From owner-svn-src-head@freebsd.org Wed Jun 20 13:33:35 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-head@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C0061019C07; Wed, 20 Jun 2018 13:33:35 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bjkfbsd@gmail.com) Received: from mail-oi0-x242.google.com (mail-oi0-x242.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c06::242]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6EF6F7ADC2; Wed, 20 Jun 2018 13:33:34 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bjkfbsd@gmail.com) Received: by mail-oi0-x242.google.com with SMTP id i205-v6so3031678oib.1; Wed, 20 Jun 2018 06:33:34 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=x4PryzQQlw6Ni1tFgMQ5yjoxkYtoLyGGfK71WqYVlL0=; b=MNyLVUGKyZdcvmj8/5t0gl7kRrnEZhLXuRifMfmRklrrNswHAbdnuu8mCosHogb6y2 MlEMCFm0iSgMVKxMZKEiVsERovUjEGYIBai5VuoxQ6IH6ktJPsiD6CSwR9h8aInbRpkQ OK1R/oqJHEOXmF8yaEweSVXFCHIznd0RNsgaEF/um+CWVF+H59VuyIGIOMsJ0IUfuBP+ /m/nnETL71vo5HZx6HRE/CI/qPf7hYgifur/1Jr6TCy8l1popL3zJkYWvTrkK3emPW5I Zy3YF5v4D14SKu6pT8zBJNJhss43lrALxogndQepv+RANHay5OLII7f57/N8jwM7aRzK ZQJg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=x4PryzQQlw6Ni1tFgMQ5yjoxkYtoLyGGfK71WqYVlL0=; b=WRVRy5PET394WoY7hnTouPAO21vqzv24N+hO6sWofZ7ZXSBJ6I8Zp6lKOR9BGWekTk YUQg3UQ9ea/ee3zUQFalqNL+UUhQW2Eyc+7V3wHIi/pr3X7E+RgkJ/5VwsS9C97eL8/N 73RCstuW7O63JJgFjlolDcHDAwV8as4qAfbbcjkUTLeHEGaI1+WKwREXls9JApW7oNzt ykbHCw6AngijfYtRdrQW5TSyXN/eTSFAhHHJ2UAgQMqZYoaorrDpoeGRQnO1wYEGgknY fXwriJn0KZ9cVVeJmGgRtAdC4ufiwgFkuNZg3G7eKM+XegQWWatm48zsUw1R9qcEwWt7 dm4g== X-Gm-Message-State: APt69E0lIQcTUH+mBQsh9UHZNIfipFtxyDkzRzAYrQwdNomvtIfAYHTT LHE/qXsLw1lmwnLZsmEtCWkEinfu5GiVrI+B2XU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADUXVKKi2pwUcLU4weU+PTIg8H+LKK+vEDW3eNqMOGg450bsTxhZrai7/7XvYJuzG96uIdsDnK1tWZ3Mo+IFnnBmuos= X-Received: by 2002:aca:e34b:: with SMTP id a72-v6mr12380245oih.117.1529501613895; Wed, 20 Jun 2018 06:33:33 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 2002:a9d:4e8c:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Wed, 20 Jun 2018 06:33:33 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <96021.1529475664@kaos.jnpr.net> References: <201806200108.w5K18sIR050132@repo.freebsd.org> <96021.1529475664@kaos.jnpr.net> From: Benjamin Kaduk Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2018 08:33:33 -0500 Message-ID: Subject: Re: svn commit: r335402 - head/sbin/veriexecctl To: "Simon J. Gerraty" Cc: "cem@FreeBSD.org" , svn-src-head@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, src-committers , "Stephen J. Kiernan" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.26 X-BeenThere: svn-src-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the src tree for head/-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2018 13:33:35 -0000 On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 1:21 AM, Simon J. Gerraty wrote: > Conrad Meyer wrote: > > > There's absolutely no reason to use sha1 or ripemd in new designs. > > These should be removed. > > Sorry I disagree - not with ripem (we never supported that or any of the > non-NIST approved hashes), but sha1 is still approved by NIST for > firmware integrity checks - which is what this is, and sha1 is cheaper > than sha256. > > As I mentioned in my talk we've included support for sha256 for 10+ > years, but do not plan to drop sha1 until NIST deprecate it for that > purpose since boot time is a very sensitive subject for us. > With all due respect, NIST is hardly the sole authority on this topic. Over in the IETF, we have the SUIT working group that is even considering hash-based signatures for firmware updates for post-quantum resistance (so that devices can be shipped now that have 20-year lifecycles can have some expectation of retaining the ability to securely take updates over that lifecycle, admittedly). With my IETF Security Area Director hat on, any greenfield proposal coming in to the IESG that included sha1 support would get extremely strong pushback, and I don't expect that "reducing boot time" would be seen as sufficiently compelling. -Ben