From owner-freebsd-arch@FreeBSD.ORG Wed Feb 4 06:01:42 2004 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-arch@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B479E16A4DF for ; Wed, 4 Feb 2004 06:01:40 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.des.no (flood.des.no [217.116.83.31]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFA3A43D1D for ; Wed, 4 Feb 2004 06:01:38 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: by smtp.des.no (Pony Express, from userid 666) id A357F5308; Wed, 4 Feb 2004 15:01:37 +0100 (CET) Received: from dwp.des.no (des.no [80.203.228.37]) by smtp.des.no (Pony Express) with ESMTP id 746CB5310; Wed, 4 Feb 2004 15:01:31 +0100 (CET) Received: by dwp.des.no (Postfix, from userid 2602) id 572D633C6A; Wed, 4 Feb 2004 15:01:31 +0100 (CET) To: Poul-Henning Kamp References: <29979.1075898861@critter.freebsd.dk> From: des@des.no (Dag-Erling =?iso-8859-1?q?Sm=F8rgrav?=) Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2004 15:01:31 +0100 In-Reply-To: <29979.1075898861@critter.freebsd.dk> (Poul-Henning Kamp's message of "Wed, 04 Feb 2004 13:47:41 +0100") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.090024 (Oort Gnus v0.24) Emacs/21.3 (berkeley-unix) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.63 (2004-01-11) on flood.des.no X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, hits=0.0 required=5.0 tests=AWL autolearn=no version=2.63 cc: arch@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Resolving the crypto duplicity... X-BeenThere: freebsd-arch@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussion related to FreeBSD architecture List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2004 14:01:42 -0000 Poul-Henning Kamp writes: > I would like to propose that we try to eliminate the private copies > of crypto functions in sys/opencrypto and instead focus on the > copies in src/crypto as our "generic" implementations. > > Are there any technical or political reasons why we should not do this ? I'm not sure how well-tested the KAME code is. For instance, until recently, src/sys/crypto/md5.c used a static buffer as temporary storage on big-endian systems, making it non-reentrant. DES --=20 Dag-Erling Sm=F8rgrav - des@des.no