Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 18:50:28 +0000 From: Steve O'Hara-Smith <steve@sohara.org> To: questions@freebsd.org Subject: Re: zero filling a storage device (was: dd and mbr) Message-ID: <20220114185028.b825ed28e179a9e8d6f9141a@sohara.org> In-Reply-To: <20220114191303.171f1cad@archlinux> References: <77680665-7ddb-23c5-e866-05d112339b60@holgerdanske.com> <20220114023002.GP61872@eureka.lemis.com> <YeDryNdYe1S20wd2@neutralgood.org> <YeGXejPepsd4aKiE@lorvorc.mips.inka.de> <523b6b6d-b17c-e632-a36a-a8c26ad61798@qeng-ho.org> <20220114191303.171f1cad@archlinux>
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On Fri, 14 Jan 2022 19:13:03 +0100 Ralf Mardorf <ralf-mardorf@riseup.net> wrote: > Nothing on the operating system side of the SSD's controller (and its > firmware) has got direct access to what's under the hood of the SSD. > Due to wear leveling a SSD much likely keeps a lot of not really erased > sensitive data. This data is not accessible/restoreable without > replacing the firmware by a forensic tool or by an unhappy coincidence, > but replacing firmware is way more likely, than a high-tech lab to > restore secret data and even an unhappy coincidence isn't far too > unlikely. I gather that military specs for deleting really secure data involve thermite. -- Steve O'Hara-Smith <steve@sohara.org>
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