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Date:      Tue, 25 Jun 2013 23:26:36 GMT
From:      Alex Weber <alexwebr@gmail.com>
To:        freebsd-gnats-submit@FreeBSD.org
Subject:   docs/179988: ThwackAFAQ - sandbox
Message-ID:  <201306252326.r5PNQadA090907@oldred.freebsd.org>
Resent-Message-ID: <201306252330.r5PNU0rM046402@freefall.freebsd.org>

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>Number:         179988
>Category:       docs
>Synopsis:       ThwackAFAQ - sandbox
>Confidential:   no
>Severity:       non-critical
>Priority:       low
>Responsible:    freebsd-doc
>State:          open
>Quarter:        
>Keywords:       
>Date-Required:
>Class:          doc-bug
>Submitter-Id:   current-users
>Arrival-Date:   Tue Jun 25 23:30:00 UTC 2013
>Closed-Date:
>Last-Modified:
>Originator:     Alex Weber
>Release:        
>Organization:
>Environment:
>Description:
This is a (potential) fix for part of the ThwackAFAQ 'red' section on sandboxes. It adds a description of the jail feature in FreeBSD, but does not address the other issues.
>How-To-Repeat:

>Fix:
Patch included with this PR.

Patch attached with submission follows:

Index: en_US.ISO8859-1/books/faq/book.xml
===================================================================
--- en_US.ISO8859-1/books/faq/book.xml	(revision 42051)
+++ en_US.ISO8859-1/books/faq/book.xml	(working copy)
@@ -5889,6 +5889,21 @@
 	    it serves to firewall the process off from processes owned
 	    by other users.  The user&nbsp;ID is also used to firewall
 	    off on-disk data.</para>
+
+	  <para>In addition to process and userid sandboxes offered by
+	    the &unix; operating system, &os; provides the &man.jail.8;
+	    feature, a secure, fast implementation of <ulink
+	      url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operating_system-level_virtualization">;
+	      operating system-level virtualization</ulink>. This
+	    allows a single &os; computer to run one or more guest &os;
+	    system images with their own users, IP addresses, and
+	    processes. Unlike &man.chroot.8;-based sandboxing,
+	    processes are permanently confined to the jail they were
+	    started in (including those owned by the jail's root user),
+	    and cannot affect processes in other jails or the host
+	    system. While the &man.jail.8; feature is unique to &os;, it
+	    is similar to Solaris Zones, AIX Workload Partitions, and
+	    Linux Containers.</para>
 	</answer>
       </qandaentry>
 


>Release-Note:
>Audit-Trail:
>Unformatted:



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