From owner-freebsd-security Sat Jan 23 18:19:46 1999 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id SAA21809 for freebsd-security-outgoing; Sat, 23 Jan 1999 18:19:46 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from fledge.watson.org (FLEDGE.RES.CMU.EDU [128.2.93.229]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id SAA21801 for ; Sat, 23 Jan 1999 18:19:44 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from robert@cyrus.watson.org) Received: from fledge.watson.org (robert@fledge.pr.watson.org [192.0.2.3]) by fledge.watson.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with SMTP id VAA03503; Sat, 23 Jan 1999 21:18:24 -0500 (EST) Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1999 21:18:23 -0500 (EST) From: Robert Watson X-Sender: robert@fledge.watson.org Reply-To: Robert Watson To: The Unicorn cc: cjclark@home.com, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: bin Directory Ownership In-Reply-To: <19990123132613.A21293@unicorn.quux.org> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org On Sat, 23 Jan 1999, The Unicorn wrote: > On Sat, Jan 23, 1999 at 06:01:40AM -0500, Robert Watson wrote: > > > > You are correct--there is no security improvement through the use of the > > bin user. However, it is also the case that (aside from false assumptions > > about some improvement) security is probably not damaged by having a bin > > user. I am in the process of some research analyzing the impact of file > > and directory ownership affecting the UNIX trust model (especially w.r.t. > > setuid and setgid binaries). I will post the results when I finish up > > (probably in a month or so). Access to the bin account is very limited; > > effectively, to acquire a uid bin process capable of modifying the > > binaries, you would first have to have a uid root process that you had > > subverted. > > This is not always the case. Have a look at the old but still valid > paper from Wietse and Dan: "admin-guide-to-cracking-101" also known as > "Improving the Security of Your Site by Breaking Into it". Especially > the part on the use of rsh and the wildcard in the /etc/hosts.equiv file > (yeah, I know that allowing the r-commands is a BIG NO-NO ;-). At least on my system, none of these accounts have valid shells, so r* should block login (/nonexistent). Robert N Watson robert@fledge.watson.org http://www.watson.org/~robert/ PGP key fingerprint: 03 01 DD 8E 15 67 48 73 25 6D 10 FC EC 68 C1 1C Carnegie Mellon University http://www.cmu.edu/ TIS Labs at Network Associates, Inc. http://www.tis.com/ SafePort Network Services http://www.safeport.com/ To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message