Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2011 14:10:37 +0100 From: =?iso-8859-2?Q?Edward_Tomasz_Napiera=B3a?= <trasz@FreeBSD.org> To: Andrey Chernov <ache@FreeBSD.ORG> Cc: src-committers@FreeBSD.ORG, Xin LI <delphij@gmail.com>, John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.ORG>, svn-src-all@FreeBSD.ORG, svn-src-head@FreeBSD.ORG, Colin Percival <cperciva@FreeBSD.ORG>, Kostik Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com>, Alexander Kabaev <kabaev@gmail.com> Subject: Re: svn commit: r228843 - head/contrib/telnet/libtelnet head/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/libtelnet head/include head/lib/libc/gen head/lib/libc/iconv head/lib/libc/include head/lib/libc/net head/libexec... Message-ID: <8E5EE6FA-7BA1-4590-843A-F5C3C0493E5B@FreeBSD.org> In-Reply-To: <20111224105045.GA11127@vniz.net> References: <201112231500.pBNF0c0O071712@svn.freebsd.org> <201112231058.46642.jhb@freebsd.org> <201112231122.34436.jhb@freebsd.org> <20111223120644.75fe944d@kan.dyndns.org> <20111223175143.GJ50300@deviant.kiev.zoral.com.ua> <20111224100509.GA98136@vniz.net> <CAGMYy3s4YM-j165o9p%2BEDgMf0%2BaJq7gKj5yR=LK8_yfECnbtog@mail.gmail.com> <20111224103948.GA10939@vniz.net> <CAGMYy3vUMUi0ajADs2AdVRPfWQShmjfXDHfrKTFBmHGiNTWPFA@mail.gmail.com> <20111224105045.GA11127@vniz.net>
next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
Wiadomo=B6=E6 napisana przez Andrey Chernov w dniu 24 gru 2011, o godz. = 11:50: > On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 02:45:21AM -0800, Xin LI wrote: >> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 2:39 AM, Andrey Chernov <ache@freebsd.org> = wrote: >>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 02:26:20AM -0800, Xin LI wrote: >>>> chroot(2) can create legitimate and secure environment where = dlopen(2) >>>> is safe and necessary. >>>=20 >>> Yes, so ischroot() check can be used only into that places where = libc's >>> libc_dlopen() currently used, i.e. placed into libc_dlopen() itself. >>=20 >> So it's Okay to break NSS in chroot jail? >=20 > We need general solution. We simple can't count all possible and = future=20 > ftpd's arround the world and insert = __FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode()=20 > into them. I even not mention other programs that may use chroot() = too. If=20 > some component like auth is critical for chroot, it should be = restricted=20 > in general scope. How about adding a check in dlopen(3) to make sure the file being opened is owned either by us (getuid(3)) or root and is not writable by anyone = else?=
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?8E5EE6FA-7BA1-4590-843A-F5C3C0493E5B>