From owner-freebsd-security Fri May 12 2: 9:32 2000 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (critter.freebsd.dk [212.242.40.131]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0701D37BCE4 for ; Fri, 12 May 2000 02:09:28 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from phk@critter.freebsd.dk) Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (localhost.freebsd.dk [127.0.0.1]) by critter.freebsd.dk (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA04228; Fri, 12 May 2000 10:00:12 +0200 (CEST) (envelope-from phk@critter.freebsd.dk) To: Paul Hart Cc: Adam Laurie , freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: envy.vuurwerk.nl daily run output In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 11 May 2000 10:03:38 MDT." Date: Fri, 12 May 2000 10:00:11 +0200 Message-ID: <4226.958118411@critter.freebsd.dk> From: Poul-Henning Kamp Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org In message , Paul Hart writes: >On Thu, 11 May 2000, Adam Laurie wrote: > >> If someone backdoors your system with an authorized key, and is >> confident they can gain root from a luser account, they don't need to >> go any further, and it's extremely likely that the change will go >> unnoticed *forever* > >But if you have hostile local users with root access, can you even trust >the output from /etc/security? Yes, if you put them in a jail(8). -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD coreteam member | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message