Date: Sat, 08 Mar 2014 17:19:07 -0800 From: David Christensen <dpchrist@holgerdanske.com> To: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Secure Infrastructure [Crypto signed ISO images] Message-ID: <531BC18B.5040504@holgerdanske.com> In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti28yxP62DASM6vkzSBagK1wL7BGSp-VqDkK8LWmDC5MRZg@mail.gmail.com> References: <CAD2Ti28yxP62DASM6vkzSBagK1wL7BGSp-VqDkK8LWmDC5MRZg@mail.gmail.com>
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On 03/08/2014 02:31 PM, grarpamp wrote: > Until the FreeBSD project ... > (1) moves to a repository ... [that] has an internal crypto hash structure ... > (2) has and uses deterministic reproducible builds for everything flowing downstream from that ... > ... signing the periphery may look good to the casual observer, but it is ultimately untraceable in any cryptographic sense to the code from which those periphery elements are purported to come from. What about the processor microcode, device(s) firmware, BIOS, extension ROM(s), boot managers, boot loaders, kernels, operating systems, installed software, etc., of the machines used to serve the repository and do the builds? David
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