenter.technica-03.local 8.0-STABLE FreeBSD 8.0-STABLE #1: Wed Jan 20 17:06:05 EET 2010 root@datacenter.technica-03.local:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/SMP64 amd64 >Description: Tor 0.2.2.7-alpha fixes a huge client-side performance bug, as well as laying the groundwork for further relay-side performance fixes. It also starts cleaning up client behavior with respect to the EntryNodes, ExitNodes, and StrictNodes config options. This release also rotates two directory authority keys, due to a security breach of some of the Torproject servers: http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jan-2010/msg00161.html Everybody should upgrade: https://www.torproject.org/download.html.en Changes in version 0.2.2.7-alpha - 2010-01-19 o Directory authority changes: - Rotate keys (both v3 identity and relay identity) for moria1 and gabelmoo. o Major features (performance): - We were selecting our guards uniformly at random, and then weighting which of our guards we'd use uniformly at random. This imbalance meant that Tor clients were severely limited on throughput (and probably latency too) by the first hop in their circuit. Now we select guards weighted by currently advertised bandwidth. We also automatically discard guards picked using the old algorithm. Fixes bug 1217; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. Found by Mike Perry. - When choosing which cells to relay first, relays can now favor circuits that have been quiet recently, to provide lower latency for low-volume circuits. By default, relays enable or disable this feature based on a setting in the consensus. You can override this default by using the new "CircuitPriorityHalflife" config option. Design and code by Ian Goldberg, Can Tang, and Chris Alexander. - Add separate per-conn write limiting to go with the per-conn read limiting. We added a global write limit in Tor 0.1.2.5-alpha, but never per-conn write limits. - New consensus params "bwconnrate" and "bwconnburst" to let us rate-limit client connections as they enter the network. It's controlled in the consensus so we can turn it on and off for experiments. It's starting out off. Based on proposal 163. o Major features (relay selection options): - Switch to a StrictNodes config option, rather than the previous "StrictEntryNodes" / "StrictExitNodes" separation that was missing a "StrictExcludeNodes" option. - If EntryNodes, ExitNodes, ExcludeNodes, or ExcludeExitNodes change during a config reload, mark and discard all our origin circuits. This fix should address edge cases where we change the config options and but then choose a circuit that we created before the change. - If EntryNodes or ExitNodes are set, be more willing to use an unsuitable (e.g. slow or unstable) circuit. The user asked for it, they get it. - Make EntryNodes config option much more aggressive even when StrictNodes is not set. Before it would prepend your requested entrynodes to your list of guard nodes, but feel free to use others after that. Now it chooses only from your EntryNodes if any of those are available, and only falls back to others if a) they're all down and b) StrictNodes is not set. - Now we refresh your entry guards from EntryNodes at each consensus fetch -- rather than just at startup and then they slowly rot as the network changes. o Major bugfixes: - Stop bridge directory authorities from answering dbg-stability.txt directory queries, which would let people fetch a list of all bridge identities they track. Bugfix on 0.2.1.6-alpha. o Minor features: - Log a notice when we get a new control connection. Now it's easier for security-conscious users to recognize when a local application is knocking on their controller door. Suggested by bug 1196. - New config option "CircuitStreamTimeout" to override our internal timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a number like 60. - New controller command "getinfo config-text". It returns the contents that Tor would write if you send it a SAVECONF command, so the controller can write the file to disk itself. - New options for SafeLogging to allow scrubbing only log messages generated while acting as a relay. - Ship the bridges spec file in the tarball too. - Avoid a mad rush at the beginning of each month when each client rotates half of its guards. Instead we spread the rotation out throughout the month, but we still avoid leaving a precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked the guard. Improves over the behavior introduced in 0.1.2.17. o Minor bugfixes (compiling): - Fix compilation on OS X 10.3, which has a stub mlockall() but hides it. Bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. - Fix compilation on Solaris by removing support for the DisableAllSwap config option. Solaris doesn't have an rlimit for mlockall, so we cannot use it safely. Fixes bug 1198; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. o Minor bugfixes (crashes): - Do not segfault when writing buffer stats when we haven't observed a single circuit to report about. Found by Fabian Lanze. Bugfix on 0.2.2.1-alpha. - If we're in the pathological case where there's no exit bandwidth but there is non-exit bandwidth, or no guard bandwidth but there is non-guard bandwidth, don't crash during path selection. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. - Fix an impossible-to-actually-trigger buffer overflow in relay descriptor generation. Bugfix on 0.1.0.15. o Minor bugfixes (privacy): - Fix an instance where a Tor directory mirror might accidentally log the IP address of a misbehaving Tor client. Bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. - Don't list Windows capabilities in relay descriptors. We never made use of them, and maybe it's a bad idea to publish them. Bugfix on 0.1.1.8-alpha. o Minor bugfixes (other): - Resolve an edge case in path weighting that could make us misweight our relay selection. Fixes bug 1203; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1. - Fix statistics on client numbers by country as seen by bridges that were broken in 0.2.2.1-alpha. Also switch to reporting full 24-hour intervals instead of variable 12-to-48-hour intervals. - After we free an internal connection structure, overwrite it with a different memory value than we use for overwriting a freed internal circuit structure. Should help with debugging. Suggested by bug 1055. - Update our OpenSSL 0.9.8l fix so that it works with OpenSSL 0.9.8m too. o Removed features: - Remove the HSAuthorityRecordStats option that version 0 hidden service authorities could have used to track statistics of overall hidden service usage. >How-To-Repeat: >Fix: Patch attached with submission follows: diff -ruN tor-devel.bak/Makefile tor-devel/Makefile --- tor-devel.bak/Makefile 2009-11-23 10:47:43.000000000 +0200 +++ tor-devel/Makefile 2010-01-21 09:02:52.000000000 +0200 @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ # PORTNAME= tor -DISTVERSION= 0.2.2.6-alpha +DISTVERSION= 0.2.2.7-alpha CATEGORIES= security net ipv6 MASTER_SITES= http://www.torproject.org/dist/ \ http://tor.cypherpunks.at/dist/ \ diff -ruN tor-devel.bak/distinfo tor-devel/distinfo --- tor-devel.bak/distinfo 2009-11-22 09:11:38.000000000 +0200 +++ tor-devel/distinfo 2010-01-21 09:02:58.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ -MD5 (tor-0.2.2.6-alpha.tar.gz) = 359c1e1abcbd1ec5a4d851c5b389b58f -SHA256 (tor-0.2.2.6-alpha.tar.gz) = 29cacc17dc38a8c621f3f2aabbce9dd8d72a37fc63a7868b8e254177c510b546 -SIZE (tor-0.2.2.6-alpha.tar.gz) = 2496440 +MD5 (tor-0.2.2.7-alpha.tar.gz) = 0c87948b21f530093112c619eb98f445 +SHA256 (tor-0.2.2.7-alpha.tar.gz) = dec3bb9e2b9c7f449bb6a019a18d070fef0a21df97f8b9259b8d3a28cbb61c69 +SIZE (tor-0.2.2.7-alpha.tar.gz) = 2497380 >Release-Note: >Audit-Trail: >Unformatted: