From owner-p4-projects@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Jan 24 09:03:42 2008 Return-Path: Delivered-To: p4-projects@freebsd.org Received: by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 32767) id B9ACC16A421; Thu, 24 Jan 2008 09:03:42 +0000 (UTC) Delivered-To: perforce@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 675A416A41B for ; Thu, 24 Jan 2008 09:03:42 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bb+lists.freebsd.perforce@cyrus.watson.org) Received: from repoman.freebsd.org (repoman.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::29]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 59C4F13C447 for ; Thu, 24 Jan 2008 09:03:42 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bb+lists.freebsd.perforce@cyrus.watson.org) Received: from repoman.freebsd.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by repoman.freebsd.org (8.14.1/8.14.1) with ESMTP id m0O93gCq013781 for ; Thu, 24 Jan 2008 09:03:42 GMT (envelope-from bb+lists.freebsd.perforce@cyrus.watson.org) Received: (from perforce@localhost) by repoman.freebsd.org (8.14.1/8.14.1/Submit) id m0O93gfp013778 for perforce@freebsd.org; Thu, 24 Jan 2008 09:03:42 GMT (envelope-from bb+lists.freebsd.perforce@cyrus.watson.org) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2008 09:03:42 GMT Message-Id: <200801240903.m0O93gfp013778@repoman.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repoman.freebsd.org: perforce set sender to bb+lists.freebsd.perforce@cyrus.watson.org using -f From: Robert Watson To: Perforce Change Reviews Cc: Subject: PERFORCE change 133988 for review X-BeenThere: p4-projects@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: p4 projects tree changes List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2008 09:03:43 -0000 http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=133988 Change 133988 by rwatson@rwatson_freebsd_capabilities on 2008/01/24 09:02:44 Update comments. We now have cap_enter(2) but it needs more work as it doesn't mask sysctls. Affected files ... .. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#6 edit Differences ... ==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#6 (text+ko) ==== @@ -48,17 +48,21 @@ * descriptors and may need adapting. * - UNIX domain socket passing of file descriptors will likely need work, * especially relating to garbage collection. - * - There is currently no way to prevent system calls from accessing objects - * other than via capabilities. * - The list of capability rights is probably inadequate. * - Should there be a privilege to expand capability rights? * - Should different underlying object sets have different valid capability * rights? I.e., CAP_SOCK_*, CAP_VNODE_*, etc? - * - cap_enter(2) is not implemented. + * - Need a way to mask system calls based on capability mode and only allow + * approved system calls. A flag in syscalls.master? + * - Need to refine access control on sysctl infrastructe sysctls, such as + * name lookup. + * - masking in fo_read/fo_write/etc is undesirable because really we want + * only the original file to be used, as it might have state (cred, flags, + * etc) that should be used instead. seekable is a particular issue. */ #include -__FBSDID("$P4: //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#5 $"); +__FBSDID("$P4: //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#6 $"); #include #include