From owner-freebsd-security Mon Nov 16 13:03:56 1998 Return-Path: Received: (from majordom@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id NAA09781 for freebsd-security-outgoing; Mon, 16 Nov 1998 13:03:56 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG) Received: from po9.andrew.cmu.edu (PO9.ANDREW.CMU.EDU [128.2.10.109]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id NAA09762 for ; Mon, 16 Nov 1998 13:03:53 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from tcrimi+@andrew.cmu.edu) Received: (from postman@localhost) by po9.andrew.cmu.edu (8.8.5/8.8.2) id QAA19818; Mon, 16 Nov 1998 16:03:17 -0500 (EST) Received: via switchmail; Mon, 16 Nov 1998 16:03:17 -0500 (EST) Received: from unix3.andrew.cmu.edu via qmail ID ; Mon, 16 Nov 1998 16:03:04 -0500 (EST) Received: from unix3.andrew.cmu.edu via qmail ID ; Mon, 16 Nov 1998 16:03:02 -0500 (EST) Received: from mms.4.60.Jun.27.1996.03.02.53.sun4.51.EzMail.2.0.CUILIB.3.45.SNAP.NOT.LINKED.unix3.andrew.cmu.edu.sun4m.54 via MS.5.6.unix3.andrew.cmu.edu.sun4_51; Mon, 16 Nov 1998 16:03:02 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1998 16:03:02 -0500 (EST) From: Thomas Valentino Crimi To: Robert Watson Subject: Re: Would this make FreeBSD more secure? Cc: Terry Lambert , freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG In-Reply-To: References: Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Excerpts from mail: 16-Nov-98 Re: Would this make FreeBSD.. by Robert Watson@cyrus.wats > I don't think I would consider md5 broken exactly. Just subject to > intermittent collisions. Is there a deterministic (and fast) way to > detect whether one is employing a hash subject to the described collision > attack? If so, perhaps we can add a piece of code that attempts a number > of values of salt, resulting in a more friendly hash. (I am also tossing in replys to others on the md5 issue) I'm not sure if I was being too rash, but that statement came from a recollection that pseudo-collisions have been found for md5 a quick search turns up http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/html/3-6-6.html It would seem that it isn't as much of an issue for passwords where long-term security is not an issue, so maybe as a passing comment was a bad idea. I do not, however, fall victim to thinking that as Poul pointed out that I thought the 128-bit keyspace was exhaustable. At most, I was too 'excited' at the pseudo-collisions ;) At the bottom of the same FAQ came the 1994 estimate at an md5 crack, I would wonder if the above information (mostly from 96 and I would imagine more work had been done in the two years since) makes any significant dents in the figure. If not, then I of course retract all statements as to md5 being broken. From my armchair point of view I can't imagine that to be the case, though. To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message