From nobody Tue Jan 27 20:55:07 2026 X-Original-To: freebsd-current@mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4f0yNG00vkz6QQHq for ; Tue, 27 Jan 2026 20:55:25 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from pmh@hausen.com) Received: from mail2.pluspunkthosting.de (mail2.pluspunkthosting.de [217.29.33.228]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4f0yNF2YjMz3fKk for ; Tue, 27 Jan 2026 20:55:25 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from pmh@hausen.com) Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org; none Received: from smtpclient.apple (87.138.185.145) by mail2.pluspunkthosting.de (Axigen) with (ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 encrypted) ESMTPSA id 1F19A8; Tue, 27 Jan 2026 21:55:18 +0100 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii List-Id: Discussions about the use of FreeBSD-current List-Archive: https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/freebsd-current List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.org Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 16.0 \(3864.300.41.1.7\)) Subject: Re: we should enable RFC7217 by default From: "Patrick M. Hausen" In-Reply-To: <39a63487-ee9a-4792-a787-d476ae6f6a0c@plan-b.pwste.edu.pl> Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 21:55:07 +0100 Cc: freebsd-current@freebsd.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: References: <9cda2fbc-b8fb-44d1-8c1f-88395d741af7@FreeBSD.org> <0f5fcd3d-b189-49f5-ac81-d4fb48d90a77@FreeBSD.org> <39a63487-ee9a-4792-a787-d476ae6f6a0c@plan-b.pwste.edu.pl> To: Marek Zarychta X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3864.300.41.1.7) X-Spamd-Bar: ---- X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-4.00 / 15.00]; REPLY(-4.00)[]; ASN(0.00)[asn:16188, ipnet:217.29.32.0/20, country:DE] X-Rspamd-Pre-Result: action=no action; module=replies; Message is reply to one we originated X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 4f0yNF2YjMz3fKk HI all, Am 27.01.2026 um 21:46 schrieb Marek Zarychta = : > To narrow the impact, I suggest switching to the MAC address as the = default key source instead of the interface name. If I read the relevant RFC correctly the main argument for stable = addresses in contrast to traditional EUI-64 is the narrowing of the search space in sweep scan = attacks. Because the OUIs which make up half of the order of magnitude are well = known. Isn't that the case, too, if we start with the MAC address and the hash = algorithm by which the final address is generated is public? Kind regards, Patrick=