Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 03:25:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r361022 - head/usr.sbin/certctl Message-ID: <202005140325.04E3PCwA050250@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: kevans Date: Thu May 14 03:25:12 2020 New Revision: 361022 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/361022 Log: certctl(8): don't completely nuke $CERTDESTDIR It's been reported/noted that a well-timed `certctl rehash` will completely obliterate $CERTDESTDIR, which may get used by ports or system administrators. While we can't guarantee the certctl semantics when other non-certctl-controlled bits live here, we should make some amount of effort to play nice. Pruning all existing links, which we'll subsequently rebuild as needed, is sufficient for our needs. This can still be destructive, but it's perhaps less likely to cause issues. I also note that we should probably be pruning /etc/ssl/blacklisted upon rehash as well. Reported by: cem's dovecot server MFC after: 3 days Modified: head/usr.sbin/certctl/certctl.sh Modified: head/usr.sbin/certctl/certctl.sh ============================================================================== --- head/usr.sbin/certctl/certctl.sh Thu May 14 03:01:23 2020 (r361021) +++ head/usr.sbin/certctl/certctl.sh Thu May 14 03:25:12 2020 (r361022) @@ -142,9 +142,11 @@ do_list() cmd_rehash() { - [ $NOOP -eq 0 ] && rm -rf "$CERTDESTDIR" - [ $NOOP -eq 0 ] && mkdir -p "$CERTDESTDIR" - [ $NOOP -eq 0 ] && mkdir -p "$BLACKLISTDESTDIR" + if [ $NOOP -eq 0 ]; then + [ -e "$CERTDESTDIR" ] && find "$CERTDESTDIR" -type link -delete + mkdir -p "$CERTDESTDIR" + mkdir -p "$BLACKLISTDESTDIR" + fi do_scan create_blacklisted "$BLACKLISTPATH" do_scan create_trusted_link "$TRUSTPATH"
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