From owner-freebsd-audit Sat Sep 8 19: 7: 8 2001 Delivered-To: freebsd-audit@freebsd.org Received: from obsecurity.dyndns.org (adsl-63-207-60-54.dsl.lsan03.pacbell.net [63.207.60.54]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 90AAB37B401; Sat, 8 Sep 2001 19:07:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: by obsecurity.dyndns.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 207CF66E58; Sat, 8 Sep 2001 19:07:01 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 8 Sep 2001 19:07:00 -0700 From: Kris Kennaway To: "Andrey A. Chernov" Cc: Kris Kennaway , "Todd C. Miller" , Matt Dillon , Jordan Hubbard , security@FreeBSD.ORG, audit@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Fwd: Multiple vendor 'Taylor UUCP' problems. Message-ID: <20010908190700.A5881@xor.obsecurity.org> References: <5.1.0.14.0.20010908153417.0286b4b8@192.168.0.12> <200109082103.f88L3fK29117@earth.backplane.com> <20010908154617.A73143@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908170257.A82082@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908174304.A88816@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909045226.A33654@nagual.pp.ru> <20010908180848.A94567@xor.obsecurity.org> <200109090120.f891KvM14677@xerxes.courtesan.com> <20010908185415.A5619@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909055903.A34519@nagual.pp.ru> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-md5; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="gKMricLos+KVdGMg" Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i In-Reply-To: <20010909055903.A34519@nagual.pp.ru>; from ache@nagual.pp.ru on Sun, Sep 09, 2001 at 05:59:03AM +0400 Sender: owner-freebsd-audit@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk List-ID: List-Archive: (Web Archive) List-Help: (List Instructions) List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG --gKMricLos+KVdGMg Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Sun, Sep 09, 2001 at 05:59:03AM +0400, Andrey A. Chernov wrote: > On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 18:54:15 -0700, Kris Kennaway wrote: > >=20 > > Yeah, thats probably a good change to make. However the uucp > > vulnerability still lets e.g. arbitrary users read/modify uucp spool > > data, create files, access the uucp:dialer devices, etc. >=20 > All you mention is historical old-days uucp subsystem bad 'features', it > is not fool proff and require ethic behaviour of its users. To eliminate > this things main uucp developers must be contacted, because this things > hardly integrated in normal usage flow and can't be deattached easily. >=20 > I.e. it is not FreeBSD security problem but uucp problem (as designed). > All we need is to protect uucp binaries from modifications (via schg). Hmm. These flaws in the UUCP suite need to be documented, then. I'm also very uneasy at having a local root exploited foiled only by the setting of UFS file flags (mostly because of the NFS-mounted /usr case). I think it's finally time to make UUCP into a port: I'll work on that later tonight. Kris --gKMricLos+KVdGMg Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQE7ms7EWry0BWjoQKURAuC3AJ4pcRUxdoH5eLUPbjARvB8kaTJr+wCg1gnG fbpUR2H4kCFObrb4Am7Nb/M= =i5+C -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --gKMricLos+KVdGMg-- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-audit" in the body of the message