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Date:      Tue, 30 Sep 1997 22:37:16 +0930
From:      Mike Smith <mike@smith.net.au>
To:        Jeremy Lea <reg@shale.csir.co.za>
Cc:        Mike Smith <mike@smith.net.au>, Peter Korsten <peter@grendel.IAEhv.nl>, chat@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Microsoft brainrot (was: r-cmds and DNS and /etc/host.conf) 
Message-ID:  <199709301307.WAA00501@word.smith.net.au>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 30 Sep 1997 10:07:11 %2B0200." <19970930100711.04631@shale.csir.co.za> 

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> > What has to exist is an adequately secure channel whereby the 
> > administrator can connect to the system(s) in question without risking 
> > compromise.  This has to include geek-in-the-middle attacks, password/
> > cookie sniffing, spoofing etc.
...
> How about something like this... I've haven't put much thought into it, but
> it's based on some ideas I've had for a large distributed database that I'm
> currently working on:

[... rampant over-the-top all-singing-and-dancing Java-PGP monstrosity 
     elided ...]

Heck, I think that says it all.

Look; all these ideas have great technical merit, but no commonsense.  
Stop and think for a few seconds about what actually has to be 
achieved in order to make this model work.  Visualise how your design 
would be used in a few different situations, eg. :

 - Single user at home.
 - Server in busy ISP application.
 - Development workstation.
 - Large corp/tertiary network.

Also consider that whatever the interface, it has to work with a 
textmode browser (ie. lynx).

> Use signature signing in PGP (or similar). You (root@foo.bar) generate a set
> of PGP keys for foo, and then proceed to sign the public keys of say
> joe@foo.bar (your own account) and admin@bar. These are your trusted
> administrators (you could implement a hierarchy and groups and access rights
> etc. to various services etc.).

Too complicated to be the only security model.  What's PGP?  "Fred the 
new admin needs to to XYZ, how do we give him permission?"

> Within a Java application, attached to your administrative web pages via
> Javascript,

How do we do this?  Why does it have to be (ack, spit) Java? 

> admin@bar could communicate with the server on foo.bar, asking
> for it's configuration options etc. which it then present in the browser.
> The admin changes these options, and they are passed back to the Java applet
> which generates the necessary magic to sent back to the server, and signs it
> with the admin@bar's secret key (which must be on the browsers machine).

So you can't just use a vanilla browser anyway; it has to have Java and 
enough security holes to run PGP on the local system?  I don't buy it.

> This also has the advantage that it doesn't require a network connection.
> You could design things in such a way that the communication occurred over
> e-mail, by sending a request for, say, a DNS host add form, which is mailed
> back, and then mail the reply.

This is nice, but basically mandates Netscape for forms-enabled email.  

> Just a sketch, I hope that I managed to get this across. Obviously there are
> a lot of details which would have to be sorted out. As you said, the
> interface and the server details are the hard parts.

TBH, even a not-terribly-wonderful encrypted channel between the 
browser and server would be the *only* way that I would accept a 
browser as an adequate interface.

By contrast, the proposed Tcl application method wins in that :

 - It can use any stream encryption for client/server comms (eg. ssh)
 - Tcl is portable to most *nixlike systems, Win32 and the Mac.
 - Client-side processing and dynamic interaction are implicit.

On the downside, it's a lot more work.  So if we can avoid it, that'd 
be Just Wonderful.

Keep brainstorming.  If you can get past these sort of objections, we 
all win.

mike




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